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The new terrain of increasing interaction between national and supranational legal 
systems within the European Union presents new challenges for conventional 
approaches to police accountability and transparency. Each EU Member State is 
responsible for policing within its jurisdiction, and the EU institutions are increasingly 
responsible for enhancing the conduct of police cooperation between the Member 
States. The thesis explores the challenges of reconciling national approaches in the 
international sphere by conducting a critical analysis of ‘how and to what extent 
national legal and administrative norms on police accountability and transparency are 
informing the concept, design and operation of EU cross-border policing instruments’.  
 
Building on the work of Peter K. Manning, Geoffrey Marshall and David Bayley 
amongst others, the thesis develops a pragmatic typology of police accountability 
through which to view the evolution and adequacy of national and supranational 
approaches. The typology contains three key dimensions, namely codes, co-option 
and complaint. Using the typology to critique conventional approaches in the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark, the thesis identifies legal and procedural anomalies and 
challenges at both the national and supranational level since the traditional elements 
of police accountability were originally formulated within the confines of national 
legal, political, historical and cultural constraints. 
 
Employing the typology to both elucidate problems and suggest methods of 
internalisation, the thesis argues that the EU should follow the lead of the Member 
States’ legislatures by seeking to regulate a wider range of policing processes through 
more expansive procedural ‘codes’ which facilitate police discretion and co-option. 
The thesis shows that it is not sufficient for the EU to prioritise its post-Lisbon policy 
of ‘co-decision’ in order to remedy its democratic deficits but that it must oversee the 
establishment and enhancement of parliamentary committees, inspectorates and other 
oversight bodies in the interest of police accountability. A number of 
recommendations are made for police reform at both the national and supranational 
levels to this end. More particularly, the research indicates that additional treaty 
changes are needed beyond the Lisbon Treaty in order to adequately reconcile 
national and supranational approaches to police accountability. 
 
I am grateful to the Irish Research Council for supporting this research by the award 
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The European Union’s relentless development of procedural instruments and 
frameworks for police cooperation is unprecedented and appears to suggest that a 
paradigm shift has occurred towards more enlightened, cosmopolitan thinking about 
issues of sovereignty, cross-border policing and police accountability in Europe. It can 
be anticipated that the development of common transnational measures and the 
challenges that they raise have been met by drawing upon and reconciling the 
Member States’ long-standing national approaches to police accountability which are 
rooted in constitutional, legal and administrative traditions and values. However no 
major academic studies have been carried out to determine the precise effect of the 
emerging EU regime, partly because the EU competency is relatively new, complex 
and continuously evolving.  
 
The thesis explores the precise nature of the EU cross-border policing project and, 
more particularly, critically analyses ‘how and to what extent national legal and 
administrative norms on police accountability and transparency are informing the 
concept, design and operation of EU cross-border policing instruments’? The thesis 
will show that the EU regime has introduced a number of cross-border policing 
measures without making appropriate accommodation for police accountability. Due 
largely to the EU’s lack of concern for police accountability many of its measures are 
considered to be unworkable and superficial by police officers while its policy 
officials have been allowed to prioritise political ambition over practical needs. The 
thesis draws upon national approaches and international best practice to mould 
constructs which could theoretically enhance the transparency and accountability of 




As a point of departure, the analysis requires a basic understanding of police 
accountability so that national and supranational approaches can be consistently 
analysed and evaluated. To clear the ground around the concept of police 
accountability the thesis draws together extant academic literature and policy 
documents to develop a pragmatic typology or hypothesis of police accountability 
which can be applied to the national and supranational policing systems. The thesis 
will use the literature review to show that there is no extant conceptualisation or 
theory of police accountability which adequately captures the range of factors, 
phenomena and distinctive characteristics of the scientific object. More particularly, it 
will argue that major police reforms in recent years have rendered popular definitions 
of police accountability outdated as they are rooted in more traditional legal and 
administrative processes and perceptions. Following the development of the 
hypothetical framework the thesis will strive to give definition to the shape and form 
of the emerging EU project before proceeding to conduct the primary critical 
analyses. 
 
Chapters 1 to 5 are concerned primarily with the application of the hypothetical 
framework of police accountability to national and supranational policing systems. 
Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the comparative analysis of a select number of 
jurisdictions, namely England (and Wales), Ireland and Denmark, in order to test the 
soundness of the typology and, most importantly, to elucidate the similarities and 
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differences in approaches to police accountability between the respective 
jurisdictions. The typology of police accountability elucidated within the literature 
review’ contains three primary dimensions, namely ‘codes’, ‘co-option’ and 
‘complaint’. Chapter 1 will focus on the issues of codes and co-option and Chapter 2 
will focus on the dimension of complaint on the national level. The comparative 
analysis will show that there is a significant degree of commonality across the 
respective jurisdictions due largely to a culture of ‘knowledge transfer’ between 
national policing systems. Subsequently, Chapters 3 to 5 are concerned with applying 
the typology to the maturing EU regime for cross-border police cooperation. The 
EU’s approaches and deficiencies will be considered in light of comparable national 




A number of key publications address various aspects of police accountability within 
the modern nation-state but none have striven to critically analyse the philosophy of 
police accountability in Europe from either a national or a broad transnational 
perspective. Geoffrey Marshall’s Police and Government, published in 1965, and 
Laurence Lustgarten’s work on The Governance of Police both focused acutely on 
political oversight and control of police forces in the UK at the expense of tangential 
legal and internal mechanisms of accountability.
1
 More recently, PAJ Waddington’s 
compendium on Policing Citizens represented a modern analysis of various 
dimensions of police governance but with specific regard to protest policing and 
public order maintenance over and above the accountability of other areas of public 
policing such as counter-terrorism.
2
 Steven Savage’s Police Reform, published in 
2006, paid acute attention to political and managerial forms of accountability, 
focusing in particular on recent policy drivers such as privatisation, marketization and 
new public management as well as contextual drivers such as globalization but left 
other areas of police accountability largely untended, particularly systems of 




Beggs and Davies’ recent compendium on Police Misconduct, Complaints and Public 
Regulation in England suffers the opposite problem. It largely re-produces the extant 
disciplinary and performance codes of conduct in order to elucidate and explain the 
internal, external and legal mechanisms of accountability but without addressing 
parliamentary oversight.
4
 Reiner and Spencer’s Accountable Policing is one of the 
few edited collections on the distinct subject of police accountability but like the 
aforementioned unitary publications it too adopts a narrow focus, examining the issue 
of political control in light of the new public management strategies adopted by the 
UK government in the 1990s.
5
 Similarly, Samuel Walker’s The New World of Police 
Accountability outlines a number of management reforms introduced since the 1990s 
to hold police organisations more accountable for the conduct of their officers but it 
                                                 
1 Geoffrey Marshall, Police and Government: The Status and Accountability of the English Constable 
(Methuen London 1965); Laurence Lustgarten, The Governance of Police (London Sweet and Maxwell 
1986) 
2 
PAJ Waddington, Policing Citizens (Routledge 1999) 
3 
Steven Savage, Police Reform (OUP 2007) 
4 
John Begg and Hugh Davis, Police Misconduct, Complaints and Public Regulation (OUP 2009) 
5 
Robert Reiner and Sarah Spencer (eds), Accountable Policing (Institute for Public Policy Research 
1993) 
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focuses particularly on performance targets and efficiency rather than local and 




Dermot Walsh’s The Irish Police is one of the few seminal publications to 
comprehensively address the issue of police accountability in its entirety within a 
single jurisdiction. Walsh’s volume thoroughly examines the mechanisms of police 
accountability, covering issues of internal disciplinary accountability, external civilian 
review, legal accountability, democratic accountability and concomitant axioms of 
police discretion, operational independence and democratic constitutionalism.
7
 Neil 
Walker’s Policing in a Changing Constitutional Order is the English publication most 
comparable to Walsh’s jurisdiction-specific approach but it focuses predominantly on 
one area of police accountability, namely political control largely at the expense of 




Other seminal books which strive to provide an overview of public policing within a 
single jurisdiction such as Whitaker’s The Police in Society, Brady’s Guardians of the 
Peace, Emsley’s The English Police and Conway’s Policing 20th Century Ireland tend 
to take a historical perspective and a descriptive approach to policing and the police 
function rather than engaging in a specific analysis of police accountability.
9
 Taking a 
more comparative approach to the issues of police governance and accountability, 
David Bayley’s Patterns of Policing examined the peculiar management structures, 
functions and political oversight of police forces across Europe, North America and 
Asia but without focusing intimately on modes of legal and disciplinary 
accountability.
10
 In contrast, Maurice Punch’s more recent Police Corruption 
addressed matters of disciplinary and legal accountability in the context of police 
deviance and the handling of police corruption across the UK, North America and the 
Netherlands throughout the 20
th
 and early 21
st
 Centuries but without attending to 
mechanisms of local or democratic accountability.
11
 Peter K Manning conveyed in 
2012 that although the problem of police accountability remains widely discussed it is 




Conceptualizing a framework of police accountability 
 
Peter K Manning suggests that there is a marked reluctance within academia to 
habitually define police accountability due to the perceived complexity of the subject 
matter.
13
 He observes that, instead of engaging with the subject of police 
accountability, academics prefer instead to colour their commentaries on various 
                                                 
6
 Samuel Walker, The New World of Police Accountability (Sage 2005) 
7
 Dermot Walsh, The Irish Police: A legal and constitutional perspective (Roundhall Sweet and 
Maxwell 1998) 
8
 Neil Walker, Policing in a Changing Constitutional Order (Sweet and Maxwell 2000) 
9
 Ben Whitaker, The Police in Society (Eyre Methuen London 1979); Conor Brady, Guardians of the 
Peace (Gill and Macmillan 1974); Clive Emsley, The English Police: A Political and Social History 
(2nd edn, Longman London 1996); Vicky Conway, Policing Twentieth Century Ireland (Routledge 
2014) 
10
 David Bayley, Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis (Rutgers University Press 
1985) 
11 
Maurice Punch, Police Corruption: Deviance, accountability and reform in Policing (Routledge 
2009) 
12 
Peter K Manning, ‘Trust and Accountability in Ireland: The case of An Garda Siochana’ (2012) 22: 3 
Policing and Society 347 
13 
Peter K Manning, Democratic Policing in a Changing World (Paradigm Publishers 2010) 23 - 37 
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dimensions of police work by inserting the term as a flattering but largely abstract 
adjective.
14
 For Lustgarten, the term ‘police accountability’ is usually employed as a 
‘weasel word’.15 He argues that what is usually at issue is the degree of control over 
the police that the public and its political representatives have and, more particularly, 




Elucidating the meaning of ‘police accountability’, Bayley argues convincingly that 
control and accountability are symbiotic in a policing context since the terms are 
largely interchangeable when applied to the public policing system since both refer to 
processes which aim to bring the behaviour of the police into conformity with the 
requirements and demands of society.
17
 He conveys that the symbiosis of control and 
accountability is exemplified not least by the hierarchical police organisation which 
exists to issue daily instructions to its members, to keep them under regular 
supervision and to maintain a constant, rigorous and uniform military-style of 
discipline.
18
 Reiner observes that it is because of the connotations of control that 




However Bittner points out that although control and accountability mean much the 
same thing in a policing context both words can have different connotations and 
applications.
20
 He notes that the idea of ‘control’ can be used to suggest an onus on 
police supervisors for the quality of direction and supervision from the top-down 
whereas the concept of accountability is often used to imply that responsibility for 
police behaviour lays primarily at the feet of the police officer in the first instance, 
potentially alleviating the supervisor of blame depending on their ability to divert 
responsibility elsewhere.
21
 Bittner warns that the use of the term ‘accountability’ risks 
placing the onus squarely on police officers to account for their actions post factum 
instead of holding senior police administrators responsible for the degree of 




Stenning has since attempted to theoretically separate control and accountability. He 
argues that some professions can have accountability without control such as the 
medical and teaching professions, the judiciary and even private policing, which tend 
to afford their members a degree of autonomy coupled with a high degree of 
answerability.
23
 However he ultimately concluded that such a distinction could not be 
made in a public policing context due largely to the presence of the hierarchical 
bureaucratic system of command.
24
 Many pre-eminent authorities, not least JQ 
Wilson, Albert J Reiss, Samuel Walker and David Bayley, have found that ‘police 
professionalism’ does not equate to the more traditional ‘professional status’ 
                                                 
14
 ibid 23 - 37 
15
 Laurence Lustgarten, The Governance of Police (Sweet and Maxwell 1986) 1, 2 
16
 ibid 1, 2 
17 
Bayley (n10) 160 
18
 ibid 160 
19 
Robert Reiner ‘Counting the Coppers: Antinomies of Accountability in Policing’ in Philip C 
Stenning (ed), Accountability for Criminal Justice (University of Toronto Press 1995) 75 - 85 
20
 Egon Bittner ‘Legality and Workmanship’ in Maurice Punch (ed) Control in the Police Organisation 
(MIT Press 1983) 3 - 7 
21
 ibid 3 - 7 
22
 ibid 3 - 7 
23
 Philip Stenning (ed), Accountability for Criminal Justice (University of Toronto Press 1995) 5 – 7 
24
 ibid 5 – 7 
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bestowed upon the medical and teaching professions due largely to the fact that the 
most ‘professional’ police departments are those in which junior officers are subjected 
to the highest degree of supervision.
25
 Differentiating ‘police professionalism’ from 
‘the professions’ is the feature of ‘control’ which is considered to be a central 
component of ‘police professionalism’ because of the likelihood of police deviance 
coupled with the proven inability of police managers to self-regulate their 
subordinates.
26
 This issue will be explored in significant depth in Chapter 2. 
 
Accountability, to all intents and purposes, has colloquial connotations of the simple 
conveyance of answers or accounts. The Sage Dictionary of Policing 2009 holds that 
police accountability requires police officers and the institutions to which they belong 
to explain, justify and answer for their conduct through internal, external and political 
mechanisms which apply the rule of law, due process and human rights protections.
27
 
Similarly the United Nations Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and 
Integrity 2011 defines police accountability as a system of internal and external 
checks and balances aimed at ensuring that police carry out their duties properly and 
are held responsible if they fail to do so.
28
 More particularly, it explains that internal 
police accountability should be premised predominantly on strong leadership, 
supervision, evaluation and the independent oversight of complaints.
29
 It holds that 
legal accountability should operate in full accordance with the rule of law and that 




The Routledge Dictionary of Policing 2008 is notable for its focus on some of the 
more thorny issues of police accountability, particularly the need for mechanisms of 
individual, legal and local accountability to capture the wrongdoing of the ‘individual’ 
as well as broader mechanisms to scrutinise the ‘policy’ institution.31 Similar issues 
are reflected in the pre-eminent Council of Europe Code on Police Ethics 2001. 
Although the Code on Police Ethics does not strive to define police accountability it 
advocates the delivery of police accountability through independent administrative 
complaints mechanisms, independent legal processes in the civil and criminal courts 
and through the elected representatives of government.
32
 Likewise, it conveys that the 
police, when performing police duties in civil society, should be under the 
responsibility of civilian authorities and that it must always be possible to challenge 





A number of common strands can be deduced from the various definitions. The need 
for clearly discernible mechanisms of complaint and inquiry across internal, external, 
legal, local, political and democratic modes is obvious. Moreover, the importance of 
the rule of law, due process and human rights protections are also touched upon. 
                                                 
25 
James Q Wilson, Varieties of Police Behaviour (Harvard University Press 1968) 29, 30; Bayley (n10) 




Alison Wakefield and Jenny Fleming (eds), The Sage Dictionary of Policing (Sage 2009) 1 
28 
United Nations, Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and Integrity (Criminal Justice 
Handbook Series 2011) 5 - 19 
29




Tim Newburn and Peter Neyroud (eds), Dictionary of Policing (Routledge 2008) 1 - 3 
32
 Council of Europe, The European Code on Police Ethics (Rec [2001]10) 59 - 62 
33
 ibid 8 – 15, 59 - 62 
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However the various definitions are extremely vague, without pinpointing the precise 
form, application and mechanisms for the delivery of police accountability in practice. 
For instance, the Code on Police Ethics vaguely enumerates a number of long 
standing policing principles, not least the proviso that the police should enjoy 
sufficient operational independence from other State bodies in carrying out its given 
police tasks for which it should be fully accountable but it does not attempt to 
comprehensively tie such concepts together to form a basic concept of police 
accountability.
34
 Similarly, the UN Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight 
and Integrity 2011 covers numerous issues ranging from the need for legislation 
which specifies police processes and powers to the need for the public to be able to 
voice their concerns through robust mechanisms of internal, legal and democratic 
accountability but it does not attempt to link the two distinct recommendations.
35
 
Reiner suggests that it is due in part to this lack of clarity and legal precision that no 
jurisdiction appears to be satisfied that it has established adequate structures and 
processes to comprehensively deliver police accountability in practice.
36
 Similarly, 
Manning stated in 2010 that, because of relatively scant attention from policy makers 
and academics, the mechanisms of police accountability remain conceptually 
ambiguous and poorly conceived, leaving them ‘in every way weak, erstwhile and 
ineffectual’.37 
 
The lack of clarity apparently emanates in part from the fact that there is no one 
mechanism for police accountability.
38
 Far from being a mere tautology, the concept 
of police accountability is complicated by the fact that different types of complaint or 
inquiry are made in different environments and require different considerations and 
outcomes.
39
 As Walsh eloquently conveys, police accountability is concerned with 
multiple processes and procedures through which police policies, strategies, practices, 
acts and omissions can be questioned with a view to securing redress for harm done or 
to effect change.
40
 Samuel Walker draws an uneven line between individual action 
and policy matters, explaining that holding officers to account for the quality of their 
individual actions and holding agencies accountable for the quality of service are not 
one and the same, often requiring very different processes.
41
 However Reiner and 
Spencer observe that, although different mechanisms exist to address the relatively 
distinct matters of individual officer decision-making on the street and the wider issue 
of general policy decision-making by police management, policy decisions will 





Broadly speaking, the various mechanisms of complaint and inquiry can be condensed 
into three largely distinct environments through which complaints and inquiries about 
police conduct can be addressed. The various dimensions can be loosely conceived as 




 UN (n28) iv, v, 5 – 9, 77 - 79 
36
 Reiner (n19) 75 
37
 Manning (n13) 15 
38
 Bayley (n10) 171 
39 
Peter K Manning, Police Work (MIT Press 1977) 13 - 15 
40 
Dermot PJ Walsh, Human Rights and Policing in Ireland (Clarus Press 2009) 307 
41 
Walker (n6)7, 8 
42 
Reiner and Spencer (n5)1 - 14 
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disciplinary, legal and democratic.
43
 ‘Disciplinary accountability’ pertains to the role 
of the modern hierarchical police organisation which exists partly for the purposes of 
ensuring that police officers behave in a disciplined manner so that breaches of the 
procedural codes or the criminal law are negated to the greatest extent possible. The 
internal hierarchy of senior police officers, administrators and managers play a key 
role in not only supervising, amending and sanctioning the conduct of police officers 
but, most importantly, handling complaints made by members of the public about 
officer conduct. Within the rubric of disciplinary accountability the internal 
administrative system has been augmented in recent years by mechanisms of external 
independent civilian oversight and investigation in order to engender greater 
transparency and objectivity in the disciplinary process. 
 
The realm of ‘legal accountability’ refers primarily to the role of the criminal and civil 
courts in holding police officers to account for their actions or omissions in 
accordance with the rule of law. Police officers who overstep their unique powers of 
arrest, search and seizure and detention should, according to the rule of law, be 
subjected to the full force of the criminal law in a fashion no different to civilians to 
ensure that they do not abuse their position of privilege and authority. Separately, 
‘democratic accountability’ is normatively provided by forums which typically exist 
within the national parliament and increasingly at regional and community levels 
which facilitate the airing of complaints, concerns, questions and simple 
misunderstandings by members of the public about the propriety of police actions or 
omissions. The mechanisms of democratic accountability should ensure that political 
representatives take steps to amend the conduct of the police force through the 
conveyance of advice, the issuance of directions or even the establishment of new 
regulatory or statutory standards.
44
 Stenning observes that police scandals are 
invariably followed by public demands of parliament to introduce new legislative 
formulas and procedural codes that serve to limit police powers and behaviour as well 





Marshall explains that accountability should ultimately entail a boundless capacity to 
require information and answers from an ‘explanatory and cooperative’ police force 
across all of the mechanisms of complaint and inquiry.
46
 The Patten Commission 
conveys that it is necessary to maintain robust, transparent and effective mechanisms 
across the respective areas so that a police force can be held accountable in a 
relatively fulsome manner.
47
 Reiner states that the ability of the mechanisms of 
accountability to consistently deliver across each of the various dimensions in 





                                                 
43 
Dermot PJ Walsh, The Irish Police: A legal and constitutional perspective (Roundhall Sweet and 
Maxwell 1998) xv 
44
 Patten Commission, A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland (The Report of the Independent 
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland 1999) 22 
45
 Stenning (n23) 3 - 5 
46 
Geoffrey Marshall, ‘Police Accountability Revisited’ (1978) in Tim Newburn (ed), Policing: Key 
Readings (Routledge 2005) 633 
47
 Patten Commission (n44) 22 
48 
Robert Reiner, Politics of the Police (Whitsheaf Books 1985) xii – 4,  51, 52, 181 
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However cases can be made against the colloquial and analytical accuracy of the 
terminology of ‘disciplinary accountability’, ‘legal accountability’ and ‘democratic 
accountability’. There are no firmly established labels for the three areas due largely 
to the diverse nature and form of the actual mechanisms which exist within them. The 
‘disciplinary’ dimension is frequently denoted by the alternative terms of internal, 
administrative, managerial or organisational accountability amongst others.
49
 The 
label of ‘internal accountability’ was relatively popular throughout the late 20th 
Century but the more recent arrival of ‘external civilian oversight’ has undermined the 
sufficiency of the term as a label of substance. Similarly, although the concept of 
‘legal accountability’ is perhaps the most stable of the terms it is often supplanted by 
the terms criminal, civil and judicial accountability. The use of the term ‘legal’ is not 
without its flaws either since the disciplinary and democratic mechanisms of 
accountability are propagated by legal instruments and standards. The quality and 
effectiveness of the regulatory and statutory standards underpinning all of the 
mechanisms of accountability could theoretically be evaluated under a broad 
interpretation of ‘legal accountability’. On the other hand, the idea of judicial 
accountability appears even less suitable due to the implication that one may be 
speaking about the accountability of the judges themselves. 
 
Similar arguments can be made about the ‘democratic’ dimension of police 
accountability. The label is often replaced by terms such as political, public, popular, 
community, local, national and central accountability since each of the terms denote 
rules and processes which generally have their origins in the political will of civil 
society.
50
 In a similar fashion to the interpretative flexibility of the concept of legal 
accountability, Reiner conveys that almost all forms of police work in constitutional 
democracies can be considered to be democratic, political, public or popular since the 
statutory offences that the police enforce and the manner in which they enforce them 





The three dimensions of disciplinary, legal and democratic accountability clearly play 
a central role in the delivery of police accountability but they are conceptually flexible 
and beset with overlapping applications. More particularly, the three dimensions are 
not conducive to evaluating legal standards such as the rule of law and human rights 
protections which should guide such mechanisms. The issue of legal standards and 
human rights protections could potentially be discussed under one or all of the labels 
with some creative interpretation, covering the same organisational, judicial and 
political issues. Instead of structuring the thesis entirely around the traditional 
dimensions of police accountability, a rudimentary typology developed by Robert 
Reiner in 1985 for the purposes of legislative analysis appears at face value to be 
concerned with capturing the pertinent issues in a more precise manner.  
 
Reiner’s particular typology essentially conveyed that policing legislation, particularly 
the Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act 1984, must serve ‘constitutional’, 
                                                 
49 
Maurice Punch, Police Corruption: Deviance, accountability and reform in Policing (Routledge 
2009) 200 
50 
Ben Bowling and Janet Foster, ‘Policing and the Police’ in Mike Maguire et al (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Criminology (3rd edn, OUP 2002) 1016 - 1018 
51
 Reiner (n48) 2, 17, 182 
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‘cooptive’ and ‘communicative’ functions.52 The ‘constitutional’ dimension holds that 
policing legislation must respect the rule of law and the values and norms of due 
process. The ‘cooptive’ function demands that legislation must take account of the 
working practices and cultural values of police officers which ultimately determine 
the nature of their engagement with legal rules and norms. Lastly, the 
‘communicative’ dimension holds that new procedural rules must be subjected to 




Although Reiner’s typology was designed for the purposes of legislative analysis, it 
appears to address the primary issues of ‘police accountability’ in modern society, 
namely who should be required to give accounts, about what and to whom. The 
analytical device effectively encourages academics and legislators to consider the 
‘ends’ of law using three separate lenses. The first requirement is to focus on the legal 
precision and constitutionality of procedural statutes. The second requirement is to 
address the challenges of co-option and the final prerequisite is to accommodate 
communicative mechanisms for complaint and inquiry. The typology is designed as a 
cyclical process, moving from complaint back to legislative action as problems are 
identified and remedied.  
 
Further academic support for the development and application of such an approach 
can also be found in the works of Manning and Maguire. Manning observes that 
police forces typically struggle with their political neutrality across three 
interconnected levels.
54
 The first area concerns their statutory mandate or code which 
is defined according to political values and ends.
55
 The second concern is that their 
conduct or culture may be coloured by systemic prejudice against minority or 
marginalised social groupings.
56
 The final political influence lies in the degree and 
nature of their accountability to local or national political authorities.
57
 To a similar 
extent, Maguire conveys that the drawing up of a more prescriptive code of conduct, 
the improved supervision of police conduct and the establishment of effective systems 
of complaint and inquiry at the national level are the three strategies advocated most 




It is anticipated that the delineation of the constituent issues could help to clarify the 
issue of police accountability to a much greater extent. Instead of gearing the critical 
analysis wholly around the dimensions of disciplinary, legal and democratic 
accountability, it appears that it would be more prudent to separate out the 
components of statutory procedural law, co-option and complaint. In other words, the 
basic mechanisms of disciplinary, legal and democratic accountability will be 
considered as the final elements of a broader cyclical process of police accountability. 
The cyclical nature of the typology, which encourages legislative action on foot of 
relevant complaints, also appears to be more attuned to the ethos of police 
accountability. As Kleinig conveys, police accountability should not be considered as 
                                                 
52




Mike Maguire ‘Complaints against the Police’ in Andrew Goldsmith (ed) Complaints Against the 
Police (Clarendon Press 1991) 178, 179 
55






 Maguire (n54) 178, 179 
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a normative demand that can be made but should be thought of as a structural 





Recasting Reiner’s rudimentary framework to focus on the issue of police 
accountability the thesis will proceed to examine the quality of police accountability 
using the lenses of ‘codes’, ‘co-option’ and ‘complaint’. ‘Codes’ effectively 
represents the legislative rules, standards and human-rights protections against which 
police policies, strategies, acts and omissions can be measured. ‘Co-option’ represents 
the invariable gap between legal statutes and practice, capturing cultural, judicial, 
political and administrative influences such as police discretion. The last limb, 
communicative ‘complaint’, effectively represents the role and function of signalling 
mechanisms for redress and improvement, specifically those designed to deliver 
accountability in the disciplinary, legal and democratic fora. Where the extant 
definitions of police accountability are ambiguous and piecemeal, the analysis aims to 
be clear, cohesive and rigorous. 
 
The dimensions of EU cross-border policing 
 
Like the literature on police accountability, the evolving EU regime on police 
cooperation suffers a similar dearth of comprehensive conceptual analyses not only in 
the area of police accountability but across other areas of policing more generally. 
There are no more than half a dozen major texts which seek to substantively address 
the EU cross-border policing regime. Malcolm Anderson’s Policing the World 
provided a pretext in 1989 by analysing multilateral, regional and bilateral forms of 
police cooperation across Europe and America at a time when the EU project was still 
only an abstract, embryonic subject.
60
 Ethan Nadelmann’s Cops across Borders, 
published in 1993, subsequently evaluated cross-border police cooperation through an 
acutely biased American lens, focusing particularly on the relationship between the 
US police institutions and police forces in South America and Europe at the start of 
the emerging EU project.
61
 The first major works to conceptually address the 
emerging EU project were Benyon et al’s Police Cooperation in Europe, Bill 
Hebenton and Terry Thomas’ Policing Europe and Malcolm Anderson et al’s equally 
cogent Policing the European Union.
62
 The authors of the respective titles were 
concerned predominantly with developing dynamic political and legal frameworks 
which could explain the nature of and relationships between the emerging EU 
structures, institutions and arrangements for cross-border police cooperation. 
 
By and large, the seminal European publications sought first and foremost to 
understand and contextualise the emerging EU regime as a singular and peculiar 
construct. At the time, many of the constituent policing measures were merely 
abstract concepts without form or function so the undertaking of serious critical 
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analyses was impossible. Applying functionalist and socio-political theory, Anderson 
et al conveyed somewhat ominously that the emerging EU regime was not conducive 
to a general theory in 1995 since the project was a hazy, contested and non-linear 
spillover of economic integration with no clear indication of purpose or trajectory.
63
 
Benyon et al commendably tried to categorise developments into a three-tiered 
typology of macro, meso and micro initiatives which delineated government 
interaction at the ‘macro’ end and practitioner engagement at the ‘micro’ end.64 
 
To a similar end, Hebenton and Thomas compiled a number of conceptual spectrums 
which positioned the emerging measures between various opposing poles. The poles 
could be normatively described as horizontal to vertical, decentralised to centralised, 
loosely structured to highly integrated, state centric to communal and 
intergovernmental to supranational.
65
 The spectrums were largely compiled from the 
work of three authorities, namely Piet van Reenen who formulated a horizontal-
vertical spectrum in 1989, Malcolm Anderson’s ‘decentralised and centralised’ 
spectrum also published in 1989 and Neil Walker’s ‘loosely structured to vertically 
integrated’ model advanced in 1993.66 The rudimentary heuristic devices were useful 
in loosely framing the nascent developments but they were not designed to withstand 
serious academic analysis.
 
The simple act of conceptualising measures as profiles on a 
spectrum was typically awkward and untidy since the constituent parts frequently 





Remarkably, the early titles published between 1993 and 1995 continue to represent 
the most considered and reasoned theses on EU police cooperation even though they 
were produced in the very early years of the embryonic EU project. More recently, 
John D. Occhipinti’s The Politics of EU Police Cooperation focused on the peculiar 
development of Europol and the legislative agenda of the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council in the years following the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United 
States.
68
 To a similar extent, Ludo Block’s From Politics to Policing focused 
predominantly on the policy drivers and negotiations behind the major EU policing 
instruments.
69
 These well researched publications are significantly valuable due to 
their focus on the nature and drivers of the EU policy agenda but they do not seek to 
address broader forms of cross-border policing within the EU or the specific problem 
of police accountability more generally. 
 
In addition, a number of useful texts focus on non-EU dimensions of cross-border 
police cooperation which help to indirectly contextualise the EU policing project. 
Deflem’s Policing World Society largely eschewed the EU developments altogether 
by focusing acutely on international police cooperation between the 1850s and 1960s, 
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with a particular emphasis on Germany and the USA.
70
 Sheptycki’s In Search of 
Transnational Policing represents a case study of English and French cross-border 
police cooperation between 1968 and 1996.
71
 Andreas and Nadelmann’s Policing the 
Globe adopted a particularly partisan approach by viewing international police 
cooperation from an American criminological perspective, focusing particularly on 
global prohibitions and the criminalisation of drugs, tobacco, alcohol, immigration 
and piracy and the concomitant crime control strategies adopted and advocated by the 




A number of Irish-based research projects have focused on police cooperation across 
the Irish land border, the most commendable being a 2002 report published by Dunn 
et al at the University of Limerick which evaluated numerous home-grown and EU 
policing measures from a transparency perspective.
73
 A more recent AHRC Research 
Project on North-South responses to organised crime in Ireland published by Tom 
Obokata in 2014 focused acutely on drug and human trafficking offence legislation 
and concomitant police powers of investigation with only vague reference to EU 
policing measures.
74
 Ben Bowling and James Sheptycki have admirably tried to inject 
a fresh round of theorizing and conceptualization into the academic discourse on 
cross-border policing through their joint publication on Global Policing but their 
relatively short publication focuses predominantly on the deployment of police liaison 





Furthermore, various authors have painstakingly collated the full gamut of extant EU 
policing measures into single publishable volumes but as part of much larger research 
projects. Steve Peer’s EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, for example, provides a 
broad overview of the policies and measures introduced across EU fields of police 
cooperation, judicial cooperation, immigration, asylum and others, offering only a 
cursory degree of commentary and analysis.
76
 Mitsilegas et al’s The European Union 
and Internal Security strived to conceptualise the broader ‘internal security’ field as a 
single EU construct, treating the issue of cross-border police cooperation as one of a 
number of broadly abstract components.
77
 Similarly, Loader and Walker’s Civilizing 
Security conceptualized the nation-state as a realist participant in cooperative security 
regimes for the purposes of providing internal and external security as a ‘thick public 
good’ which they considered crucial to the idea of common political community.78 
Markus Dubber’s The Police Power took a similar approach to the development of 
internal security within the USA, focusing on the peculiar functions and approaches of 
the American federal government.
79
 Although the general focus of these expansive 
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publications is much broader than public policing, extending to concepts of security, 
governmentality and the raison d’Etat, their perceptive observations arguably help to 
inform and contextualise any analysis of the emerging EU policing regime. 
 
Despite the clear need for regular analyses of the modern EU regime for police 
cooperation, comprehensive publications have remained few and far between. Guille 
suggested in 2010 that not only was the extant research on European police 
cooperation devoid of substantial theoretical exploration but that researchers were not 
even showing a particular interest in the conduct of police officers in practice, 
preferring instead to produce bland descriptions of the legal frameworks introduced 
by the EU.
80
 Edited texts, which do not demand fulsome accounts of the subject 
matter, have instead become the primary staple of cross-border and comparative 
policing research. Popular edited works on various dimensions of cross-border police 
cooperation include Fijnaut’s The Internationalization of Police Cooperation in 
Western Europe;
81
 Anderson and Den Boer’s Policing Across National Boundaries;82 
Sheptycki’s Issues in Transnational Policing;83 Anderson and Apap’s Police and 
Justice Cooperation and the New European Borders;
84
 Lemieux’s International 
Police Cooperation and Fijnaut and Ouwerkerk’s The Future of Police and Judicial 




Edited collections which take a more specific rather than a thematic approach include 
Conny Rijken and Gert Vermeulen’s volume on Joint Investigation Teams in the EU 
which focuses predominantly on the establishment of one operational joint 
investigation team between the UK and the Netherlands.
86
 Other edited texts which 
focus on policing structures from a comparative perspective but without a dominant 
cross-border dimension include Brodeur’s Comparisons in Policing,87 Otwin 
Marenin’s Policing Change, Changing Police,88 Brewer et al’s The Police Public 
Order and the State,
89
 Mawby’s Policing Across the World  and Eterno and Das’ 




Although many of the edited publications are thoughtfully conceived and propagate 
fresh perspectives on public policing, the absence of comprehensive theses means that 
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there are very few publications that even attempt to provide a factual account of the 
whole range of factors or phenomena that make up the subject of EU police 
cooperation let alone its constituent parts. As Deflem succinctly observes, edited texts 
are not conducive to ‘theoretical explorations’.91 Without comprehensive analyses the 
policy implications for international, national and local policing systems remain 
obscure and poorly understood. The voluminous edited collections effectively mask 
the remarkable dearth of comprehensive academic analyses in the areas of cross-
border policing and police accountability. 
 
The modern approach to police epistemology, particularly the preference for bland 
edited collections over analytical theses and the dominance of vague evaluations of 
legal instruments over and above conceptual socio-legal studies, sits in sharp contrast 
to the cutting-edge approaches adopted by policing scholars of the 1960’s and ‘70s. 
The effect of law and policy on the conduct of police officers was the subject of a rich 
mosaic of academic research from the 1960s but such concerns do not appear to have 
transferred to the modern regime of cross-border police cooperation, arguably due to 
its increasingly complexity. Dramaturgical field observations and ride-alongs 
undertaken by a number of select police researchers in the 1960s and ‘70s contributed 
to a significant, albeit largely anecdotal, body of knowledge around various trenchant 
working practices and characteristics of the public police. Police discretion, in 
particular, was found to be a dominant and necessary feature of police work. Most 
importantly, this crucial feature did not have statutory underpinnings and was only 
recognised by the academic community following targeted socio-legal research. 
 
Michael Banton’s The Policeman in the Community,92 James Q Wilson’s Varieties of 
Police Behaviour,
93
 Egon Bittner’s The Functions of the Police in Modern Society,94 
Jerome Skolnick’s Justice Without Trial,95 William K Muir’s Streetcorner Politicians 
and Peter K Manning’s Police Work all helped to elucidate the dynamics between the 
criminal law, organisational control and police practice in the 1960s and ‘70s.96 The 
researchers showed that there was a significant gap between criminal codes and police 
conduct, generally indicating that mechanisms of police accountability played a 
crucial role in ensuring that the police conducted themselves in the spirit of the law. 
Remarkably, this body of knowledge does not appear to have been applied in any 
substantial fashion to the EU regime. It would appear that no modern academic 
publication can claim to have subjected the EU to a comparable degree of scrutiny 
and inquiry. As a result, the issue of whether and to what extent disparities exist 
between EU measures, police conduct and the concomitant mechanisms of police 
accountability have remained unaddressed. 
 
Instead of addressing the complexities of the EU regime, the current cabal of policing 
theorists appear to have turned their gaze to the issue of donor police assistance or 
‘security sector reform’ of weak and failed States in Asia, Africa and South America. 
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The EU apparatus for cross-border police cooperation, albeit fundamentally under-
researched, is considered to be comparably advanced. Bayley’s seminal Changing of 
the Guard inspired much of current interest, denoted not least by Ryan’s Statebuilding 
and Police Reform, Ellison and Pino’s Globalization, Police Reform and Development 
and Goldsmith and Sheptycki’s edited volume on Crafting Transnational Policing.97 
Ellison and Pino suggest that much of the academic research is inspired by the fact 
that police reform discourse and NGOs on the ground in the developing world 
promote an illusory concept of ‘democratic policing’ without any clear understanding 
of what it means.
98
 It is submitted that a similar claim can be made about the EU’s 
approach to police accountability. James Sheptycki appeared to be all too aware of the 
precarious condition of police epistemology when he stated in his contribution to 
Crafting Transnational Policing that the internal security field was in ‘utter disarray’, 
comparing the policy field to ‘boats floating rudderless on the sea of insecurity’.99 
 
The thesis ultimately aims to build upon the work of Marshall, Banton, Bittner, 
Walsh, Lustgarten, Walker and others to develop a modern appreciation of 
transnational police accountability. The thesis focuses not only on the institutional and 
legal frameworks dominating the national and the international arenas but on the 
conduct of police officers on the ground and the effectiveness of the relevant 
mechanisms for accountability in practice. The project is distinctive because of its 
critical focus on the practical relationship of the EU instruments to the domestic legal 
arrangements and administrative practices for police accountability in the Member 
States. Although the extant literature on police accountability is largely piecemeal in 
nature the broad spectrum of scholarly insights and empirical and analytical research 
will substantively inform the thesis.  
 
As a point of departure, there appears to be nothing to substantially suggest that police 
accountability cannot take a relatively uniform and common shape and form across 
the increasingly fragmented post-modern world in a similar fashion to the widely 
embraced structures of democratic government, free market economics and human 
rights protections.
100
 Bayley’s extensive comparative research suggests that although 
there is considerable variety across police forces around the world, ranging from 
armed to unarmed, centralised to decentralised, authoritarian to democratic and 
specific crime policing to general crime policing, the same basic mechanisms for 
ensuring police accountability should apply.
101
 This thesis represents an invaluable 
addition to modern epistemology as it addresses largely virgin territory by critically 
analysing a number of nascent legal, constitutional and administrative issues around 
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Conceptualizing EU supranationalism 
 
Sovereignty, which represents the ability of a government to establish exclusive legal, 
administrative and social control over the inhabitants of a finite geographical area, 
thereby giving form to its raison d’Etat, has clearly been affected by the EU regime 
on cross-border policing.
102
 The EU institutions can introduce binding policing 
measures on a ‘supranational’ basis across the majority of EU policing objectives. 
Walker argues that the ceding of some policing competencies, traditionally a prized 
preserve of statehood, ‘upwards’ suggests that the idea of State sovereignty is being 
eroded as European nation-states are becoming ‘more nation and less state’, since 
statehood implies territorial jurisdiction.
103 
Similarly, Sheptycki suggests that the 
ideas of sovereignty and policing are increasingly becoming ‘de-territorialized’ within 
the EU.
104
 However, police forces within the Member States continue to derive all of 
their basic police powers and functions from the nation-state and the State continues 
to claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of force which theorists such as Hobbes 




To give the relationship between the Member States and the EU regime a degree of 
definition and clarity, Walker has more recently described the emerging EU system as 
a ‘relational legal order’ or a form of ‘constitutional pluralism’ wherein Member 
States continue to be sovereign in some areas but not others, particularly those areas 
pertaining directly to international cooperation.
106 
In this sense, he remarks that public 
policing can no longer be described wholly as an element of ‘state constitutionalism’ 
but nor does it belong to the emerging realm of EU ‘supranational constitutionalism’ 
since domestic policing belongs to the former and some cross-border policing matters 
have been ceded to the latter.
107
 He proffers instead a more dynamic label of ‘meta-
constitutionalism’ to accommodate both streams.108 Similarly, Deflem postulates that 
national and cross-border policing dimensions effectively exist side by side as 
relatively distinct policy dimensions, only the latter of which is subject to 
supranational EU competency.
109
 Various academics have used the creative labels of 
‘European supranational non-State’ and the ‘post-Hobbesian State’ amongst others to 




More substantively, Anthony Anghie indicates that the idea of treating nation-states as 
sovereign in some policy matters but not others is, in fact, largely in line with the 
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original purpose of sovereignty.
111
 Anghie points out that the concept of sovereignty 
depends not only on a constituent citizenry recognising the authority of their territorial 
government but that it also requires the government’s authority and jurisdiction over a 
specific territory to be recognised by other nation-states, exemplified not least by the 
Peace of Westphalia 1648.
112
 Supporting this observation, he argues convincingly that 
the marauding and conquering expeditions of European State-backed armies to the 




 Centuries did not recognise the foreign 
tribal governments, villages and townships as ‘sovereign’ or afford them a sovereign 
status regardless of whether they were deserving of it.
113
 The concept of sovereignty 
was a privilege of international law that was considered to exist only among the 
European monarchies premised upon their particular brand of monarchical political 
government, economic systems, legal systems, systems of property ownership and, 
most importantly, inter-governmental diplomacy.
114
 Further evidence of the relational 
nature of sovereignty can be found in Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine when he stated in 1904 that ‘chronic wrong-doing or impotence which 
results in a general loosening of the ties of society may in America or elsewhere 
ultimately require intervention by some civilised nation and … in flagrant cases of 
such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power’.115  
 
The notion of ‘sovereignty’ therefore appears to represent a transnational condition 
that is established and maintained by a system of States working together rather than 
any particular governmental entity acting independently. For Rijken the renegotiation 
of the doctrine of sovereignty in order to hive off some marginal dimensions to a 
supranational body is entirely logical and acceptable if it strengthens and enhances the 
ability of the national government and the State’s judicial and policing apparatus to 
maintain effective systems of justice and economic and social activity.
116
 Walker and 
Loader convey that the competencies that have been ceded upwards to the 
supranational level could be considered in cosmopolitan-universalist terms to be 
‘global public goods’ which the wider international community has an interest in 
facilitating in the interests of peace, prosperity and justice.
117
 Anderson describes the 
emerging ‘pluralist’ arrangement as a novel ‘security community’.118 Finding out 
what this national/ EU dichotomy means for the issue of police accountability is one 
of the fundamental aims of this research. 
 
To elucidate the shape and form of the EU project, it is crucial to understand the 
evolving nature of the EU’s substantive objectives and competencies in the area of 
cross-border police cooperation. This task is daunting considering the fact that four 
different treaties have served to substantially alter the face of the EU competency for 
cross-border police cooperation in criminal matters within the last twenty years. Four 
seminal treaties were introduced between 1992 and 2012, namely the Maastricht, 
Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties, all of which affected the policy area of cross-
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border police cooperation in a number of ways. The Treaties, let alone the legislative 
and policy measures introduced pursuant to them, represented a major transformation 
and acceleration of EU involvement, and even governmental interest, in matters of 
cross-border police cooperation within a remarkably short period of time. 
 
The objectives and rationales espoused within the Treaties must serve as the rational 
point of departure for understanding and conceptualising the nature of the EU project 
and its concomitant effects on police accountability. The Lisbon Treaty 2009, which 
represents the most recent restatement of the EU’s objectives in the area of cross-
border police cooperation, states first and foremost that the EU ‘shall establish police 
cooperation’ in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal 
offences.
119
 In doing so, it has ‘shared competency’, which means that the Member 
States can legislate and adopt legally binding acts in the area pursuant to the principle 
of subsidiarity but only to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence.
120
 Broadly speaking, the Lisbon Treaty outlines five primary objectives 





First and foremost, the Treaty outlines the Union’s aim to establish measures 
concerning ‘the collection storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant 
information’, in particular through the EU’s European Police Office (Europol).122 
Despite the EU’s competency lying squarely in the realm of police cooperation, the 
objective holds clear and immediate inferences that police structures and processes on 
the ground in the Member States, which may have little or nothing to do with cross-
border cooperation, could potentially be affected. For instance, robberies, shootings, 
money laundering and prostitution are often drug-related and may indirectly form part 
of a broader cross-border criminal case. Any efforts to change police processes for the 
collection, storage, processing and analysis of information and intelligence related to 
drug crime could easily interfere with standard operating procedure. The measures 
introduced by the EU pursuant to this objective raise immediate issues of police 
accountability. Checks and balances clearly need to be established to ensure that the 
rule of law, human rights standards and civilian and policing needs are met both 
below and above the national level.  
 
The second policy objective is much less contentious, concerning the introduction of 
measures to ‘support’ staff training, staff exchange, equipment use and research.123 
Although the first and second objectives found various iterations in the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam Treaties, the third objective outlined in the Lisbon Treaty represents a 
considerably new addition to the EU’s policing competencies. The third objective 
concerns the EU’s intention to introduce measures concerning ‘common investigative 
techniques’ in relation to the detection of serious forms of organised crime.124 The 
introduction of ‘common investigative techniques’ within the ambit of police 
cooperation is undoubtedly designed to assist the mutual admissibility of evidence and 
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the mutual recognition of judgments by virtue of establishing common standards and 
processes. 
 
Although new to the specific dimension of police cooperation, the establishment of 
common investigative standards is not entirely new to the broader EU policy area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (Title V) as it is closely related and almost inextricably 
linked to key elements of the policy area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 
The chapter on judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which directly precedes the 
chapter on police cooperation, requires the mutual recognition of ‘all forms of 
judgments and judicial decisions’.125 It establishes EU competencies to approximate 
laws and regulations and establishes minimum rules concerning the mutual 
admissibility of evidence, the rights of individuals in criminal procedure, the rights of 
victims of crime and the definition of criminal offences and sanctions for serious 
crimes with a cross-border dimension.  
 
The introduction of ‘common investigative techniques’ would appear at face value to 
have major ramifications for the conduct of policing on the ground in the Member 
States. Like the procedures for information collation and analysis, the domestic 
investigative techniques used in relation to the detection of serious forms of organised 
crime are typically used across the investigative spectrum ranging from local 
aggravated robberies to terrorism. Although the EU’s objective is to develop measures 
strictly in the area of ‘police cooperation’ the fact that cases with a cross-border 
dimension are built upon local structures and codes of procedure means that the 
exercise of the EU’s competencies can potentially affect a police force’s standard 
operating procedures in general. The same is largely true of the connected area of 
judicial cooperation. EU measures introduced to establish minimum rules concerning 
the admissibility of evidence and the rights of individuals within the criminal process 
risks rewriting a police force’s basic standard operating procedure for evidence 
gathering and questioning. The thesis has already outlined that the quality of police 
accountability depends substantively on the nature of these very codes, rules and 
human-rights protections. Moreover, the EU can introduce such measures in 
accordance with the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ which means that the 
representatives of a particular State could vote against a measure but still see it passed 





The fourth objective outlined in the Lisbon Treaty is to ‘establish measures 
concerning operational cooperation’ between the relevant police authorities.127 
Although the Treaty does not elaborate on the contents of ‘operational cooperation’, 
various measures introduced under the previous Treaties suggest that operational 
cooperation denotes the movement of police officers across borders in possession of 
some police powers in order to continue the ‘hot pursuit’ or surveillance of a suspect, 
to participate in a property search or to assist in a major incident amongst other 
scenarios. Due in part to the fact that the accommodation of foreign police officers 
raises acute legal issues in the event of individual misconduct, the EU can only 
introduce such measures at the behest of the EU Council acting unanimously through 
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the ‘special legislative procedure’.128 The Lisbon Treaty states that the Council must 
explicitly lay down the conditions and limitations under which the competent 
authorities of the Member States may operate in the territory of another Member State 




The fifth and final principal objective of the EU project concerns using Europol in 
other operational ways. The Lisbon Treaty provides that Europol’s mission is to 
support and strengthen action by the Member States’ police authorities in preventing 
and combating terrorism, serious crime affecting two or more Member States and 
other forms of crime of a common interest.
130
 More particularly, Europol must 
coordinate, organise and implement investigative and operational action jointly with 
the Member States, using joint investigation teams where appropriate.
131
 To dispel 
fears over the development of a federal-style EU policing regime, the Treaty holds 
that any operational action involving Europol must be carried out in liaison and in 
agreement with the authorities of the Member States concerned and that the 
application of coercive measures shall remain the exclusive responsibility of the 
competent national authorities.
132
 This broad objective is not new to the EU policy 
area of cross-border police cooperation, finding previous enunciation in the 
Amsterdam Treaty.
133
 Viewed from an accountability and transparency perspective, 
the central position and functions enjoyed by Europol raise acute concerns, 
particularly whether and to what extent Europol is accountable with respect to its own 
structures, processes, tasks and activities and whether and to what extent it holds the 
Member States’ police forces to account for the quality of their cooperation.  
 
Although most of the EU competencies raise important issues of police 
accountability, no substantive mention is made of police accountability under Title V 
of the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, a strong argument can be made that the Lisbon 
Treaty Preamble and various disparate provisions imply that the EU institutions 
should be actively enhancing the qualities of police accountability. For instance, the 
Treaty Preamble affirms the EU’s ‘attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law’.134 The 
Preamble also outlines the EU’s ambition ‘to continue the process of creating an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as 
possible to the citizen’.135 Moreover, it conveys the desire of the Member States ‘to 
deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture 
and their traditions’.136  
 
Many of the same principles are reiterated in Articles 1 through Article 3 of the 
Treaty.
137
 In addition the recognition of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union 2000, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 and the explicit right to the protection of personal 
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data processed pursuant to EU instruments and measures are enumerated.
138
 Echoing 
the spirit of democratic accountability, Articles 10 and 11 explicitly state that the EU 
institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with 
representative associations and civil society and that the European Commission shall 
carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that the 
Union’s actions are coherent and transparent.139 Similar expressions were made in the 
Preamble and opening articles of the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and Amsterdam Treaty 
1997.
140
 The thesis will proceed to examine whether and to what extent the EU cross-
border policing regime reflects these values and realises the qualities of police 




The analysis is conducted primarily through a combination of the traditional legal 
method, the comparative method and critical analysis of secondary literature and 
materials. The extant legal frameworks at the national level are evaluated by way of 
statutory interpretation and case law analysis of relevant legislation and distinctive 
institutional and administrative frameworks. Three jurisdictions are used for 
comparison, namely England, Ireland and Denmark. The thesis focuses in particular 
on England as a constituent member of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland (referred to herein as the UK) in order to accommodate the 
fundamental legal and administrative differences between the police forces of 
England (and Wales), Scotland and Northern Ireland. From a legal perspective, 
England and Ireland are both common law jurisdictions with close historical, political 
and legal connections whereas Denmark has a unique hybrid legal system. From an 
accountability standpoint, England has one of the most decentralised policing systems 
in Europe whereas Ireland and Denmark are considered to be among the most 
centralised.
141
 With respect to cross-border police cooperation, the Irish police force 
has long cooperated with police forces in Northern Ireland. English police forces are 
heavily involved in a much lauded Channel Tunnel policing initiative with France as 
well as a Cross Channel Intelligence Conference with France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Danish police districts on the other hand cooperate extensively with 
police forces from Sweden and Norway through a well-respected regional Nordic 
policing framework. Danish police districts also interact with police forces from 
Northern Germany on a day-to-day basis. 
 
By focusing on England, Ireland and Denmark, the thesis captures a broad and diverse 
array of policing systems and cross-border policing constructs. Moreover, the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark were the only EU Member States to insert unique opt-out 
clauses into the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties while the UK and Ireland 
are the only two Member States that do not participate fully in the policing framework 
of the Schengen Acquis. As a result, the three jurisdictions represent a rich mosaic of 
distinctive legal and administrative characteristics and approaches to police 
accountability and cross-border police cooperation, arguably unrivalled by any other 
individual Member States of the European Union.  
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Evaluating the various jurisdictions through the three critical lenses of codes, co-
option and complaint should ultimately enable the thesis to ascertain if there is enough 
evidence of similarity between the three jurisdictions to validate the proposed 
theoretical framework. The selection of Denmark as a jurisdiction of interest is 
particularly important as it practices a hybrid legal system which would suggest that it 
is both an amalgam of best practice from across Europe and, more particularly, that 
the relevant features of its legal system are not hugely different from neighbouring 
States such as Sweden and Germany. A five-month research trip to the University of 
Copenhagen, Denmark was undertaken in Autumn 2012 to access and translate 
relevant legal codes, reports, parliamentary debates and secondary literature. 
 
In regard to matters of EU cross-border policing, the application of the three lenses to 
the EU’s activity in the area of cross-border police cooperation should crucially 
enable the thesis to deduce whether and to what extent the EU is incorporating the 
Member States’ conventional legal and administrative approaches to police 
accountability. The history, development and current state of EU law and practice on 
cross-border police cooperation is scrutinised by relying primarily on the application 
of the traditional legal methods of statutory interpretation and case law analysis to 
relevant sources. These include the Lisbon Treaty and the Schengen, Prum and 
Mutual Assistance Conventions; EU legislation such as the Framework Decision on 
Joint Investigation Teams, the Europol Decision and decisions of the European Court 
of Justice amongst others. The legal analysis will be supplemented by the critical 
analysis of associated national and EU parliamentary debates; institutional reports 
published by the relevant police forces and departments of justice; EU Council and 
Commission documents, media reports and secondary literature. A number of off-the-
record interviews with key personnel from various police forces and Europol were 
undertaken to inform and shape the research. Informal interviews were carried out at 
Europol Headquarters in The Hague in October 2012, at the Danish National Police 
Headquarters in Copenhagen in November 2012 and at the Irish Police Headquarters 










Ch. 1 Codes and co-option within the Member States 
 
“Accountability involves the presentation and reception of an account to 
certain codes”.142 
 
Drawing on the work of Bayley, Reiner, Bittner, Walsh and Stenning amongst others, 
the thesis has suggested that an overly narrow and obscure treatment or interpretation 
of police accountability has been casually adopted by the Sage Dictionary of Policing 
2009), the Routledge Dictionary of Policing (2008) and the UN Handbook on Police 
Accountability, Oversight and Integrity (2011). The thesis has outlined that the vague 
definitions obscure the qualities of police accountability and largely disregard 
comprehensive academic examination and conceptual precision. The analysis will 
commence by considering whether the concept of police accountability can be better 
elucidated through the lenses of codes, co-option and complaint. The typology is 
based in part on Maguire’s observation that the three strategies advocated most often 
to militate against police malpractice in the aftermath of a policing scandal include the 
drawing up of a more prescriptive code of conduct, the improved supervision of 





The chapter will focus on the first hypothetical lens. It will argue that ‘codes’ play a 
central and fundamental role in police accountability since they set the standards 
against which police policies, strategies, acts and omissions must be measured. The 
chapter will show that the traditional conceptualisation of police accountability has 
become severely outdated as radical legal reforms over the past 30 years have 
dramatically amplified the importance of codes as a key defining feature of police 
accountability, particularly in common law jurisdictions. Furthermore, it will show 
that procedural codes have not only radically re-defined the standards against which 
police conduct must be measured but that they have also made significant inroads into 
the problem of police ‘co-option’. The chapter will focus on relevant legal reforms at 
the national level across England, Ireland and Denmark. 
 
The importance of ‘codes’ 
 
Bittner observed as early as 1970 that codes are fundamental to the idea of police 
accountability for the simple reason that without an abstract formulated standard we 
would not know what kind of police conduct to look for.
144
 Most importantly, from a 
juridical perspective, Dicey’s highly regarded formula for ‘the rule of law’ demands 
the absolute supremacy of clearly-defined regular law to prevent the State from 
wielding arbitrary power.
145
 One of the basic tenets of constitutional law and 
international human rights law is that fundamental human rights, not least the right to 
liberty, shall not be encroached upon by agents of the State save in accordance with 
the law.
146
 One famous component of constitutional law and ‘legalism’ is the maxim 
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of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, which applies to both criminal and 





Reiss remarks that it is the principle of legality which effectively underpins the 
legitimacy of police powers and interventions.
148
 Constitutional and statutory laws, 
secondary regulations and internal guidelines effectively determine the domain of 
competence of the police by establishing the basis for and the limitations to police 
powers and functions.
149
 The thesis uses the term ‘codes’ broadly to refer to all of the 
legal and administrative standards against which police conduct can be measured, 
encompassing not only the formal rules and regulations which are formally labelled 
‘codes’, such as the PACE Codes of Practice or the Danish Criminal Code, but any 
significant statute or juridical or administrative framework which underpins the 
exercise of police powers, duties and practice. 
 
From an accountability perspective, ‘codes’ effectively underpin one of the basic 
questions of accountability, ‘what for?’150 ‘Codes’ set the standard against which 
police policies, strategies, acts and omissions are measured.
151
 The chapter will show 
that the concept of police accountability was traditionally focused predominantly on 
the development of internal administrative codes of discipline and the criminal law 
but that more intricate procedural codes have become increasingly popular since the 
late 20
th
 Century, representing a discernible paradigm shift. More particularly, it will 
show that State legislatures traditionally assumed that the statutory establishment of 
the police organisation, concomitant police powers and disciplinary infractions 
through individual and piecemeal policing and criminal laws was sufficient to ensure 
a highly programmatic and disciplined police force but a number of policing scandals 
in the 20
th
 Century suggested otherwise. The thesis will convey how a major paradigm 
shift occurred in the 1980s, particularly within common law jurisdictions, which led 
to the popular development of highly formulaic and programmatic codes of procedure 
to minimise police malpractice and enhance human rights protections. It will convey 
that this paradigm shift is crucial to any modern conception of police accountability 
for it not only changed the landscape considerably but various jurisdictions have not 
yet fully completed this evolutionary step and remain somewhat tied to the outdated 
ideologies of the 19
th
 Century.  
 
A major paradigm shift: from ‘disciplinary codes’ to ‘procedural codes’ 
 
England’s modern public policing model was originally defined predominantly by an 
internal system of accountability which revolved around a proscriptive set of 
disciplinary infractions. Reith conveys that all of the major organisational features of 
the English model, developed in the early 19
th
 Century, could be considered 
derivative, drawn predominantly from the army’s system of hierarchical control.152 
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His in-depth analysis of the key influences behind the establishment of the London 
Metropolitan Police in 1829, from Rowan’s military influences to Pitt’s failed Police 
Bill, convincingly shows that the seminal organisational features, procedures and 
practices of the new police were almost exclusively and intentionally drawn from the 
tried and tested military organisational structures for directing, supervising and 




Like the traditional military style of leadership and management, the system revolved 
around a code of conduct and a concomitant proscription of disciplinary infractions 
which served to ensure that subordinates carried out their instructions within specific 
parameters or face punishment for misconduct. The original General Instructions 
issued by the first London Police Commissioners to the London Metropolitan Police 
required police officers to remain well-tempered and unresponsive to personal insult 
at all times, to behave with courtesy, impartially and without prejudice and to use only 
the most minimal and justifiable force necessary in accordance with common law, 
amongst other prerequisites.
154
 The formal proscription of General Instructions was 
considered to be crucial for ensuring that police officers would strive to resolve any 
and all conflicts by using the utmost restraint, persuasion and moral authority, 
resorting only to the most minimal force absolutely necessary to affect an arrest.
155
 
The original London Police Commissioners stated in 1830 that each member of the 
police force must show ‘the most perfect civility at all times to the public, of 
whatsoever class, as any man who acts otherwise cannot be allowed to remain in the 
force’.156 The General Instructions were designed to ensure that police officers would 
act not as emotional men but behave according to an ‘institutional personality’.157 
Officers were expected to behave as an ‘institution rather than a man’.158 The 
Commissioners considered that breaches of the ‘code of conduct’ risked undermining 





Regularly updated as new situational exigencies came to the attention of successive 
police chiefs and commissioners, by the middle of the 20
th
 Century disciplinary 
regulations for police forces across England and Ireland typically contained a 
relatively uniform list of infractions.
160
 Infractions which aimed to regulate police-
civilian interactions included ‘abuse of authority’ which encompassed the improper or 
excessive use of force, ‘neglect of duty’ such as a failure to act in response to a 
reported crime, ‘discreditable conduct’ which could tarnish the publics’ confidence in 
the officer or the force and a number of prohibitions pertaining to criminal conduct 
such as corruption, falsehood and prevarication.
161
 Infractions which aimed to 
facilitate strict internal hierarchical control by commanding officers included 
‘disobedience of orders’ or insubordination, ‘misconduct’ towards another member of 
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the force and ‘untidiness’ amongst others.162 The proscription of infractions has 




 Centuries. England’s most recent 
Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008 categorises its enumerated infractions under the 
headings of reasonable, proportionate and necessary use of force; honesty and 
integrity; respect and courtesy; equality; diligent exercise of duties; discreditable 





The general instructions and disciplinary infractions effectively represented a ‘code of 
ethics’ which defined how police officers were to engage with civilians, demanding 
that they act as paragons of dignity, honesty, openness, compassion and restraint or 
face sanction and punishment by the internal hierarchical regime. Neyroud and 
Beckley group these ethical responsibilities of police officers into four primary 
categories of theoretical ethics, namely ‘duty’ which encompasses taking 
responsibility for protecting and respecting human rights in a dignified manner, 
‘virtue’ which encapsulates the honesty of the individual, ‘utility’ which connotes 
justiciable consequences and ‘care’ which places a premium on needs and emotions 
rather than laws and rules.
164
 They succinctly convey that ethics are concerned 
predominantly not with the outcome of an action but with the way an action is taken, 




Alderson comments that ethical standards of discipline are as important as the legal 
standards of criminal behaviour for public policing since the manner in which they are 
applied play a significant role in shaping police conduct and are just as likely to create 
a sense of injustice if abused.
166
 As Kleinig observes ‘legal accountability’ is 
concerned with process and not with character.
167
 The disciplinary regime on the other 
hand is designed to deal not only with legal rights and wrongs but with the ethics of 
good and better. It is about regulating behaviour such as rudeness, indifference and 
aggression which are common to civilian conduct but short of the ethics expected of 
the policeman.
168
 The codes of police ethics effectively serve to ensure that the 
normative expectations of police behaviour are ultimately higher than the normative 




Most importantly, adherence to the General Instructions and the concomitant 
disciplinary infractions was to be guaranteed by the military-style hierarchical police 
organisation which existed in part for that very purpose.
170
 It was clearly the belief 
and intention of the original Home Secretary and Police Commissioners in England 
that the military-esque organisational structures and processes would deliver a highly 
disciplined professional force, largely free of deviant and corrupt behaviour.
171
 
‘Professional’ ethics were prioritised and underpinned by the recruitment and training 
of officers according to specific standards in line with other more traditional 
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‘professions’.172 However unlike the traditional professions, such as medicine and 
teaching, the hierarchical police organisation existed to ensure that police officers 
functioned as part of an integrated, coordinated and highly disciplined organisation, as 
opposed to an unwieldy body of individuals.
173
 To facilitate close direction, control 
and supervision, police constables were grouped into units or squads headed by a 
sergeant, loosely modelled on the army platoon.
174
 Units were grouped into stations or 
departments headed by a superintendent, akin to the army company. Stations were 
grouped into ‘divisions’ headed by a chief superintendent or an assistant police chief, 
much like the army battalion, and divisional headquarters were overseen by a force 
headquarters headed by a police chief, akin to the office of army general.
175
 The 
police ‘division’, referred to more recently as the Basic Command Unit (BCU), was 
expected to be capable of handling any and all occurrences within its geographical 




The fact that the internal hierarchical police organisation was capable of ensuring 
discipline and delivering police accountability more generally was largely taken for 
granted on the basis of the historical success of the military model of direction and 
control. More particularly, the simple existence of a hierarchical police organisation 
armed with a suite of disciplinary infractions was considered to be a vast 
improvement on traditional policing practices. The Watch and Ward and thief-taking 
systems which existed in the 18
th
 Century were widely considered to be prone to 
corruption and deviance due to the lack of regimental oversight and poor pay.
177
 Poor 
working class neighbourhoods, which could not afford a robust Watch or the costly 
services of thief-takers, were reportedly racked with violent brawling, drunkenness, 
pick-pocketing, burglaries and general lawlessness on a daily basis, leading to regular 
outcry from local residents and entrepreneurs.
178
 Violent and armed robbers 
reportedly acted with impunity since they could easily bribe watchmen and thief-
takers to escape apprehension.
179
 Fielding, a London magistrate, had advocated the 
amalgamation of all of the disparate London Watches into a single unitary force in 
1749, largely akin to the Parisian Guard, and even tried to develop a formal 
information system between the thief-takers in order to aid the tracking of fugitives, 
but failed considerably on both counts.
180
 London’s population had proceeded to 
almost double in size between 1750 and 1820, through rural and foreign immigration, 




Furthermore, although the heavily armed English Army and Yeomanry were usually 
effective at dispersing crowds rioting over food shortages, unemployment rates and 
tenant rights amongst other complaints, their methods were occasionally 
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disproportionate and unnecessary leading to the massacre of innocents.
182
 Notable 
massacres include the killing of upwards of 300 at the anti-Catholic Gordon Riots in 
1780, the slaughter of some 50 protestors and injuring of more than 300 in Hexham in 
1781, and the death of 11 civilians and the injuring of more than 400 gathered at 
Peterloo in 1819.
183 
The fact that the hierarchical police organisation was established 
to replace the policing functions of the Watches and the Army was considered to be a 
major political and social breakthrough. A Police Bill had been unsuccessfully tabled 
earlier in 1785 and six parliamentary committees had considered the establishment of 
a police force in London between 1812 and 1822 in an effort to address growing 
discontent.
184
 Although various segments of London society were in favour of 
retaining the extant systems of crime control, the new modern public policing model 
gained support primarily on the assumption that it would bring greater discipline to 




The overarching consensus was that the ‘new’ system would engender a more 
disciplined, accountable, unitary system of crime control by blending together the 
basic functions of the watch, the thief takers and public order maintenance within one 
organised, professional and disciplined public organisation.
186
 Although the 
organisational structure of the new police was similar in nature to the British Army its 
functions were almost entirely different to the Army, which was tasked to operate 
from barracks and trained to engage a hostile citizenry using heavy weaponry and 
overwhelming force.
187
 To appease a sceptical general public many of the basic 
features of the traditional policing systems were integrated into the ‘new’ police.188 
The patrol function traditionally carried out by the Watch and Ward would continue to 
be the primary function of the public police who, by virtue of their discernible 
uniforms and constant vigilance would work to deter crime largely through a simple 
‘scarecrow effect’.189 Emsley remarks that the patrol ‘beat’ system adopted by the 
new police constables was familiar to most Londoners as similar patrols had 
traditionally been carried out by members of the Watch and Ward.
190
 Likewise, the 
Bow Street Runners employed by the Fielding magistrates from 1748 were considered 
to be particularly astute at investigating local reports of crime by relying on a network 
of informants, eventually leading to the establishment of a detective bureau within the 
London Metropolitan Police.
191
 The intention was that the hierarchical police 
organisation would be able to deliver a highly disciplined, professional body of police 
officers who could preserve public order by virtue of their moral correctness and 
authority rather than by overwhelming coercive force of arms.
192
 There was evidently 
little reason to believe that the hierarchical police organisation would have any effect 
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Unfortunately the capacity of the internal hierarchical regime to deliver police 
accountability in practice did not attract close scrutiny until the spiking of academic 
interest with the publication of Michael Banton’s The Policeman in the Community in 
1964. It became common consensus thereafter that the General Instructions and 
disciplinary infractions served as a useful proscription of ‘what not to do’ rather than 
providing police officers with a relatively fulsome guidance on ‘what to do’ when 
exercising their police powers.
194
 Basic police processes were largely outlined in 
piecemeal internal administrative police manuals such as the crime investigation 
manual and the charging manual which only covered a few basic police processes.
195
 
Breathnach, writing in the 1970s, described the Irish Garda Code, which largely 
collated the major criminal offence definitions, laws and statutes, as the ‘bible’ for 
Irish police officers.
196
 Wilson outlined how the guidance issued to police officers was 
essentially far more inhibitory than explanatory and that there was significant scope to 
provide patrolmen with greater guidance on best practice in various scenarios or 





A major problem with the original regime was that the prevailing disciplinary codes 
were evidently far too narrow. Criminal statutes such as the Vagrancy Act 1824, 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861, Poaching Prevention Act 1862, Public Stores 
Act 1875 and Explosives Act 1875, which restated old prohibitions and offences as 
well as enumerating new ones, merely outlined concomitant police powers and 
responsibilities such as stop and search upon reasonable suspicion without going into 
extensive detail about how processes, such as a stop and search, should be conducted. 
The legislature evidently operated under the assumption that such matters were of 
little concern to the body politic since the hierarchical police organisation applied a 
stringent code of ethics espousing courtesy, dignity and minimal force amongst other 
ethical standards. However, even the original London Commissioners were well 
aware of the limitations of the disciplinary regulations and General Instructions. The 
latter was prefaced with the caveat that:  
 
‘the following General Instructions for the different ranks of the police force 
are not to be understood as containing rules of conduct applicable to every 
variety of circumstance that may occur in the performance of their duty; 
something must necessarily be left to the intelligence and discretion of 
individuals; and according to the degree in which they show themselves 
possessed to the qualities and to their zeal, activity and judgement, on all 
occasions’.198 
 
The judiciary was essentially expected to act as the final external check on any 
unlawful or unconstitutional police practice. Principles such as the formulation of 
reasonable suspicion before conducting a stop and search, minimal use of force, the 
right of access to a solicitor during detention, the prohibition of oppressive 
questioning during interrogation, the requirement for voluntary confessions and the 
provision of comfort, refreshment and sleep during police detention were all 
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 The seminal Judges Rules 
of 1912, for instance, formally outlined many of the basic processes for police 





 Miller observes that it was not uncommon for magistrates to throw out 
cases in the 19
th
 Century if it was found that an officer had arrested an individual 
without reasonable suspicion even where the suspect had assaulted the officer during 




Not only did the judiciary strive to elucidate police procedures since the extant suite 
of disciplinary infractions and General Instructions failed to provide procedural 
guidance across all police processes but the nature and content of police powers 
changed considerably over the course of the 20
th
 Century without commensurate 
changes being made to the mechanisms of police oversight and complaint. When the 
system was originally designed in the early 19
th
 Century, the range of police powers 
bestowed upon constables was not at issue since the Home Secretary had designed the 
new London constables to be little more than ‘citizens in uniform’ who were simply 
modern versions of the ancient office of civilian tithingman and peace officer who 
enjoyed broadly the same range of powers as civilians, albeit as part of a more rigid 
hierarchical regime.
202 
The government was apparently at pains to convey that the 
powers and functions of the new police were in fact not new but ancient in order to 
garner the acquiescence of a sceptical public. However by the 1970s, police officers 
could no longer be considered to be ‘citizens in uniform’ for their powers had evolved 
considerably over the preceding hundred years.  
 
Voluminous numbers of criminal offence statutes had been introduced in England 
throughout the 20
th
 Century such as the Public Order Act 1936, Sexual Offences Act 
1956, Homicide Act 1957, Theft Act 1969, Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, Protection of 
Children Act 1978, and Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, many of which attached 
police powers in a piecemeal manner. Not only were the statutes considerably vague 
or relatively unconcerned about how the concomitant police powers would be 
exercised in practice but some powers such as stop and search and property searches 
without warrant were attached to some criminal offences but not others.
203
 Haphazard 
anomalies and ambiguities were not only hindering police investigations but enabling 




Most importantly, it was increasingly acknowledged towards the end of the 20
th
 
Century that neither the internal regime of disciplinary oversight nor the criminal 
courts were capable of safeguarding civil liberties to the fullest extent. Breaches of the 
Judges Rules were reportedly endemic partly because they were not considered to be 
clear disciplinary infractions.
205
 Reiner conveys that the reports of coerced 
confessions in a number of high profile cases and the absence of legal advice prior to 
or during the questioning of a number of juveniles in the Confait case raised major 
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public ire and caused a discernible ‘haemorrhage’ of public confidence in the police in 
the 1980s.
206
 Doreen McBarnet commented in 1981 that suspects’ rights had become 
little more than rhetoric, widely trampled upon in practice.
207
 Walker remarks that the 
police were widely perceived, particularly among disadvantaged minority 





Only in the 1980s, after numerous miscarriages of justice and Royal Commissions of 
Inquiry, did the Parliament and legislature realise that it had incrementally introduced 
disparate police powers without introducing commensurate checks and balances. The 
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP), sitting in 1981, signalled the need 
for a radical paradigm shift to reconstruct the onus of police accountability to include 
not only the hierarchical police organisation and the judiciary but to foster a clear 
responsibility within the legislature itself for the formulation of procedural 
guidance.
209
 It recommended the introduction of clearer, rationalised and more 
human-rights compliant police processes to address pervasive police malpractice and 





On foot of the Commission’s recommendations, the landmark Police and Criminal 
Evidence (PACE) Act was introduced in 1984.
211
 It essentially rationalised general 
police powers, applying them to all indictable offences, such as the power to stop and 
search with reasonable suspicion,
212
 the entry of private property in certain 
instances,
213
 and the search of private property without a warrant immediately upon a 
suspect’s arrest to locate valuable evidence, amongst other basic processes.214 Most 
importantly, the Act incorporated detailed guidance on how stop and searches, arrests, 
bodily searches, property searches, detention, interrogation and the taking of forensic 
bodily samples amongst other processes should be carried out in order to comply with 
long-standing constitutional human rights standards.
215
 The relevant traditional 
principles of common law, the Judges Rules and ECtHR jurisprudence were 




In addition to the statutory provisions themselves, the Act also required the Home 
Secretary to introduce secondary instruments under the Act in the form of new codes 
of practice to ensure that the provisions were given clear and useful effect in 
practice.
217
 Unlike the traditional Judges Rules, a breach of any of the codes would 
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generally be deemed to constitute a disciplinary infraction.
218
 The Home Office 
introduced eight Codes of Practice labelled A to H which addressed as distinct and 
individual processes the conduct of stop and search, property search, arrest, detention 
and questioning and the taking of bodily samples. The Codes provided relatively clear 
guidance on issues such as ‘reasonable suspicion’ and the ‘reasonable use of force’. 
 
The modern significance of ‘procedural codes’ 
 
To evoke legal and procedural clarity and human-rights compliance, the Act and the 
concomitant Codes effectively represented a step by step procedural guide from arrest 
to charge. At the pre-arrest stage, the Act held that stop and searches, which are 
highly uncomfortable and insulting if items of crime are not found, must only be 
undertaken with a reasonable suspicion premised upon the factual presence of 
information, intelligence or suspect behaviour. Clear guidance was provided on a 
number of specific situational exigencies such as the stop and search of someone with 
religious head coverings. It was conveyed that the purpose of detention was to prevent 
the person causing harm to others or to facilitate the prompt investigation of an 
offence not as a form of punishment in itself, advocating the use of ‘street bail’ as an 




The Act and the concomitant Codes were highly programmatic. During arrest, 
detainees were to be notified of the reasons for arrest, were to be brought to the station 
as soon as practicable and a subsequent ‘custody record’ of the arrest must be made at 
the police station outlining the reasons for, location and time of arrest, the degree of 
force used and the ethnicity of the detainee amongst other information.
220 
Bodily 
samples required for forensic analysis were to be restricted to non-sensitive samples 
such as fingerprints, mouth swabs or a strand of hair unless the detainee consented to 
more sensitive blood and semen samples.
221
 One of the most important areas regulated 
by the Act was the conduct of interviews and detention which had previously been 
regulated by the Judges Rules. Interviews were to be recorded by audio and visual 
means unless impracticable and were only to be undertaken for the purposes of 
securing enough information to charge, affording the suspect access to immediate 
independent legal advice by phone or in person, regular refreshments and comfortable 
seating and sleeping arrangements.
222
 Police interviewers were to notify interviewees 
of their legal rights and obligations and were prohibited from making oppressive or 
threatening statements.
223
 Statements were to be recorded by hand by either the 
detainee or a police officer who was required to outline all of the incriminating and 
exculpatory evidence to the greatest extent possible. Interpreters were to be provided 
if appropriate and a person known to the detainee notified of the arrest unless such 




Moreover, detention without charge could only be extended beyond 6 hours if an 
inspector unconnected to the investigation was of a reasonable belief that continued 
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detention was proportional and necessary in the furtherance of the criminal 
investigation.
225
 The inspector was required to record such reasons in the custody 
record and must review the case every 9 hours thereafter.
226
 Detention for any longer 
than 24 hours could only be approved by a superintendent acting as the reviewing 
officer. Detention for any longer than 36 hours required the intermittent approval of a 
district court magistrate, up to a possible total of 7 days under the Misuse of Drugs 
Acts or up to 28 days under the Terrorism Acts.
227
 Furthermore, PACE provided that 
as soon as the reviewing or custody officer was satisfied that there was a satisfactory 
minimum amount of evidence on which to bring a charge on indictment, the file must 
immediately be transmitted to the independent Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) 
so that a charge could be considered.
228
 Upon charging, the suspect should be released 
on ‘police bail’ if release would not immediately hinder the investigation and 
prosecution or else the detainee must be brought to the magistrates court for a 




PACE and its associated secondary Codes of Practice extensively outlined the form 
and nature of basic police processes in a manner that was entirely unprecedented. 
Echoing the pronouncements of Rene Descartes in the 17
th
 Century, it was belatedly 
realised that a single legal framework which was strictly observed would engender a 
better ordered State than a multiplicity of laws which could furnish excuses for 
vice.
230
 It was a watershed for police accountability for there had never before been 
such a clear and publicly accessible codified standard of police procedure against 
which police conduct could be measured.
231
 It was only in the 1980s, more than 150 
years after the creation of the English policing model, that the assumptions around the 
adequacy of the internal hierarchical regime as the prime producer of disciplinary 
guidance were examined and found to be remarkably short-sighted. 
 
The paradigm shift towards explanatory codes of procedure and practice in England 
did not go unnoticed in Ireland. Like its neighbouring jurisdiction, the Irish 
Government had introduced a plethora of haphazard, piecemeal and anomalous 
criminal laws throughout the 20
th
 Century, facing many of the same legal and 
procedural challenges as England in the 1970s and’80s.232 In the absence of a highly 
formulaic regime for arrest, detention and interrogation, a ‘heavy gang’ of detectives 
who were skilled in the art of coercing confessions through oppressive and 
threatening means reportedly operated with impunity in the 1970s, regularly 
breaching the Irish Judges Rules.
233
 All too aware of the recommendations of the 
English Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 1981, the Irish government took 
similar steps to rationalise its basic police powers and processes. The Irish Criminal 
Justice Act 1984 was ideologically similar to the PACE Act. Police ‘powers’ such as 
stop and search, the entry of private property and detention without charge were 
rationalised whilst police ‘processes’ such as the conduct of stop and searches, arrests, 
bodily searches, property searches, interrogation, the taking of forensic bodily 
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samples and the approval of extended detention were enumerated in accordance with 
long-standing human rights standards.
234
 Analogous to the supplementary English 
Codes of Practice, the Irish Minister for Justice introduced similarly expansive 
regulations, not least the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Treatment of Persons in Custody 
in Garda Stations) Regulations 1987 and the Criminal Justice Act 1984 (Electronic 
recording of interviews) Regulations 1997 amongst others. 
 
Viewed from a continental perspective, the major paradigm shifts in England and 
Ireland can be viewed as significantly belated. Not only did it take the UK and Irish 
Governments until the 1980s to realise the obvious weaknesses inherent in their 
policing systems, their negligence is particularly stark considering the fact that most 
police forces in continental Europe were already being held to account according to 
highly formulaic and programmatic codes of procedure, a feature that many European 
countries shared dating back to the Napoleonic era.
235
 Police powers and functions in 
Denmark, for instance, had long been rationalised in the ‘Retsplejeloven’ or 
Administration of Justice Act 1916 (AJA). The key long-standing principles of 
reasonable suspicion, the reasonable use of force, the right of access to legal advice 
during detention and regular custody reviews were not unique to the common law 
systems of England and Ireland but had long been outlined in specific chapters of the 
Danish AJA.
236
 Distinct chapters of the AJA pertain to bodily search, property search 
with and without a warrant, arrest, detention and interrogation amongst others.
237
 In 
fact, various principles are even more extensive than the PACE equivalents such as 
the requirement that defence counsels must be given immediate and unrestricted 
access to a detained suspect throughout the interrogation and identification 
processes.
238
 Criminal offence definitions and sanctions, on the other hand, were 
codified in a separate Criminal Code 1930 under various headings such as attempt and 
complicity, offences against the public peace, offences of violence against the person, 
offences against privacy, sexual offences and property offences amongst others.
239
 





 Centuries.  
 
It is submitted that in light of the longstanding approach to police accountability in 
continental Europe, the English and Irish paradigm shifts would appear to bring their 
policing systems closer into line with their European counterparts. A consensus has 
clearly emerged that the establishment of a clear procedural standard against which 
police conduct can be measured is most readily achieved by way of a codified 
statutory framework. Nothing in the analysis would suggest that this major 
harmonisation of policing procedure and police accountability has been affected by 
European supranational pressures. The evidence would suggest that the major 
weaknesses in the traditional system of internal hierarchical accountability coupled 
with the limitation of external judicial checks and balances reached a crescendo 
within England and Irish courtrooms in the 1970s leading to development of the 
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respective frameworks. To the same extent that Ireland internalised many of the key 
recommendations of the Royal Commission, the members of the Royal Commission 
undoubtedly looked to other countries for inspiration in order to address the prevailing 
problems of police procedure and accountability. The continental penchant for 
codified police procedure more than likely had a bearing on the Commission’s 
recommendation to adopt a similar codified framework to enhance procedural clarity 
and, by extension, police accountability. 
 
Anderson conveys that the remarkable similarity of policing and criminal statutes 
between countries that are a considerable geographic distance apart is far from 
surprising since there has always been a high degree of ‘knowledge transfer’ between 
jurisdictions and police forces.
240
 Representative police officers and prosecutors have 
long been discussing new structural, procedural and technical innovations at regular 
international conferences such as the International Police Exhibition of 1851 and more 
recently at Interpol conferences.
241
 Many of the features of the ‘new’ London Police 
were reportedly copied by the cities of Boston, New York, Stockholm and Vienna 




 Den Boer notes that States tend to look to 
processes and practices in other jurisdictions for inspiration particularly in times of 
crisis.
243
 Bayley comments that in more recent times it is not unusual for police forces 
to have their own research, planning and professional standards units which 
periodically undertake research trips to foreign police forces, particularly to the 
‘flagship’ police forces in London, New York and Los Angeles.244 
 
The future of ‘codes’ as a source of police accountability 
 
The PACE Act 1984, the Irish Criminal Justice Act 1984 and the Danish 
Administration of Justice Act rationalised and clarified many of the key standards and 
procedural formalities against which police conduct can be measured. PACE, for its 
part, has been updated more than 200 times since its introduction in 1984.
245
 Issues 
such as data protection have demanded substantial amendments of various PACE 
provisions following high profile cases and tangential statutes such as the Protection 
of Freedom Act 2012. Nevertheless, the original English and Irish statutes are far 
from comprehensive. Two other major areas of public policing have since undergone 
attentive codification, namely the conduct of protest policing and covert surveillance. 
 
The matter of protest policing in England was subject to PACE-like regulation in the 
Public Order Acts of 1986 and 1994 which enumerated a number of steps that police 
commanders must take to engage with protestors both before and during a protest in 
order to minimise the possibility of disorder.
246
 The 1986 Act was introduced in part 
to mitigate growing public concern about the increasing frequency with which police 
forces across England were using force to disperse and arrest groups of protestors, 
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particularly miners protesting over changed pay and working conditions.
247
 With a 
presumption in favour of protest, once notified of a planned protest police 
commanders must enter into pre-protest negotiations with protestors to arrange 
venues, routes and times so that the police force can facilitate a protest while ensuring 
the safety of the protestors and the local population and property.
248
 Subsequent case 
law has elucidated that specially-dressed and equipped riot police should only be 
dispatched on the basis of credible information and intelligence.
249
 Riot police are to 
be subjected to strict supervision and direction by their supervising officers, normally 
sergeants, on the ground to ensure that they remain disciplined and calm in the face of 
hostility and danger.
250
 Any cordons imposed which restrict the movements of 
civilians must be justifiable and must be lifted as soon as practicable.
251
 From a 
comparative perspective, the ethos of the Public Order Act 1986 did not find shape or 
form in Ireland for nearly ten years. Ireland’s Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 
1994 largely mimicked the 1986 Act, prescribing the basic police powers of direction, 
cordon and arrest and the connected offences of breach of the peace, threatening 




The increasing importance of procedural codes is particularly well reflected in the 
respective approaches of the legislatures to the regulation of covert surveillance. 
TPACE was followed by the Interception of Communications Act 1985 but, much 
like PACE, the statute was not introduced as part of some noble effort to engender 
police accountability but rather in response to another police scandal. The ECtHR 
ruled in 1984 that the interception laws, which were largely enunciated at common 
law, did not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and limitations of police 
powers.
253
 In response, the 1985 Act outlined relatively descriptive procedures for the 
interception of postal mail and communications. However, as communication and 
surveillance technologies rapidly advanced beyond the scope of the Act, the ECtHR 
once again reached a similar conclusion in 1999 about the clarity of the measures.
254
 
Fijnaut and Marx observed at the time that emerging mobile telephone and computer 
technologies which enabled police officers to remotely tap telephones and computers 
had served to tear asunder conventional notions of privacy which had not been 
adequately addressed.
255
 The Legislature appeared to be operating behind the curve, 
beckoning the same perils that inflicted police procedure and accountability prior to 
PACE.  Rules and regulations in place had become outdated and unfit for purpose 
long before the legislature took action to remedy the prevalent legislative gap. 
 
Moreover the 1985 Act dealt primarily with one specific area of covert surveillance, 
largely ignoring the issues of undercover police officers and informants. Undercover 
police officers at the time were reportedly routinely engaging in activities which 
amounted to complicity in crime to protect their cover or were involved in unfairly 
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‘entrapping’ criminals by actively encouraging criminal behaviour.256 Nadelmann 
contends that many controversial investigative methods were inspired and encouraged 
by the American Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) which was reportedly 
pressurising all major West European police forces to disrupt the international drug 
networks as part of America’s global ‘War on Drugs’ in the 1980s.257 Ultimately, it 
was not until 2000 that the English legislature took steps to rectify the stark absence 
of statutory guidance and legislative gaps by introducing the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) which repealed the 1985 Act. 
 
The RIPA Act 2000 effectively introduced a PACE-style ethos to the area of covert 
surveillance for the first time. It provided that in urgent circumstances intrusive 
surveillance, which generally constitutes planting audio or video surveillance 
equipment in a private dwelling, could be independently authorised by a deputy or 
assistant chief constable for up to 72 hours.
258
 Long-term intrusive surveillance could 
be authorised by chief police officers for up to 3 months or by the Home Secretary for 
up to 6 months.
259
 Most importantly, like the ethos of recording and review applied 
throughout the PACE Act, almost all authorisations under the Act required notice to 
be given to a Surveillance Commissioner appointed by the Home Secretary who had 
to independently review all actions either post factum or upon application.
260
 In a 
similar fashion to PACE, the Home Secretary was required to introduce detailed 
secondary codes of practice. They now include the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers (Interception of Communications Code of Practice) Order 2002; the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert Surveillance and Property Interference 
Code of Practice) Order 2010 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert 
Human Intelligence Sources) Order 2010.  
 
A major concern from the perspective of police accountability is that it ultimately 
took the legislators until 2010 to realise the basic PACE-style ethos of procedural 
clarity across the broader range of police powers and processes. Most importantly, the 
legislature’s experience with the Interception of Communications Act 1985 shows 
that law makers cannot afford to rest on their laurels but must continuously strive to 
ensure that the relevant statutory procedures and standards are commensurate to 
emerging technologies and evolving police practices. The evolving jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR suggests that codes of procedure remain far from perfect, finding against 
the UK in recent years for maintaining substandard legislation that enabled the largely 
unfettered and unnecessary retention of DNA samples in the case of S and Marper as 
well as the use of routine stop and search cordons without reasonable suspicion in the 
case of Gillan and Quinton.
261
 Although its suite of measures evidently requires 
constant improvement, the legislature appears to have comprehensively embraced the 
fundamental importance of procedural codes as a crucial source and standard for 
police accountability. 
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In comparison, Ireland appears to have fallen considerably behind the curve. Aside 
from its responsive legislative action in 1984, Ireland not only waited ten years to 
introduce a lacklustre Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994 but the UK’s 
Interception of Communications Act 1985 and more substantive RIPA Act 2000 only 
found favour in Ireland belatedly through the Interception of Postal Packets and 
Telecommunications Messages Act 1993 and the more substantive Criminal Justice 
(Surveillance) Act 2009 respectively. Walsh suggests that Ireland’s lacklustre 
approach to procedural clarity and international ‘best practice’ is due largely to the 
fact that the Irish Government does not carry out major inquiries into police structures 
and procedures with the same regularity and rigour as the English Parliament.
262
 He 
observes that although numerous disparate and piecemeal reports and reviews by 
various consultants and committees have been commissioned by the Irish Government 
over the past number of decades, concerning narrow administrative subjects such as 
pay, working conditions, reorganisation of resources and station closures, the Irish 
police has never been subject to a comprehensive root and branch review similar to 




Although Denmark’s Administration of Justice Act was already highly programmatic, 
the benchmark procedural standards of the AJA were also afflicted with severe 
inadequacies as emerging technologies began to facilitate previously unregulated 
police practices. Evidence presented by Danish detectives in court which was derived 
from the interception of communications, electronic surveillance and undercover 
work was increasingly being challenged by defence lawyers on the basis that 
suspects’ constitutional rights were being unlawfully breached in the absence of a 
statutory framework for covert surveillance.
264
 The inadmissibility of evidence was 
particularly problematic for Danish police districts which were increasingly engaging 
in covert surveillance to investigate a ‘biker war’ between the Hells Angels and 
Bandidos in the early 1990s.
265
 The gangs were reportedly engaging in widespread 





Mirroring the developments in England, new codified measures concerning the 
interception of communications measures were added to the AJA in 1985.
267
 For 
instance, the new suite of measures provided that, in cases of urgency, senior police 
officers could engage in covert surveillance and retrospectively apply for a court order 
within 24 hours.
268
 The Danish measures were updated and augmented by substantial 
measures concerning electronic surveillance, undercover and covert property searches 
in 1995 and ’96 at the height of the ‘biker’ war.269 In various respects, the new Danish 
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provisions arguably facilitated even greater transparency and accountability than the 
comparable English measures. Communications interceptions and to a lesser extent 
undercover operations required a special attorney to be appointed unknown to the 
suspect to represent the suspect’s interests and rights during in camera petitions for 




The experience of the three jurisdictions shows that legislatures now routinely rely on 
procedural statutes to regulate police procedure. Although the common law 
jurisdictions were previously concerned largely with the issue of police ‘powers’, 
leaving the responsibility of guiding police ‘process’ to the internal hierarchical police 
organisation, they have belatedly realised the importance of clear procedural guidance 
and the fundamental role the legislature must play in formulating and implementing it. 
The extension of the ‘codification’ ethos to protest policing and, more particularly, to 
the conduct of covert investigations in recent years shows that highly programmatic 
and formulaic codes of procedure are increasingly becoming a necessity across all 
facets of police procedure. Most importantly, the belated introduction of legislation 
and secondary regulations to regulate the conduct of covert investigations in the 2000s 
shows that legislators must remain responsive to the emergence of previously 
unregulated forms of police practice.  
 
The comparative analysis shows that although legislators have evidently recognised 
the importance of introducing and maintaining procedural police guidance there are 
clear discrepancies in standards across England, Ireland and Denmark. The three 
jurisdictions may have comparable statutes in place at present but they vary in detail. 
Moreover, they were introduced in a piecemeal manner across time and place. One 
jurisdiction had a highly programmatic and formulaic framework in place when 
another did not. None of the jurisdictions could claim to maintain a rigorously high 
standard of procedural guidance at all times. The situation indicates the need for more 
robust signalling mechanisms within the States and perhaps more rapid ‘knowledge 
transfer’ between the States. The European Union would appear to be an appropriate 
construct to stimulate and facilitate such cooperation. 
 
The issue of ‘co-option’ 
 
“The police view the law with profound cynicism, both as a code they are 
expected to enforce upon others and as a set of constraints under which they 
must conduct themselves”.271 
 
Although statutory and administrative ‘codes’ are an important source or engine for 
police accountability, they are not introduced and applied in a vacuum.
272
 Police 
forces are characterised by a number of entrenched ideologies, processes and practices 
which significantly determine the nature of their engagement with legal rules and 
norms. Herbert Packer conveys the problem eloquently when he comments that ‘there 
are two kinds of problems that need to be dealt with in any model of the criminal 
process. One is what the rules shall be. The other is how the rules shall be 
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implemented’.273 Similarly, Anderson states that policy makers cannot simply 
introduce new measures to satisfy the expectations of the public but they must take 
account of the extant law enforcement practices that determine whether and to what 
extent such measures are given effect.
274
 For Loader and Mulcahy, many of these 
values, norms and institutional practices are deeply rooted or entrenched in the 





The concept of police ‘co-option’ denotes the social and cultural space that exists 
between law and practice, the often complex social and cultural factors that shape and 
define the application of legal codes and principles in practice. Although the criminal 
law typically consists of defined prohibitions and offences which are technically 
without equivocation, common convention is that police officers must interpret the 
true intention of criminal laws to ‘fit’ legal rules and principles to highly dynamic and 
unique cases.
276
 Police officers are expected to use their own intuition, communal 
values, sensibilities, pragmatism and ‘common sense’ to meet the ends of justice and 
order rather than zealously adhering to the letter of the law in many cases.
277
 Manning 
comments that since the law does not and indeed cannot define the dense web of 
social values, meanings and actions that a police officer must navigate, the law must 
be considered to be a ‘crude’ instrument.278 The crude nature of the criminal law is 
largely why common law jurisdictions tend to ‘frame’ legislation according to legal 
principles that can be fitted to innumerable scenarios.
279
 Banton conveys that policing 




The examination of ‘co-option’ should play a fundamental role in any consideration 
of police accountability since it requires the relevant social, cultural and 
administrative factors to be examined and potentially approved or remedied by 
appropriate mechanisms of oversight. The examination of police practice should shed 
light on the issues of whether and to what extent legal statutes and principles are being 
appropriately interpreted and applied by police officers on the ground. In the absence 
of appropriate oversight, police officers could be mis-interpreting the law according to 
deviant personal or institutional values and sensibilities which are not widely shared 
by the broader community.
281
 Alternatively, police officers could be systemically 
avoiding onerous processes out of simple inertia due to a lack of managerial 
oversight. Moreover, police officers could be actively avoiding certain statutory 
requirements which are unpopular with local communities.
282
 An appreciation of the 
relevant social, cultural and administrative factors should ultimately enable legislators 
and wider civil society to approve of their police forces’ systemic interpretation and 
application of the law, thereby giving a degree of legitimacy and public consent to 
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 Deviant practices might signal that clearer legal provisions or 
perhaps more flexible legal frameworks are required. The fact that the law often 
passes through a number of social, cultural and administrative filters before it is 
applied by the police officer in practice signals the fundamental importance of 
mechanisms of complaint and inquiry, which should serve to monitor and legitimise 
this interpretative process.  
 
The chapter focuses on one particular entrenched feature of modern public policing 
that has a significant bearing on the application of statutory and administrative 
‘codes’, namely police discretion. Police discretion essentially affords police officers 
significant leeway to make decisions about the merits of a case. It allows for the fact 
that there are a variety of ways for police officers to conduct themselves morally, 
particularly when faced with conflicting circumstances.
284
 Lustgarten notes that 
discretion is exercised where the administrative limits on a police officer’s power 
leave him free to make a choice amongst possible courses of action or inaction.
285
 
Reiner conveys that the exercise of discretion has played a large part in shaping the 
‘values, norms, perspectives and craft rules’ that inform the conduct of police officers 
and give shape to the global idea of ‘police culture’.286 It is well established that the 
feature of police discretion not only has a significant bearing on the conduct of police 
officers in common law jurisdictions like England and Ireland but also in civil law 




The principle of police discretion occupies an ambiguous but highly important 
position in police theory. Since the publication in 1964 of Michael Banton’s ground-
breaking study of the activities of police officers within a number of Scottish and 
American police forces in The Policeman in the Community, it has become common 
convention that police forces spend only a small proportion of their time actually 
enforcing the law and arresting offenders.
288
 This is due largely to the fact that violent 
crimes such as aggravated assault, rape and homicide typically represent a relatively 
small proportion of all reported crime.
289
 Maguire’s research in 2000/01, which 
pertained strictly to England and Wales, indicated that only 12 percent of all recorded 
offences pertained to violence against the person.
290
 The vast majority of instances 
that a police force must deal with typically concern relatively minor crime or the 
simple resolution of conflicts between couples, neighbours, business partners, drunks 
and assisting persons in emergencies or life-threatening situations.
291
 Bittner 
comments that the police work is concerned predominantly with people in trouble and 
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The anomaly of police discretion is a major feature of police work for the simple fact 
that the resolution of a domestic or business dispute, an altercation between inebriated 
persons or drunks on the street, the unintentional harm of a child by a parent or 
accidental property damage is often best served by police officers imparting advice or 
issuing a caution instead of arresting the transgressor with a view to prosecution.
293
 
Reiner remarks that the arrest of a person for noisiness, public disturbance, loitering 
and ‘victimless’ crimes such as street commerce and public alcohol consumption may 
clearly not serve the interests of justice where a warning or advice may be more 
proportionate and fair.
294
 Waddington observes that warnings or advice carry 
significant weight because of the very real underlying threat of the enforcement of law 
if the advice is not followed.
295
 Banton conveys that since police officers frequently 
‘under-enforce’ the law by imparting advice rather than executing an arrest, only 
specialised detectives tasked with investigating the small proportion of serious and 
violent crime can actually be described as routine ‘law enforcers’.296 
 
Goldstein conveys that the majority of police officers in democratic societies 
ultimately do not deal primarily with criminal codes but with the residual problems of 
society.
297
 Punch describes statutory codes and legal rules as little more than 
‘rhetoric’, somewhat removed from the informal ‘operational code’ that is applied in 
practice.
298
 Walker comments that the General Instructions effectively represented a 
police force’s interpretation of the extant laws and regulations coupled with lessons 
learned from the poor application of police powers compiled into a single set of 
‘management rules’ which give shape and context to the often obscure principled 
legislation and case law.
299
 Muir’s ground-breaking research described patrolmen as 
‘streetcorner politicians’ to reflect the nexus of informal agreements that police 
patrolmen formed and maintained with the drug users, prostitutes, drunks, vagrants 
and loitering youths on their beat.
300
 Bayley and Bittner indicate that the ‘informal’ 
operational code may involve a soft tone of voice to calm an aggressor, a strict tone to 
assert authority, separating couples and addressing each one individually, avoiding 
belittling aggressors at all costs or employing humour and banter to encourage 
individuals to comply with instructions instead of resorting to coercive force.
301
 
Similarly, Goldstein gives little credence to the role of formal legal rules, regulations 
and codes of procedure as standard-bearers for police conduct, commenting that they 
are normally trumped in practice by the officer’s own ‘working rules’ to address or 
defuse specific situational contexts.
302
 Waddington suggests that by virtue of the fact 
that police officers frequently threaten to enforce the law without actually doing so, 
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Nevertheless, it is well established in legal jurisprudence that the exercise of police 
discretion must meet a number of key criteria.
304
 Walsh notes that the landmark 
Wednesbury test formulated at common-law indicates that police officers must call 
their attention to matters which they are bound to consider and to exclude from their 
considerations matters which are irrelevant or inappropriate for the making of an 
impartial rational decision.
305
 Failure to do so may render any subsequent action 
unlawful.
306
 Similarly, choosing to ignore a reported offence is not an option and can 
give rise at the very least to disciplinary action or a civil suit on the basis of 
negligence. Waddington notes that the exercise of discretion ultimately requires a 
police officer to take all relevant factors into consideration, weigh the options, 




Furthermore, Muir’s research indicates that the avoidance of complaint is a major 
factor impinging on a police officer’s discretionary decision-making process.308 He 
observed that a police officer will typically ensure that the victim is reasonably 
satisfied with the outcome and that if the use of force is required, the target will not 
complain about overwhelming or disproportionate force.
309
 Wilson remarks that 
forefront at the officer’s mind is generally the issue of whether an arrest will improve 
the situation, will anyone be unjustly deprived if no arrests are made and will there be 
a complaint if there is no arrest.
310
 Manning found that police officers are most likely 
to pursue a course of action which is unlikely to be challenged or more importantly 
reach public attention.
311
 Punch remarks that the avoidance of complaint ultimately 
requires police officers to become ‘chameleons’ instinctively changing colours to fit 




The common convention of discretion can be found at English law as an implicit tenet 
of early internal guidance to the public police, within the obiter dicta of tangential 
criminal and civil cases and more recently within the College of Policing Code of 
Ethics.
313
 The Preface to the General Instructions issued in 1829, for instance, 
outlined that police officers must be cautious not to interfere idly or unnecessarily and 
to act with friendship when dealing with innocent civilians, vulnerable people and 
human suffering.
314
 Rawlings conveys that discretionary conduct has always been a 
fundamental tenet of policing and can be traced back to the ancient Norman constable 
of the Middle Ages who regularly employed discretion when dealing with public 
order disturbances, informal street trade, the regulation of ale houses, vagrants and 
prostitution amongst other offences.
315
 The principle of discretion can also be found in 
the continental civil law systems wherein police officers are not required to refer 
                                                 
304
 Walsh (n43) 155, 332 
305
 ibid 330 – 334 referring to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation 




 Waddington (n176) 38 
308




 Wilson (n25) 84 
311
 Manning (n39) 199, 200 
312
 Punch (n49) 3 
313
 Code of Ethics (College of Policing 2014) 5.5 
314
 Muir (n293) 186, 187 
315
 Rawlings (n188) 49 – 54, 59 - 62  
 47 
decisions to their commanding officers and are encouraged to use their discretion to 




The exercise of police discretion clearly has major ramifications for police 
accountability for it enables police officers to choose when, if and how to enforce the 
criminal law.
317
 The exercise of discretion effectively means that the full potential of 
criminal laws, whether old or new, can be significantly diluted in practice.
318
 The 
effect of new tougher legislative sanctions or prohibitions can potentially be reduced 
to nil if police officers choose not to enforce the relevant offence on a case by case 
basis thereby undermining the influence of the legislature as a law making body.
319
 
More particularly, the exercise of discretion essentially enables police officers to 
unilaterally decide the ends of justice and dispose of a case on the street.
320
 Reiss and 
Bordua observe that the exercise of discretion effectively usurps the role of the rule-
orientated judiciary.
321
 Reiner remarks that the exercise of discretion enables the 




Banton’s pioneering work of 1964 attracted serious academic attention to the issue of 
police discretion largely for the first time. It served to bring into focus the importance 
and, more particularly, the capacity of the internal hierarchical system of police 
oversight and discipline to monitor this peculiar area of ‘low visibility’.323 A 
particular concern was that due to the lack of visibility the internal police hierarchy 
was largely incapable of monitoring and swiftly addressing the erroneous exercise of 
discretion or, even more controversially, the prejudiced exercise of discretion on the 
basis of a police officer’s own sexist or racist views.324 Lustgarten comments that a 
constable’s discretion is paradoxically greatest when he chooses not to invoke the law 
for it will seldom come to his superiors notice.
325
 Skogan remarks that where no arrest 
is made, the quality of a police officer’s decision to ‘under-enforce’ the law is almost 
impossible for the internal hierarchical regime to evaluate after the fact due to the lack 
of a record.
326
 Wilson famously observed that police forces have the special property 
that discretion actually increases as one moves down the hierarchy due to the 





Lustgarten notes that although the principle of discretion has been used as a semantic 
sponge to refer colloquially to the capacity of police administrators to decide which 
resources to apportion to which investigations or which local crime strategies to 
pursue over others, police discretion in its analytical sense pertains primarily to the 
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issue of whether and to what extent an officer should evoke the criminal law during 
police-civilian interactions.
328
 It was clearly obvious to almost all of the early 
commentators that more transparent mechanisms of supervision and complaint were 
needed to keep the exercise of discretion under review.
329
 Reiss states that regardless 
of the benefits of police discretion, police officers cannot be permitted to act with 
impunity and must be held accountable for their actions across all areas of police 
work.
330
 Bayley remarks that a failure of the internal hierarchical organisation to 
vigorously evaluate the exercise of police discretion in the context of domestic 
disputes, emergencies and juvenile altercations is like not evaluating a school on 
whether children can read or write by simply assuming they can do so out of mere 
social matriculation.
331
 Effective and transparent signalling mechanisms of complaint 
and inquiry are clearly needed to determine whether and to what extent the ‘low 





Making inroads into police discretion 
 
Clearly there is a significant degree of variance between law and practice heralding 
the importance of mechanisms of complaint and inquiry so that the appropriateness of 
police conduct can be actively measured against a clear procedural standard. Before 
examining the traditional mechanisms of police accountability in the form of 
disciplinary, legal and democratic measures, it is submitted that modern ‘codes of 
procedure’ have actually made significant inroads into police discretion in recent 
years. When theorists such as Reiner, Punch and Waddington refer to statutory codes 
and criminal laws as ‘crude instruments’ that are ‘trumped’ in practice by informal 
‘working rules’ they are clearly referring by and large to the criminal law.333 The 
criminal law pertains largely to criminal offences on the statute book such as the 
indictable offence of possessing illicit drugs or summary offences such as vagrancy. 
The purpose of police discretion is to ensure that instead of charging every person 
found in such situations according to a rationale of full enforcement or zero tolerance, 
police officers can instead use their own intuition, communal values and sensibilities 
to deduce whether it is appropriate, fair and constructive to pursue a prosecution in 
each case. It is submitted that while this ethos applies to ‘criminal codes’, it does not 
apply to modern ‘procedural codes’ of police procedure and the complementary 
internal disciplinary regime to nearly the same extent. 
 
It is submitted that a police officer’s relationship to the criminal law concerns decision 
and choice whereas their relationship to the statutory codes of procedure and the 
complementary internal disciplinary regime concerns process and behaviour. The 
internal disciplinary regimes are designed, for the most part, to ensure that police 
officers’ conduct themselves in an ethical manner whether or not they decide to 
invoke the criminal law, focusing predominantly on behaviour rather than the matter 
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of decision. Police officers can choose not to invoke the criminal law but they should 
not flout the ethics of behaviour by acting unethically.  
 
More recently, modern statutory codes have focused on regulating the key processes 
before and after any decision is taken to invoke or not to invoke the criminal law.
334
 In 
other words, police discretion enables police officers to choose whether or not to 
invoke the criminal law for drug possession in an appropriate case but they cannot 
choose whether or not to follow the statutory processes circumscribed for a stop and 
search under the ‘codes of procedure’ or whether or not to be courteous to the drug 
user under the internal code of ethics. In the aftermath of the civil rights disorders in 
the USA in the late 1960s, Breatnach lamented that there were police guidelines for 
the wearing of uniforms but not for how to intervene in a domestic dispute, for the 
cleaning of a revolver but not when to fire it, for the use of departmental property but 
not when to break up a public altercation, for handling stray dogs but not for handling 
field interrogations.
335
 Modern ‘procedural codes’ have clearly addressed many of 
these issues. Matters of behaviour and procedure are increasingly finding elucidation 
in statute, leaving only the matter of decision to the realm of police discretion. As 
Loader cogently conveys, modern legal rules and codes of procedure appear to have 
significantly narrowed the ‘discretionary space’.336 The thesis will convey in latter 
chapters that the EU is trying to use codes of procedure to narrow the discretionary 




Following prolific policing scandals throughout the mid to late 20
th
 Century, caused 
partly by inherent weaknesses in the traditional internal regime for police 
accountability, it was clear that more programmatic processes were necessary to 
engender more human-rights compliant police processes and to facilitate greater 
police accountability. It was evident that the ‘constitutional paradox’ between the 
State’s obligation to deter and vindicate criminal harms and the State’s obligation to 
respect fundamental human rights could not be simply assumed or left to the 
hierarchical police organisation and the police officer on the ground to reconcile.
337
 
Bullock and Johnson convey that the naïve assumption that police officers are both 
willing and capable of undertaking such reconciliations is highly impractical, illusory 
and considerably unfair on the public police.
338
 Programmatic and formulaic statutory 
codes are evidently needed to guide police procedure and to ensure that police 




The modern evolution of national statutory codes marks a dramatic paradigm shift, 
particularly in common law jurisdictions. National legislatures have been forced to 
recognise the need for statutory guidance and have assumed relatively proactive roles 
in defining police procedure to an unprecedented extent. The need for highly 
programmatic and formulaic statutory codes of procedure has become so entrenched 
that the ECtHR now regularly holds that in order for police powers to be compatible 
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with the ‘rule of law’ they must not only be enunciated in law but must be formulated 
with sufficient precision to indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any coercive 
powers conferred on public officials.
340
 As Walsh iterates, it is clear that the ‘rule of 
law’ now demands that police powers, procedures and concomitant human rights 
protections are elucidated and clarified through detailed statutory provisions and 
codes of practice which are publicly accessible and regularly updated.
341
 This 
remarkable paradigm shift has taken place only within the last thirty years, a radical 
and relatively rapid development in the context of police history. Moreover, it appears 
to bring common law jurisdictions closer into line with their continental counterparts 
in Europe. As Loader and Walker argue, the neo-liberal school of thought around the 
perceived reduction of state involvement in criminal justice matters does not appear to 
transfer to the field of public policing which apparently needs continuous and perhaps 
even more enhanced regulation to define and limit the conduct of police officers, not 
less.
342
 Waddington conveys that modern codes of procedure, such as PACE, should 




Of particular interest to this analysis is the fact that this remarkable evolutionary step 
has been taken by England, Ireland and Denmark largely in unison. There have been 
discrepancies across time and place but by 2009/ ’10 each of the three jurisdictions 
had a broadly similar suite of procedural codes regulating police powers and 
processes of stop and search, arrest, interrogation, detention, protest containment, 
covert surveillance, undercover work and the handling of informants. From a 
theoretical perspective, the evidence at hand would suggest that there are enough 
similarities across the three jurisdictions to draw the conclusion that statutory ‘codes 
of procedure’ have increasingly become a defining feature of policing systems, 
largely for the purposes of police accountability. In striving to engender procedural 
clarity, legal precision and human-rights compliance, the modern procedural codes 
together with the traditional suite of internal general instructions and disciplinary 
infractions establish a clear and legally precise standard against which police conduct 
can be measured. One of the basic questions of police accountability, namely ‘what 
for?’ has been answered emphatically in recent times by the national legislatures by 
way of highly programmatic and formulaic statutory codes. However, whether and to 
what extent the modern signalling mechanisms of complaint and inquiry ensure that 
police conduct remains in line with the procedural codes and, most importantly, 
whether the extant procedural codes are sufficient in their own right are crucial 
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Ch. 2 Complaint and inquiry within the Member States 
 
‘Language which is without embellishment, apparatus, construction or 
reconstruction, language in the naked state, is the language closest to truth 
and the language in which the truth is expressed’.344 
 
The signalling mechanisms of complaint and inquiry are the constructs most readily 
associated with police accountability.
345
 Purported definitions typically convey that 
police accountability is concerned with requiring police officers, and the institutions 
to which they belong, to explain, justify and answer for their conduct through internal, 
external and political mechanisms. The previous chapter conveyed that ‘codes’, which 
set the standard for police conduct, are considerably important but thus far 
fundamentally underappreciated. From an accountability perspective, the previous 
chapter was concerned primarily with the issue of ‘what for?’ This chapter is 
concerned with the key issues of ‘to whom?’ and ‘how?’346  
 
The chapter will proceed to analyse the three primary areas of complaint and inquiry, 
namely disciplinary, legal and democratic accountability in order to investigate 
whether there are sufficient commonalities across England, Ireland and Denmark from 
which to deduce a common framework of police accountability. The chapter will 
show that some mechanisms exist to reduce the gap between the codes of procedure 
and the exercise of police discretion, such as the respective independent police 
complaints commissions, whereas other constructs aim to regulate police discretion 




The police forces’ basic internal systems for addressing police misconduct through a 





 As outlined in the previous chapter, the regime of supervision and 
sanction was originally designed to identify, punish and deter unethical and unlawful 
behaviour according to a stringent code of ethics and practice.
348
 It was well 
appreciated as early as the 19
th
 Century that police forces ran the same risk as private 
sector employers of attracting a multitude of characters ranging from authoritarian 
zealots to violent rule breakers, thrill seekers, misogynists, racists, opportunistic 
thieves, work avoiders and even cowards.
349
 The internal hierarchy of senior police 
officers, administrators and managers were expected to supervise, amend and sanction 




Reports of police misconduct have traditionally taken one of three forms, informal 
and formal complaints from members of the public, informal and formal complaints 
by fellow police officers and informal and formal complaints emanating from 
supervising officers having witnessed or identified poor procedure. Once a complaint 
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is made the primary actor is typically the police officer’s superintendent. The 
superintendent is generally expected to instruct a sergeant or inspector to examine the 
complaint by speaking with the police officer involved, the complainant, any 
witnesses and by examining the officer’s diary.351 Citing the case of Garvey v Ireland, 
Walsh remarks that the principles of natural justice demand that a police officer must 
not only be questioned about a complaint pertaining to his conduct but that he must be 





Infractions of a minor nature were traditionally dealt with by way of advice, 
admonition or warning. England (and Wales), for example, amended its formal 
procedures for dealing with minor infractions as late as 2012, requiring the holding of 
an initial formal ‘disciplinary meeting’ wherein the officer is issued an ‘action’ for 
improvement instead of the more traditional sanctions of reprimand, caution or fine.
353
 
The officer may also be asked to meet with the complainant so that both parties may 
air their grievances. Although the process, known as ‘victim reconciliation’, is quite 
popular with police supervisors and managers, Waddington reports that police officers 
dislike consenting to reconciliation as they see their attendance at a meeting as an 
admission of guilt even though they may have done nothing wrong.
354
 If there is little 
to no improvement in an officer’s conduct a second disciplinary meeting should be 
held to issue a written warning followed by a third and final meeting for the purposes 
of a final warning, followed by possible dismissal. Although not formally 
acknowledged, Walsh states that in the event of persistent minor breaches, it is not 
unusual for police chiefs to use his or her power of general direction and control to 
transfer a police officer from one division to another or from a detective branch to a 




The treatment of a complaint of a more serious nature is similar across England, 
Ireland and Denmark.
356
 When it appears to a superintendent that there may have been 
a serious breach of discipline, an officer of the rank of inspector or higher, who is 
unconnected to the complaint and the police officer’s immediate unit, should be 
appointed as an investigating officer. Following the same protocol as more minor 
complaints, the complaint should be examined by the investigating officer by 
speaking with the police officer involved, the complainant and any witnesses. 
Depending on the gravity of the claim, the accused may be suspended by the police 
chief while the investigation is ongoing. Suspension has the unfortunate consequence 
of appearing to be a sanction in itself, even supporting the accusation of misconduct, 
even though it is designed to serve not as a sanction but to safeguard against any 
possibility that evidence might be tampered with or complainants and witnesses 
coaxed or intimidated, however remote.
357
 Suspension also serves to ensure that a 
community’s confidence in the force is not undermined by the ongoing deployment of 
a police officer who is eventually found to be guilty of a serious infraction. 
 
                                                 
351
 Reiner (n48) 115, 186 
352
 Walsh (n43) 208 citing Garvey v Ireland (1981) IR 75 
353
 Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012; Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012 
354
 Waddington (n176) 169,182 
355
 Walsh (n43) 174, 175, 260 - 264 
356
 Jensen et al (n239) 46 - 69; 150 - 154  
357
 Walsh (n43) 240 - 242 
 53 
Once an investigation is complete, the investigating officer must typically submit the 
report along with a recommendation to the appointing officer who must decide if the 
complaint has merit. The investigation report should consist of an evaluation of all 
statements taken, setting out the chronological order of events before, during and after 
the incident, denoting the variations in the statements and offering an opinion on 
where the most plausible or truthful scenario lies.
358
 If it appears that a criminal 
offence may have occurred, all evidence and statements should be forwarded to the 
Prosecution Service in the respective jurisdictions so that criminal charges can be 
considered. Throughout the 19
th
 and much of the 20
th
 Centuries, in England and 
Ireland the decision to charge was typically taken by the police superintendent or 
police chief before the function was transferred to the independent national 
prosecution services to ensure greater propriety.
359
 Denmark’s police chiefs can still 
institute criminal charges in theory but the function is generally carried out by special 
prosecutors under their supervision. 
 
If however it appears to the appointing officer that serious malpractice may have 
occurred but that it does not amount to a criminal offence, a ‘disciplinary hearing’ 
should be established. The process is similar in many ways to a criminal trial whereby 
the suspect is entitled to full disclosure of charges and evidence, is entitled to be 
represented by an attorney or barrister, usually funded by the officer’s representative 
association, and is permitted to cross examine witnesses and introduce exculpatory 
evidence. Civilians who may have evidentiary value to the inquiry can usually be 
compelled to attend under threat of summary conviction, a fine or contempt of court. 
If the panel finds in favour of the complainant, a number of sanctions are usually 
available to the panel depending on the gravity of the infraction, not least forced 
resignation or dismissal. In England, the decision to sanction is taken by the panel 
itself whereas in Ireland the panel makes a recommendation but the decision is 
ultimately taken by the police commissioner.  
 
In a similar fashion to the normal criminal process, the possibility of appeal and 
judicial review can be pursued. Appeals are normally conducted by way of an 
administrative panel consisting not least of a senior judge or lawyer and the police 
chief or a senior delegate. Panels of appeal in England can also consist of a permanent 
secretary of the Home Office and a senior member of the police officer’s 
representative association or union.
360
 The appeal panel typically has all of the same 
powers and procedures as the initial inquiry to examine evidence and can call 
witnesses and may affirm, vary or set aside the original finding. Walsh notes that 
although judicial review is available for cases of dismissal an applicant cannot simply 
challenge the constitutionality of the police chief’s power to dismiss him which is 
clearly enshrined in statute and is one of the most fundamental powers of a police 




The need for external mechanisms of complaint 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the appropriateness of the internal hierarchical 
regime for addressing police misconduct was largely unquestioned due to its para-
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military nature. Raymond Fosdick observed in 1915 that the integrity of the 
complaints systems was preserved by the simple ability of police chiefs to remove 
their subordinates for indiscipline.
362
 Although somewhat naïve, this widely held 
assumption was underpinned by the fact that successive Police Commissioners in 
England and Ireland had dismissed numerous police officers for drunken, tardy and 






 Nevertheless, although 
the internal organisational system for addressing police complaints appeared at face 
value to be relatively robust, there were, and still are, a number of inherent 
weaknesses in the system. 
 
One of the major inherent weaknesses concerns the issue of police discretion. Once an 
officer has considered the merits of a case, weighed up the options and dealt with the 
incident, one of the parties involved, whether victim or aggressor, is likely to feel 
aggrieved, embarrassed or humiliated by the decision.
364
 Although the decision may 
be considered to be the most appropriate by the police officer, decisions can often 
only be ‘crude’ at best as they must be made quickly, using conflicting or inaccurate 
information and normally without the full facts of the case.
365
 Moreover, as Skolnick 
observes, police officers are expected to operate in dangerous situations and resolve 
situations quickly and authoritatively so it is not unreasonable that their emotional 





Goldsmith notes that the crude nature of the police officer’s decision making ability 
invariably means that complaints should be treated as part and parcel of the policing 
function.
367
 He adds that complaints should be considered to be a crucial source of 
‘organisational feedback’ which provides police forces with dynamic civilian 
perspectives on how and how well their officers are behaving on the street and, as 
such, should be embraced by police forces as an irrepressible source of institutional 
quality control, a tool through which the police force can reassure the public and 
promote public confidence in the police.
368
 Waddington comments that the very fact 
that people are willing to make a high volume of complaints should not lead observers 
to assume that the police are necessarily corrupt or over-zealous but that it may 





The main weakness in the traditional internal hierarchical system lies primarily with 
the ability of the police officer’s commanding officer or the investigating officer 
appointed to investigate the complaint. In a similar fashion to the way in which the 
police officer exercises discretion by considering the merits of a case, weighs up the 
options and decides whether and to what extent a clear offence has been committed, 
the police supervisor or investigator must also consider the merits of a complaint, 
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weigh up the options and decide whether and to what extent a clear infraction has 
been committed. It is submitted that three implicit factors substantially impinge upon 
the decision-making ability of the police supervisor or investigator. The factors 
include the difficulties experienced by the supervisor or investigator in securing 
statements from the officer’s colleagues, the tendency of senior police officers to 
empathise with the circumstances of the accused, and the desire of the supervisors and 
managers to protect their own position and the institutional image of the force. 
 
Firstly, the considerable difficulties experienced by police supervisors and 
investigators in securing evidence related to the complaint are premised upon a 
prevalent degree of empathy amongst police officers. Manning’s research indicates 
that one of the primary elements underpinning this anomaly is the constant presence 
of uncertainty permeating the exercise of police discretion.
370
 Even though police 
officers are expected to apply ‘common sense’ in the public interest, by doing so, they 
must live with almost boundless uncertainty and stress over whether their exercise of 
discretion will generate a complaint which could significantly impinge upon or even 
end their career.
371
 Skolnick states that the stress, danger and uncertainty of police 
work are part of the universal ‘working personality’ of police officers which generates 
empathy and loyalty amongst officers.
372
 This prevalent sense of empathy amongst 
police officers ultimately generates a marked unwillingness of officers to provide 
supervisors or investigators with incriminating evidence about a colleague’s character 
or his conduct on duty, whether spontaneously in the form of an internal complaint or 




Vollmer is often attributed with giving this long-standing problem the label of the 
‘blue wall of silence’ or ‘code of silence’, describing it in such terms before the 
Wickersham Commission into police corruption in 1929.
374
 The social solidarity 
amongst officers essentially serves to reduce the degree of uncertainty that police 
officers would otherwise face on a day-to-day basis. Manning conveys that this blue 
wall of silence helps police officers to ensure the same day-to-day job security that 
most private sector employees take for granted.
375
 This feature of group loyalty or 
‘occupational solidarity’ has become one of the central features of the common 
abstract concept of ‘police culture’.376 Bayley remarks that it is somewhat ironic that 
police officers, who are typically classed as conservatives because they advocate swift 
and sure punishment for criminals, tend to excuse their fellow police officers whereas 
liberals, who are commonly associated with community activism, tend to show much 





Secondly, with respect to the empathy of the supervising or investigating officers, 
while senior police officers claim to approach each complaint in earnest, research 
indicates that police officers are reluctant to second guess the decisions taken by their 
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 While it is relatively easy for a police supervisor or manager to 
identify corrupt conduct or criminal offences which are intentional by definition, it is 
far from easy in practice for police supervisors to identify and sanction police conduct 
that is not corrupt or unlawful but simply unethical. The supervisor or investigator 
must consider whether the officer’s conduct falls within the acceptable range of 
ethical actions that a reasonable police officer might take in light of the situation that 
confronts him or her. Waddington observes that deciding whether a crime has or has 
not been committed, whether harm was accidental or deliberate or whether 
punishment would be appropriate is often a considerable task.
379
 Research indicates 
that police administrators and investigators typically empathise with the fact that 
officers must make decisions without complete information when dealing with 
characters who are often highly emotional, aggressive, disrespectful or under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol and must do so without deferring the responsibility of 
decision-making to more senior officers.
380
 Police forces generally do not require their 
police officers to consult with their superiors before reaching decisions in most 




Bittner conveys that because of this permanent uncertainty which afflicts police 
officers, the prevailing attitude of police supervisors is to instead engender loyalty by 
sparing their subordinates the stress and uncertainty of constant scrutiny.
382
 Moreover, 
as Wilson observes, the police supervisor, who is responsible for the morale of his 
men and typically only has the word of the officer and that of the complainant, often 
an unsavoury character, is logically more inclined to believe the word of his officer.
383
 
Walsh comments that a number of major tribunals in Ireland have identified that 
investigating officers, who are themselves police officers, are prone to attributing 
considerable weight and truth to the account of police officers instead of taking a 




As Bittner outlines, the internal hierarchical system is effectively weakened in 
practice by the systemic tendency of police managers to breed loyalty through 
collusion and complicity rather than good leadership.
385
 Sanders and Young’s 
research indicates that this detrimental feature of police oversight severely 
undermines the supposed hierarchy of police oversight, starting with the most basic 
role of custody officer who is central to the PACE provisions regulating detention 
procedures.
386
 Although the custody officer is expected to review the patrolman or 
investigator’s reasons for and manner of arrest, custody officers reportedly defer 
largely to the judgement of the arresting officer, effectively turning the custody report 
into a rubber-stamping exercise. They argue that the lack of oversight by line 
managers and custody officers effectively leads to the erosion of basic principles of 
standards such as reasonable suspicion and the minimal use of force which are at once 
so fundamental to the idea of democratic policing.
387
 Kleinig succinctly conveys that 
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although the processes of discipline and ethics were traditionally concerned as though 
all problems occur at the police-community interface, many of systematic problems 
have their genesis within the police organisation, starting particularly with police 




The third issue, the desire of the supervisor to protect their own position and the 
institutional image of the force, is equally problematic. Roebuck and Barker suggest 
that police managers tend to avoid dealing with serious complaints, particularly those 
complaints concerning corruption, in order to present a good yet superficial image to 
their superiors and the general public with the aim of preserving the good standing of 
the force and, more critically, the longevity of their own position and tenure.
389
 Reiss 
observed as early as 1971 that police supervisors had a tendency to ‘manipulate’ 
complaints, to ‘cool’ citizens out of complaining by offering superficial reassurance 
that the officer would be dealt with.
390
 More recently, Goldsmith’s research indicates 
that supervising officers show a reluctance to record complaints in the first instance in 





Waddington observes that one tactic employed by police supervisors is to treat most 
complaints as minor infractions, resolving them by way of informal advice rather than 
formal and recorded admonishment.
392
 Walsh notes that another typical tactic is to 
delay any inquiries until such time as the suggested misconduct becomes irrelevant.
393
 
Marx outlines how police line-managers actually have a tendency to put further 
distance between themselves and a complaint the worse the complaint is.
394
 
Complaints about the conduct of Special Branch detectives were reportedly often 
deflected by informing the complainant that the case was highly sensitive and that the 
police force was entitled to withhold information pertaining to the case even in a court 
of law.
395
 Punch notes that the famous Mollen Commission into police corruption in 
the US sharply stated that police supervisors appeared to fear the consequences of a 
corruption scandal more than the corruption itself.
396
 Muir remarks that this 
organisational ethos is not unique to police forces since in any organisation a tendency 
exists to displace the needs of its clientele for its own good.
397
 Anderson et al indicate 
that police administrators are typically more concerned with ‘getting the job done’ 
rather than how and how well it is carried out.
398
 Van Maanen observes that the police 
force in reality represents a ‘mock bureaucracy’, representing only the appearance of 
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Reuss-Ianni and Ianni argue that the approach to complaints by the police 
management has become so entrenched that it can be described as a discernible ‘sub-
culture’ or ‘management culture’.400 They indicate that the tendency towards avoiding 
disciplinary action has become so entrenched that when senior officers do move to 
bring disciplinary charges against rank and file police officers that their subordinates 
feel that such efforts are being arbitrarily or unfairly undertaken for the purposes of 
laying the blame for a complaint further down the chain of command. They suggest 
that the prevailing ethos has engendered a confrontational street cop versus 
management cop narrative.
401
 It is suggested that the rank and file police officers 
employ two informal codes, a code of loyalty towards other cops and a code of 




One of the most important facets of this organisational ethos, aside from the clear 
avoidance of police accountability, is that the complicity of fellow officers and 
managers can feed the impression that rule breaking is an acceptable or even a 
necessary part of policing.
403 Roebuck and Barker’s research in 1974 indicated that 
not only will the unchecked corrupt actions of one officer effectively encourage and, 
in most cases require other officers in a unit to engage in corruption, but any 
newcomers to the team will be encouraged to abide by the team’s ethos, whether it 
involves frequently resorting to street justice, falsifying evidence, accepting bribes or 
stealing cash during property searches.
404
 The nonchalant institutional attitude 
effectively enables police officers to act corruptly, whether it is the patrolman on the 
street resorting to abusive ‘street justice’, the detective falsifying evidence in the name 
of ‘noble cause corruption’ or the police officer flagrantly stealing items or cash 




‘Noble cause corruption’ or the ‘Dirty Harry syndrome’ which is often referred to as 
being ‘bent for the job’ generally entails a police officer acting unlawfully or 
unethically purportedly in the public interest.
406
 It may involve fabricating evidence, 
forcing falsified confessions through oppressive interrogation techniques, committing 
perjury through false testimony or using excessive or unwarranted force to administer 
punishment beatings in the knowledge that the ‘real’ evidence is insufficient to bring a 
prosecution or a substantial jail term for a deserving criminal.
407
 Roebuck and Barker 
draw a line between being ‘bent for the job’ and ‘bent for self’, conveying that the 
latter generally involves the selfish taking or receiving of money in the form of 
kickbacks, shakedowns, protection money or simple opportunistic theft.
408
 
Westmarland’s research indicates that police officers generally have no difficulty 
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differentiating between minor infractions and serious misconduct, noble or selfish 




Sherman observed in 1977 that the degree of loyalty amongst police officers up and 
down the hierarchy of command and the managerial aversion to complaint meant that 
police corruption is typically not caused by the deviance of one particular corrupt 
patrolman or investigator but was more of ‘a management problem’.410 Reiss argues 
that systemic police corruption is directly attributable to the police management’s 
aversion to investigating and sanctioning misconduct, so much so that the police 
management can invariably be considered complicit in police deviance and 
corruption.
411
 Punch conveys that police corruption is ultimately not individual but 
institutional.
412
 He argues that corrupt police officers are, by and large, ‘not born but 
made’ by the embedded institutional ethos.413  
 
To a similar extent, Bayley states that the organisational climate is ultimately the most 
important determinant of the extent or pervasiveness of police corruption.
414
 







 Centuries have found that entire units and 
departments have become complicit in systemic police corruption due to poor 
oversight and management.
415
 These include the London Metropolitan Police drug 
and vice squads in the 1960s and ‘70s, the Knapp Commission of Inquiry into 
Allegations of Corruption within the NYPD in 1970 and the Rampart Inquiry into an 
LAPD anti-gang ‘CRASH’ unit in 2000 amongst others.416  
 
Punch notes that the sheer weight of case law suggests that detective bureaus which 
deal with cash seizures on a regular basis, whether it is small amounts of cash seized 
during vice raids or much larger amounts connected to drug crime, are particularly 
susceptible to systemic corruption.
417
 He conveys that while drug and vice squads 
officers are often found to be bent-for-self, counter-terrorism officers are often found 
to be bent-for-the-job in their pursuit of enhancing national security.
418
 Roebuck and 
Barker comment that the insular, protective environment that permeates the internal 
supervision and sanction of police detectives, or the lack thereof, has led to the 





The Mollen Commission of Investigation into Allegations of Police Corruption within 
the NYPD in 1992 found that police officers continue to prioritise loyalty over 
integrity.
420
 As recently as 2007, in the Irish case of Shortt v Commissioner of an 
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Garda Siochana the presiding judge stated that the manner in which ‘members set 
about concocting evidence and subsequently persisted in trying to cover up their 
misdeeds, not entirely out of sight of their colleagues, displayed a worrying 
confidence on their part that they could get away with it’.421 Similarly, the Irish 
Smithwick Tribunal in 2013 stated ‘there prevails a prioritisation of the protection of 
the good name of the force over the protection of those who seek to tell the truth, 
loyalty is prized over honesty’.422 Each of these relatively modern cases concerns the 
attitudes and working practices of detective units and show that the inherent 
weaknesses in the internal hierarchical police regime remain. The thesis will convey 
in latter chapters that the suspicion of systemic corruption within detective bureaus is 
also a particularly important determinant of the quality of police cooperation across 
borders. 
 
From an accountability and transparency perspective, the net effect is that the police 
force’s internal disciplinary regime is effectively trumped in practice by the police 
force’s own informal ‘blue code of silence’ that runs up and down the police 
hierarchy.
423
 Conway observes that after the Morris Tribunal, which sat between 2002 
and 2006, the Irish government tried to make some headway into penetrating the blue 
wall of silence ethos.
424
 In order to address the finding that police officers refused to 
divulge information pertaining to their activities apparently without fear of sanction or 
regard for the integrity of the Inquiry, the new Garda Siochana (Disciplinary) 
Regulations 2007 introduced a new ‘duty to account truthfully for actions’ which 
made it a disciplinary infraction for an officer to refuse to divulge information 
pertaining to the officer’s actions or the actions of another police officer. However, 
the reluctance of police officers to provide evidence against their colleagues is only 
one part of the problem. 
 
To address the ineptitude of police management, various academics have stressed that 
police supervisors, particularly sergeants, must adopt a more transformative 
leadership style and lead by example as ‘civic educators’.425 They must allow for 
discretion but consistently refuse to accept deviant, demeaning or even thoughtless 
behaviour under any circumstance.
 
Reiner argues that the tendency to assess 
individual police performance in terms of negatives, not least the use of performance 
targets, must be replaced by an ethos that promotes performance in positive terms.
426
 
One way to do so would be to focus not only on the outcome of interactions but on 
how a conflict was dealt with, in other words the means as well as the ends.
427
 Punch 
remarks that there should be no shame in rooting out corruption due to the simple fact 
that police officers, particularly detectives, will always be susceptible to corruption.
428
 
He adds that the only shame is in not doing anything about it.
429
 He ultimately 
recommends that police supervisors and managers should adopt a three-pronged 
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 Firstly, supervisors should reduce the opportunity for corruption by engaging 
in close scrutiny of the work of police officers, secondly they must mobilise and 
encourage citizens to report police deviance and thirdly they must actively sanction 
police deviance and corruption.
431
 Bayley comments that, rather than cultivating 
loyalty, police supervisors must lead through respect which is cultivated through 




England has taken some novel steps in recent years to enhance the ‘organisational 
responsibility’ of police management by introducing a set of Police (Performance) 
Regulations 2008 which contain a suite of new infractions such as a failure to perform 
duties to a satisfactory level as well as a requirement for line managers to write 
evaluation reports on the performance of their subordinates.
433
 As Beggs and Davis 
convey, the 2008 performance regulations aim to treat poor performance as a 
management issue rather than simple individual misconduct.
434
 The Regulations were 
introduced by and large in response to the findings of the Taylor Commission 2005 
which found that, amongst other issues, the extant disciplinary regulations gave little 




Unfortunately such recommendations are only paper thin. It is well established that 
while a good transformational leader may effectively establish for their subordinates a 
‘sense of permission’ or ‘perception of reality and purpose’ of what is possible and 
what is not based on moral and ethical standards, more often than not the sergeant will 
apply a less taxing and more adverse ‘sense of permission’ which is premised on 
deviance, secrecy, the covering up of mistakes and transactional loyalty.
436
 Skogan 
observes that police supervisors and management are generally not only complicit in 
police deviance and corruption but they are often the most active resistors of 
reform.
437 
Punch comments that police chiefs for their part have usually been 
operating within the system for so long that they have become ‘addicted’ to the 
trenchant practices.
438
 Moreover, Reuss Ianni and Ianni remark that even if a police 
chief adopts a transformational style of leadership, their power and authority typically 
gets lost or dissipates as it travels through layers of self-interested managers long 




The rise of external mechanisms of complaint 
 
Nevertheless, as Chan indicates, although the police officer’s working environment or 
‘habitus’ is defined by management attitudes and ethos, the attitudes and ethos of 
management are far from immovable.
440 
Just like the police officer who must work to 
meet the expectations of his or her sergeant, the conduct of the managers themselves 
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can be regulated through routine supervision and review. More effective and 
transparent mechanisms of oversight, particularly for dealing with complaints, can 
work to ensure that police forces are not slaves to deviant leadership styles. The 
fundamental need for a third-party system of oversight to keep police forces’ handling 
of complaints under review was regularly advocated over the course of the 20
th
 
Century, particularly in the aftermath of cases of police brutality.
441
 Remarkably, no 
such mechanisms were established to complement the internal hierarchical systems 
for handling complaints in either England or Ireland until the 1970s.  
 
Although police managers were widely considered to be unsuited to investigating 
complaints against their fellow police officers, there was significant opposition to the 
establishment of independent agencies to monitor or carry out the investigation of 
complaints. The prevailing argument, associated most commonly with US police 
chiefs August Vollmer and O.W. Wilson, was that civilians could not fully appreciate 
the nature and demands of police work, particularly the exercise of police discretion, 
and would only serve to punish police officers unfairly and arbitrarily, thereby 
heightening police officer notions of uncertainty and job insecurity.
442
 Moreover, it 
was argued that if police investigators struggled to permeate the blue wall of silence, 
the civilian investigator could expect even less cooperation which would render the 




The stark reality was that the traditional internal disciplinary system for handling 
complaints had almost always been considerably inept and would undoubtedly benefit 
from some measure of external scrutiny. Manning conveys that it was obvious from 
judicial obiter dicta, oral histories and subsequent police memoirs that the police 







 Whitaker reported that police complaints had effectively doubled in the 
ten years between 1968 and ’77 alone.445 Reiss noted in 1971 that 42 percent of the 
complaints to a number of American police forces under review concerned issues of 
police brutality during arrest, 28 percent concerned discourteous behaviour and 22 
percent concerned harassment.
446
 Goldsmith remarks that despite their rhetoric of 
‘professionalism’, modern police forces were clearly never able to ‘self-regulate’ in a 
similar fashion to the established professions.
447
 Bittner stated rather forcefully in 
1983 that the ability of the internal hierarchical police organisation to ‘control’ police 
work had long been ‘condemned’.448 
 
Bayley points out that it was somewhat bizarre that police officers objected to 
civilians overseeing police complaints since civilian juries in common law countries 
were not only deemed to be capable of determining guilt in serious criminal trials but 
they had a constitutional right to do so.
449
 Whitaker observes that English police 
chiefs had made similar arguments in the 1980s when moves were made to transfer 
the responsibility for bringing charges and conducting prosecutions away from the 
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police force to the Crown Prosecution Service in 1985.
450
 Senior police officers 
reportedly considered that the involvement of prosecutors was wholly unsuitable due 





Ultimately little effort was made to test or brush aside Vollmer and Wilson’s rhetoric 
until Banton’s examination of police discretion in the 1960s inferred that police 
prejudices were significantly influencing the exercise of discretion, particularly in 
segregated States in the USA, without appropriate supervision or sanction.
452
 Marshall 
remarks that there had been no concerted academic or political debate on police 
accountability prior to this point.
453
 Goldsmith observes that the calls for civilian 
oversight of police complaints quickly became a key feature of the demands of human 
rights protestors in segregated America.
454
 Civilian review held the promise of 
bringing the police closer to the communities they served and the ethics that they were 
supposed to adhere to.
455
 Reiss observed in 1971 that it was widely appreciated that an 
independent complaints body was needed to ensure that complaints were adequately 
addressed, not only to punish errant officers and to provide justice for victims but to 
ensure that the statutory and administrative rules governing police powers, procedure 
and discipline had substance.
456
 In 1972 the landmark Mollen Commission of Inquiry 
in New York officially recommended the establishment of mechanisms for civilian 
oversight and independent investigation of major complaints.
457
 The late 1970s 
eventually witnessed a number of external ‘civilian review’ boards established in a 
handful of American States with a mandate to ensure that police supervisors and 
managers were actively, routinely and appropriately addressing minor and serious 
complaints.
458
 Reiner remarks that an important paradigm shift ultimately took place, 





The embryonic development of independent civilian bodies for the handling of police 
complaints gained traction in England, Ireland and Denmark in the 1980s. England 
first established a Police Complaints Board (PCB) on foot of the Police Act 1976. The 
new English system ensured that citizens with locus standi would no longer have to 
submit their complaints directly to the relevant police station but could complain 
directly to the Board.
460
 However the PCB was not bestowed with the power to 
independently investigate complaints, it simply received copies of investigation 
reports and the connected decision of the police chief for the purposes of post hoc 
review. The Board publicly recommended the employment of its own investigating 
officers to independently investigate cases of police assault as early as 1980.
461
 The 
Board, alongside similar mechanisms in America, was almost universally criticised 
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for failing to challenge police investigations and for not publishing reasoned 




A second round of civilian oversight boards emerged in the 1980s, addressing some of 
the extant issues. England replaced the PCB with a Police Complaints Authority 
(PCA) on foot of the PACE Act 1984. PACE was concerned not only with 
formalising, codifying and, in some cases, enhancing police powers and processes but 
since it was also concerned with incorporating concomitant human rights protections 
it made sense to improve and enhance the system of police complaints.
463
 The PCA 
had three crucial features that differentiated it from the earlier model. Unlike the PCB, 
the new Authority was to be notified of all complaints made to the police and was 
required to provide clear explanations for its decisions.
464
 The Chief Executive 
employed by the Board, along with his or her staff, was effectively responsible for 
determining the admissibility of each complaint. Crucially, the Chief Executive could 
issue directions to the investigating officer appointed by the police force as part of its 
new supervisory function.
465
 Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the Chief 
Executive could conduct independent investigations but only in a limited array of 
cases. Lastly, if a complaint was of sufficient seriousness, the PCA could lead the 
disciplinary hearing, taking two of the seats on the three-person panel. Nevertheless, 
the construct continued to come in for severe criticism mainly because it suffered 
from a significant lack of resources and finances which meant that it could not hire 





Somewhat controversially, Ireland, which had mirrored the English effort to codify 
police powers and processes through its own Criminal Justice Act 1984, did not 
provide for an external complaints body therein. By 1985 England had effectively 
established two different versions of a civilian complaints board whereas Ireland had 
yet to establish one. Walsh remarks that Ireland showed remarkable disregard for 
police accountability and human rights by not only failing to establish a civilian 
complaints body in line with the English and US efforts in the 1970s but by 
continuing to ignore calls to introduce one during the drafting and introduction of the 
1984 Act which codified and in some cases controversially enhanced police 
powers.
467
 Ireland’s first civilian complaints body, the Irish Police Complaints Board, 
was eventually established on foot of the Garda Siochana (Complaints) Act 1986 but 





Walsh notes that the Irish PCB had several characteristics that could be considered 
improvements on the English model but also some fundamental weaknesses.
469
 One 
subtle improvement was that the investigating officer appointed by the police force 
was required to report more regularly to the Chief Executive to facilitate close 
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supervision. Some major weaknesses included the fact that the Board did not have to 
give its reasons for dismissing complaints and the fact that the PCB could not compel 
statements or documents from witnesses within the police force if such cooperation 
could lead to police officers’ self-incriminating themselves.470 Like its English 
counterpart, the Irish body also came in for severe criticism for not having sufficient 




On the Danish side, the Government established numerous decentralised boards.
472
 
Each PCB was responsible for handling complaints emanating from the police forces 
assigned to it. Each one consisted of an attorney as chair and at least two laymen from 
the locality nominated by the local municipality for a tenure of four years.
473
 PCBs 
were to be immediately notified of complaints made, investigative decisions taken, 
could suggest investigative measures and sanctions to the Regional Public Prosecutor 
(RPP) and could even appeal decisions to the DPP. Both the PCB and the RPP could 
submit recommendations to the relevant police commissioner to adopt remedial 
practices. The Danish model appeared to address many of the inherent weaknesses of 
the English and Irish models. 
 
The rise of external ‘investigative’ mechanisms of complaint 
 
The adequacy of the English and Irish models continued to be called into question due 
in particular to the absence of an independent investigative capacity for routine, less 
serious complaints. It was widely appreciated that public confidence in the handling 
of police complaints could only be improved if the external civilian complaints 
authorities were bestowed with routine investigative powers, a team of skilled 
investigators and a much larger staff to oversee the internal handling of complaints.
474
 
Two major catalysts reportedly had a significant bearing on England’s eventual 
decision to bestow fulsome investigative powers upon an external civilian complaints 
body. Firstly, the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998 was drafted and passed by the 
Westminster Parliament which established a civilian complaints body for Northern 
Ireland as part of the Northern Ireland peace process. The Police Ombudsman for 
Northern Ireland (PONI) was required to handle all complaints, could independently 
investigate those it deemed sufficiently important and was to manage or supervise all 
remaining admissible complaints handed back to the police force for internal 
investigation.
475 
Savage remarks that PONI effectively changed the landscape for the 
external civilian review of police complaints.
476
 Goldsmith and Lewis convey that it 
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Secondly, the MacPherson Report in 1999 into the killing of Stephen Lawrence 
identified a systemic culture of racial prejudice within the London Metropolitan 
Police and recommended the immediate introduction of an independent complaints 
body with investigative powers due to the apparent inability of the police force to 
systemically identify and punish the overt racial prejudices of various detectives. 
England’s PCA was subsequently replaced by the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC) pursuant to the Police Reform Act 2002. The Commission, 
which consists of a chairperson appointed by the Queen and members appointed by 
the Home Secretary, is empowered, along with its staff, to supervise the police 
investigation of complaints, to manage investigations by way of directions to police 
investigators or alternatively to carry out investigations itself.
478
 Investigators have 
recourse to all of the powers and privileges of constables to enter private property, 
search premises and conduct surveillance under the relevant policing Acts.
479
 The 
IPCC is required to undertake independent investigations into all police-public 
encounters which end with a fatality but, in practice, almost all minor complaints are 
forwarded or ‘leased back’ to the relevant territorial police force to be dealt with 
internally, subject to IPCC supervision and direction.
480
 Where independent 
investigations are pursued, the IPCC must forward its findings and recommendations 
to the relevant chief constable so that the disciplinary process can be activated. Where 
complaints concern the police chief such reports must be forwarded to the elected 
Police and Crime Commissioner who may move to dismiss the police chief.
481
 The 
IPCC may direct that disciplinary hearings are opened to the public if it determines 
that it is in the public interest to do so. The IPCC must publish an annual report 
outlining the nature and number of complaints received and the nature of their 
resolution. 
 
Ireland, for its part, was once again slow off the mark and did not establish a 
comparable civilian complaints body until 2005. Much like the English government, 
Ireland refused to bestow the external civilian complaints mechanism with powers of 
independent investigation until it was pressurised to do so following a major policing 
scandal.
482
 The Morris Tribunal, which conducted its inquiries between 2002 and 
2006, found major ‘management negligence’ in the supervision and discipline of 
police officers within the Donegal police division which contributed to the unchecked 
falsification of evidence, harassment of suspects, detainee abuse and oppressive 
interrogation techniques.
483
 In light of the extensive, unchecked police malpractice, 
Justice Morris recommended the immediate reform of the external complaints 
mechanisms to include a general power of independent investigation. Conway posits 
that the Morris Tribunal only scratched the surface of systemic police malpractice in 
Ireland at the time, pointing to the use of oppressive interrogation techniques and 




Ireland subsequently transformed its PCB into the Garda Siochana Ombudsman 
Commission (GSOC) pursuant to the Garda Siochana Act 2005 which was modelled 
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largely on PONI and the IPCC. However unlike its Northern Irish counterpart, the 
Irish body did not have the power to conduct inquiries on its own initiative, only once 
a complaint was received from a person with locus standi. Its counterpart in Northern 
Ireland, for instance had used this power with significant effect to conduct major 
investigations into the police handling of investigation into the Omagh bombing 
amongst others. The inability of GSOC to conduct a major inquiry on foot of a 
whistle-blower’s complaints in 2014 ultimately contributed to a political stalemate 
that resulted in the resignation of both the Irish Police Commissioner and the Minister 
for Justice following the eventual validation of the whistle-blower’s complaints by 
way of a separate government inquiry. Unfortunately, the Irish government only 
intends to address this particular anomaly in 2015.   
 
Denmark was comparatively late in transforming its Police Complaints Board into an 
independent civilian body to monitor and investigate the handling of complaints. The 
independent Police Complaints Authority (Politiklagemyndigheden) was established 
only as recently as 2012. The PCA consists of a Police Complaints Council 
(Politiklageradet) and a Director.
485
 The Council contains a judge (as chairman), one 
lawyer, a university lecturer in legal sciences, and two public representatives. The 
judge is appointed by the Minister for Justice on the recommendation of the courts 
service, the lawyer on the recommendation of the Bar Council, and the public 
representatives on the recommendation of the Local Government Association for a 
period of four years.
486
 The PCA Director must follow the instructions and guidelines 
of the Council and participates in Council meetings. The PCA can request a relevant 
police chief to conduct an investigation under its supervision or else it may submit a 
valid complaint or issue to the DPP for investigation and prosecution.
487
 Like England 
and Ireland, internal resolution in less serious cases often involves the holding of a 
meeting between the complainant and the police officer so that views can be aired.
488 
Warnings and disciplinary fines of between €100 and €400 can be issued for improper 
conduct.
489
 Similarly, all cases of injury due to police firearms must be investigated 
and in cases of criminal conduct police officers can face a criminal trial.
490
 Reports 
indicate that the vast majority of the complaint cases that reach the courts relate to 




Denmark was reportedly reluctant to establish the PCA since its internal police 
complaints process and long-standing Police Complaints Board were held in relative 
esteem.
492 
Confidence in the extant system was premised upon the fact that Denmark 
had long established a novel institutional structure which ‘co-located’ police 
prosecutors alongside police officers within the police organisation, largely for the 
purposes of minimising police malpractice.
493
 The incorporation of prosecutors within 
police units was designed to ensure that the supervisory presence of police 
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prosecutors would make police officers less able to falsify reports, tamper with 
evidence, force confessions, hoard information from other members of the department 
or conceal malpractice.
494 
Most importantly, the co-location of police prosecutors was 
designed to ensure that prosecutions would not fail on the basis of poorly formatted 
police reports, incomplete evidence or unlawfully or unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence. Police prosecutors were required to have a law degree, usually from the 
University of Copenhagen, and to have spent a minimum of three years postgraduate 
work experience in the legal field.
495
 Their legal skill and training in matters of law 
and human rights compliance was designed to counteract the more goal-orientated 
nature of police officers who receive comparably little legal training. Where police 
officers may have been more concerned with the ‘ends’ of police work, the police 
prosecutors were to focus on the ‘means’ to ensure that the ‘ends’ were legal and 
could withstand judicial scrutiny. 
 
In practice, Denmark’s detective bureaus typically consist of a number of detective 
units, each with their own assigned or ‘co-located’ police prosecutor who typically 
operates from the same office space. A chief police prosecutor is normally assigned to 
each major investigative area within the Divisional headquarters such as homicide 
fraud, organised crime and so forth.
496
 The police prosecutors have no command 
authority over the police detectives but supervise their investigative work, proffer 
advice and ultimately present criminal cases throughout all court proceedings, 
including applications for warrants, applications for extended police detention and the 
trial itself to ensure that all legal materials and presentations are of a high legal 
quality.
497
 Where police malpractice is identified, either through civilian complaint or 
internal monitoring, the police prosecutor is expected to notify a commanding officer 
so that disciplinary proceedings can commence. By virtue of their legal training and 
objectivity, it is widely appreciated that police prosecutors are not tempted to conceal 
police malpractice to a systemic extent for it is their precise function to engender strict 
adherence to lawful and judicially-admissible conduct. 
 
To ensure that Danish police prosecutors can be actively instructed to oversee 
particular cases or be deployed between detective and uniformed units as needs arise 
they are directly employed by the police chief and subject to his or her direction and 
control. However since the police prosecutors are employed primarily to prosecute 
cases in court, the Danish police prosecutors also serve as employees of the 
Prosecution Service and are subordinate to the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(Rigsadvocaten).
498
 The link between the two areas, operational policing and 
prosecution, is the Danish police chief who serves as a formal member of the 
Prosecution Service, holding the title of chief prosecutor. In practice, the police chief 
employs a senior chief prosecutor to carry out prosecutions on his or her behalf.  
 
The police chief serves as a police prosecutor primarily to ensure that full control of 
the police force can be exerted through the issuance of directions to both police 
officers and police prosecutors within the force. The common convention is that the 
DPP cannot interfere in police operations in accordance with the principle of 
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operational independence save in the interest of coordinating investigations across 
multiple police districts.
499
 This may involve the issuance of instructions to one police 
force to relinquish investigations or investigative materials to another police force in 
the interests of a more effective prosecution. Langsted outlines that the DPP’s 
influence is used primarily to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between the police 




To engender continuous, clear and systemic cooperation and communication between 
Denmark’s 12 district police chiefs, the DPP is also assisted by two Regional Public 
Prosecutors (RPPs) or ‘Statsadvokaterne’, one responsible for the eastern part of the 
country corresponding to the jurisdiction of the Eastern High Court (Ostre Landsret) 
and one for the west or Western High Court (Vestre Landsret).
501 
The two regional 
prosecutors work closely with the senior chief prosecutors and their legal staff within 
the police districts to ensure an effective prosecution which may involve the issuance 
of directions to police prosecutors to coordinate their cases.
502
 The two regional 
prosecutors will normally lead the prosecution of any serious crime cases which carry 
sentences in excess of four years imprisonment. A Public Prosecutor for Serious 
Economic Crime (SOK) was also created in 1973 to lead the prosecution of serious 
cases of fraud relating to VAT, insurance, stock market and EU frauds. The regional 
prosecutors are empowered to carry out inspections of the working practices of the 
police prosecutors and may instigate disciplinary proceedings and publish reports. 
Denmark’s police prosecutors, not including the district police chiefs, are subject to a 
separate disciplinary system headed by a special board (Advokatnaevnet) when 




England and Ireland appear to have caught on to the idea of the Danish approach in 
recent years but without formally and radically incorporating police prosecutors into 
their police services. English and Irish detectives traditionally tended to carry out their 
investigation and complete their case files and books of evidence before leading the 
prosecution themselves as common informers at common law.
504 
This changed 
considerably in the 1970s and ‘80s as the Irish Prosecution Service, headed by an 
independent DPP, was established in 1974 and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), 
also headed by an independent DPP, was established in 1985 respectively. All police 
case files concerning indictable offences were thereafter to be submitted to the offices 
of the DPP to impartially review case files before deciding whether and what charges 
should be brought, the punishment sought or whether an alternative was more 
appropriate.
505
 Prosecutors and State Attorneys employed by the Prosecution Service 
would subsequently assume responsibility for the presentation of the case at court. 
One of the primary purposes of the transformation was to ensure that the legal 
arguments, the standard of evidence and the presentation of the case before the court 
would be of a consistently high legal quality. The DPP was not entitled to direct 
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police investigations but could simply refuse to bring a prosecution on the basis of 




Even though the police forces and prosecution services were each independent in 
theory, the net effect in England and Ireland was that police detectives tended to 
follow the guidance and preferences of the DPP to ensure that their investigative work 
would not go to waste and, most importantly, that they would not receive a reprimand 
from their supervisors for botching an investigation, for wasting police resources or 
for undermining the victim’s confidence in the police force and the wider criminal 
justice system. Although a professional distance between the police force and the 
prosecution service has been maintained in England and Ireland, the working 
relationship between detective units and public prosecutors has arguably grown 
increasingly akin to the Danish model. The respective prosecution services now 
typically assign public prosecutors to each of the police stations that house the major 
detective departments. Although public prosecutors typically operate from law firms 
unconnected to the police stations, they regularly attend police stations to discuss 
investigative matters with detectives at the detectives’ request.  
 
It is submitted that a more structured relationship between police officers and 
prosecutors, along Danish lines, could arguably improve the quality of police 
investigations and reduce the opportunity for police malpractice and its concealment 
in England and Ireland. As recently as 2014, a damning inspection by Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) in England found that only 3 out of every 40 
police reports examined during its inspections were of a sufficient quality to present to 
the CPS for prosecution.
507
 In the interest of enhancing the quality of cross-border 
police cooperation, a number of distinct EU working groups have also recommended 
the establishment of more formal relationships between police detective units and 
prosecutors along the lines of the Danish model of ‘co-location’ in order to improve 






The relatively new addition of ‘investigative’ complaints bodies to the realm of 
disciplinary accountability is evidently crucial to any modern conceptualisation of 
police accountability. The rapid development of the ‘investigative’ civilian review 
bodies for the handling of police complaints between 2002 and 2012 across England, 
Ireland and Denmark represents a remarkable evolutionary step. They represent a vast 
departure from the closed internal system for handling police complaints which 




 Centuries. The new bodies should ultimately 
serve to ensure that police conduct is brought as close as possible into line with 
traditional codes of ethics and more modern codes of procedure by enhancing 
objectivity and transparency.  
 
Bayley remarks that the modern feature of civilian management of police complaints 
has become critical to democratic policing, police accountability and, by extension, to 
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 He explains that ‘democratic policing’ refers not just to the 
issuance of rules by a representative government elected by citizens at frequent 
intervals by universal suffrage through processes that are free, fair and forged in 
constitutional law but, more particularly, it is about the accountability of the police to 
each and every individual citizen through the rule of law and mechanisms that 
monitor police activity, evaluate propriety and institute remedial action if needed.
510
 
Bayley and Shearing comment that external review has the potential to remove the 
shroud of secrecy and monopoly long held by the police forces, to dispel unfounded 
criticisms and to hold errant police officers to account.
511
 Similarly, Samuel Walker 
observes that institutional and political understanding has finally caught up with the 
scholarly perception that accountability mechanisms must not only target individual 





Although independent civilian complaints bodies clearly serve to enhance 
transparency across the three jurisdictions, the actual impact that the new bodies will 
have across the respective jurisdictions appears to differ considerably. The modern 
English and Irish mechanisms were long demanded by victims of police abuse, 
political commentators and academic scholars but such demands were not so evident 
in Denmark. Police management within the Danish police forces was not considered 
to be closed, insular or deviant to the same extent due primarily to the integration of 
legalistic police prosecutors. It is submitted that Denmark’s new complaints body will 
undoubtedly enhance the transparency of the complaints process but it appears that 
the new body does not need to affect management change to the same extent. From a 
comparative perspective, it appears that Denmark established the new body largely to 
keep in step with its neighbouring jurisdictions. Although it may not be needed in 
substance, a jurisdiction without an independent civilian body for handling police 
complaints suddenly has the appearance of being considerably closed and 
undemocratic. 
 
Importantly, the ‘blue wall of silence’ remains a formidable problem of police 
accountability.
513
 Police officers reportedly continue to use delaying tactics when they 
are asked by the civilian investigative bodies to provide documents, attend interviews 
and answer questions.
514
 An observation made by David Bayley in 1995 arguably 
holds one key to overcoming this trenchant issue. He warns that civilian review 
bodies must be careful not to supplant the role of the internal hierarchical regime to 
discipline itself, thereby encouraging police management to leave matters of adverse 
police conduct to be dealt with by the external body out of simple inertia or 
resistance.
515
 He explains that it must remain the role of police supervisors to 
proactively ensure adherence to high moral and legal standards since it is the police 
sergeant who can discourage systemic malpractice from occurring in the first 
instance.
516
 He remarks that the evolving external complaints bodies must not only 
                                                 
509
 David Bayley, ‘Preface’ in Goldsmith (n364) vi – ix  
510 
David Bayley, Changing the Guard (OUP 2006) 17 - 21 
511 David Bayley and Clifford Shearing, ‘The future of Policing’ in Newburn (n48) 720 
512
 Walker (n6) 1 - 35  
513
 Punch (n49) 213 
514
 Savage (n476) 107  
515




concern themselves with investigating and sanctioning complaints about police 
misconduct, they must also ensure that police supervisors and managers are carrying 
out their supervisory functions appropriately and consistently.
517
 Bayley surmises that 
external civilian review must ultimately serve to make police forces more rather than 




Bayley’s observations clearly imply that the external civilian review bodies could do 
well to treat the practices of police management during the handling of a complaint as 
a more important issue than the actual deviance of the individual police officer. It is 
submitted that the complaints body should scrutinise first and foremost whether the 
police management handles a complaint appropriately and subsequently admonish the 
police management if necessary and carry out the investigation itself. The pressure 
that such an approach would bring to police management, possibly leading to the 
dismissal of sergeants, inspectors and superintendents, would arguably encourage 
police management to gradually dismantle the blue wall of silence itself by adopting 
more transformative leadership styles that engender ethics, consistency and respect 
over and above deviance and loyalty. Moreover, Bayley indicates that the 
investigation of the police management by an external civilian agency would 
presumably be far more acceptable to the rank and file police officers than if the 
external civilian agency simply subsumed the role of management and carried out 
external investigations into individual malpractice itself, thereby leaving police 
managers free of scrutiny and responsibility, ultimately discouraging them from 




Unfortunately Savage’s research suggests that the ability of the complaints bodies to 
monitor the broader police organisation continues to be impeded by a lack of 
funding.
520
 Savage indicates that additional funding would enable IPCC case 
managers to follow up minor cases that are leased back for internal investigation more 
quickly and regularly.
521
 Additional manpower would also enable the complaints 
bodies to undertake more independent investigations as an alternative to supervision if 
appropriate. As Maguire notes, it is often the minor complaints that concern the 
discourteous, offensive or improper exercise of police discretion that can be most 
damaging to the victims involved and the public image of the police if carried out 
regularly and with impunity.
522
 Nevertheless, it is the minor complaints that are 
habitually ‘leased back’ to the police. 
 
The civilian complaints bodies could clearly do more to hold police management to 
account and encourage more transformative leadership styles, particularly in England 
and Ireland. Complaints concerning stop and search in England, for example, have 
been habitually considered to be of minor interest and leased back to the police for 
internal investigation but a 2014 report by HMIC showed that police officers are 
systematically displaying a keen lack of understanding around the purpose, 
requirement and justifiable grounds for the exercise of stop and search powers.
523
 The 
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Inspectorate pointed to over a million stop and searches every year since 2006, of 
which only 9 percent resulted in arrest.
524
 More than 20 years earlier, Sanders’ 
research had indicated that English police officers were regularly unable to specify 
exactly why they had stopped and searched an individual, referring predominantly to 
abstract, unacceptable notions of instinct.
525
 The same HMIC report also indicated 
that ‘authorising officers’ under the RIPA Act do not fully appreciate the standards 




One of the major roles of the civilian complaints bodies is to hold officers to account 
for unlawful practice but in these instances the problem clearly lies with the broader 
police management. It is the sergeants, inspectors and superintendents who should be 
systematically shaping the ethical and lawful conduct or ‘sense of permission’ of their 
subordinates and should be held accountable for the systemic malpractice of their 
subordinates. The civilian complaints bodies must clearly do more to hold police 
managers to account and, as a corollary, force them to adopt more transformative and 
ethically-compliant leadership styles.  
 
Whether dealing with the deviance of individual officers or broader police 
management, the civilian complaints bodies evidently play an important part in 
bringing police conduct and co-option ever closer into line with constitutional, legal 
and administrative codes of procedure and ethics. This is particularly true in the case 
of England and Ireland. In Denmark, the civilian complaints body can work to 
roundly show the general public that complaints are being dealt with in practice and 
that police conduct is in line with the AJA thereby enhancing the quality of 
constitutional democracy and transparency. In light of the difficulties faced by the 
English and Irish civilian complaints agencies, serious thought should be given to 
adopting some elements of Denmark’s model of ‘co-location’ as a complementary 




The mechanisms of ‘legal accountability’ are undoubtedly the most stable of the three 





 Centuries with relatively negligible differences arising across England, Ireland 
and Denmark. The realm of ‘legal accountability’ refers explicitly to the role of the 
criminal and civil courts in holding police officers to account for their actions or 
omissions according to the rule of law. ‘Legal accountability’ can be attained 
primarily through three legal avenues, the criminal courts, the civil courts and judicial 
review, depending upon the nature of the complaint. The chapter will show that not 
only are the mechanisms of legal accountability almost identical across the three 
jurisdictions but, more particularly, that legal accountability is only capable of 
capturing a relatively small degree of police deviance and malpractice in comparison 
to the realms of disciplinary accountability and democratic accountability. 
 
The criminal prosecution of an errant police officer provides a direct way to 
communicate a complaint and to ensure punishment. At common law, each police 
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officer is responsible for the legality of his or her own actions and should be 
prosecuted for any actions that constitute criminal offences in the same manner as a 
civilian.
527
 Walsh comments that AV Dicey’s highly regarded formula for ensuring 
the ‘rule of law’, which demands the equality of all before the regular law whether 
legislators, public servants or civilians, in order to avoid arbitrary oppression is 
crucial to the ideas of democratic policing and accountability.
528
 He notes that 
criminal liability was a fundamental feature of the ancient offices of tithingman and 
constable ensuring that any individual bestowed with a public policing power and 
function could be prosecuted before a magistrate for criminal behaviour.
529
 Pursuant 
to the Justices of the Peace Act 1361, justices of the peace could not only convict a 
parish constable for criminal offices arising from the unlawful treatment of detainees 
but could also see them dismissed.
530





numerous police officers were convicted of criminal offences through the criminal 
process.
531
 Sanders and Young note that at least forty serving police offices were 
prosecuted in England for corruption between 1998 and 2005.
532
 Reiner comments 
that the subjection of police officers and their use of police powers to the criminal law 
in a similar fashion to the citizenry is ultimately a major factor which legitimises the 




Unfortunately, although police officers can be prosecuted in criminal courts to the 
same extent as the regular civilian, police work rarely comes before the courts. In the 
first instance, most police-civilian encounters are minor cases and are dispensed with 
on the street through the exercise of police discretion.
534
 Moreover, most civilian 
complaints about police officers do not pertain to criminal offences but largely to 
discourtesies. In the fraction of cases of police malpractice that do amount to criminal 
conduct and eventually reach the criminal courts, the issue of conviction subsequently 
becomes a considerable challenge. Waddington remarks that jury verdicts tend to 
reinforce a perception that jurors will show lenience to police officers who claim to 




By and large, it is the trial of the civilian criminal that, by volume and nature, 
provides the most frequent opportunity to scrutinise police conduct.
536
 The civilian 
under prosecution can convey instances of ill treatment which can potentially 
undermine the admissibility of the prosecution’s evidence and possibly lead to 
charges being brought against the suspect police officer. Moreover, the trial judge can 
exclude evidence because of police malpractice such as oppressive interviewing or 
even because of omission or negligence which renders evidence unreliable.
537
 
Although the trial judge is powerless to oversee the punishment of a police officer 
during a civilian trial, the exclusion of unsafe evidence should indirectly deter police 
deviance and malpractice. Deeming police methods to be unlawful or unfair 
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significantly weakens the chances of a successful prosecution thereby rendering the 
officer’s actions counter-productive.538 However judges, particularly in the UK, tend 
not to exclude evidence on the basis of police misconduct itself but only if such 
misconduct jeopardizes the reliability of the evidence collected.
539
 Similarly, in 
Denmark if the complaint concerns the use of evidence sourced without an 
appropriate court order, the judge can hear a presentation from the complainant and a 
representative of the police.
540
 Reports indicate that Danish judges tend to be reluctant 
to exclude evidence on the basis of police error, preferring instead to accept evidence 




In cases where a judge has identified poor or unlawful police practice, the judge will 
often make a statement in obiter castigating the performance of the police force. 
Unfortunately, judicial obiter dicta and the exclusion of evidence reportedly do not 
carry much weight with police officers. Bayley and Bittner note that police officers 
tend to institutionally distrust and resent judges in any case for habitually taking 
lenient approaches to accused persons who the officers obviously considered were 
deserving of arrest and punishment in the first instance.
542
 Moreover, although the 
civilian criminal trial carries some hope of bringing police malpractice to light, 
Ashworth and Redmayne note that the majority of criminal cases never reach the trial 
stage but instead are resolved by way of plea-bargaining which means that police 




Due largely to the limited ability of the criminal court to hold an errant officer 
accountable, civil cases have become increasingly popular as a panacea.
544
 The civil 
court offers civilians the chance to seek financial damages for physical, emotional, 
financial or property damage caused intentionally or negligently by police officers in 
the course of their duty. The main setback of the civil or tort route is that civil cases 
must be pursued at the personal effort and often the personal cost of the plaintiff. 
Unless a plaintiff can secure legal aid from a Legal Aid Board and can show that they 
do not have the appropriate financial means to finance the case themselves, the 





Moreover, like the criminal trial of a civilian, a successful civil suit does not mean 
that an errant police officer will be punished for his or her harmful acts.
546
 Whether 
the harm caused was intentional, in the form of assault, unlawful detention, trespass or 
threatening language, or even if it was unintentional in the form of a negligent car 
accident or failure to protect life through inaction, the civil process can only provide a 
financial remedy subject to a number of strict legal standards.
547
 The civil process 
cannot even require the errant police officer to incur the financial sanction himself. 
Police chiefs across England, Ireland and Denmark will typically be held vicariously 
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liable for torts committed by constables acting under their direction and control in the 
performance of their functions, particularly where the rules, regulations and 
instructions in place could and should have prevented the reasonably foreseeable harm 
from occurring in the first instance. Even if the police administration is not deemed to 
be vicariously liable, the police force or the officer’s representative association 
frequently pay the financial penalty on their behalf. The only mechanism that can 
actually sanction the errant officer other than the criminal court is the administrative 
disciplinary process. 
 
Due in part to the weaknesses of the disciplinary and criminal routes, the civil route 
has become so popular that the London Metropolitan Police alone has paid out several 
million pounds in compensation to hundreds of plaintiffs over the past two decades.
548
 
The Irish Police reportedly incurred damages of €37 million between 1997 and 
2008.
549
 In Denmark, claimants routinely seek compensation through the civil courts 
for pecuniary loss even for suffering or humiliation caused by a criminal investigation 
where no charge is brought or if the prosecution is abandoned. Waddington remarks 
that not only has the civil court proved to be a good avenue for securing financial 
restitution but where police forces decide to contest the case it serves as a useful 
window into a police force’s policies, arrangements and methods.550 He argues 
furthermore that a police force’s disciplinary regulations should ideally be designed so 
that a pay-out at civil court automatically activates a disciplinary hearing or sanction 
because the mere idea of awarding damages without bringing a disciplinary sanction, 




Judicial review also exists in order to challenge the constitutionality and lawfulness of 
statutes, legal principles and the interpretation of those statutes and principles by 
police officers.
552
 In the context of a police operation, judicial review can be used to 
inquire into whether the relevant rules and regulations were appropriately interpreted 
and applied reasonably by the police commanders and police officers involved.
553
 As 
Walsh and Conway observe, judicial inquiries are key instruments of police 
accountability for the purposes of fact finding, exemplified not least by the famous 
Knapp, MacPherson and Morris inquiries.
554
 Lustgarten suggests that the fact-finding 
inquisitorial approach of the judicial review, albeit expensive and slow, is quite 
effective in uncovering the truth.
555
 Judicial review, for instance, appeared to work 
well in England in the Fisher and Blackburn cases in order to solidify constitutional 






The extant literature and case law would suggest that the three ‘legal’ dimensions of 
criminal law, civil law and judicial review operate in broadly the same fashion across 
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England, Ireland and Denmark.
557
 Nevertheless, the stark reality is that ‘legal 
accountability’ would appear to capture only a relatively small volume of police 
deviance. Few police officers who engage in police malpractice will be charged with a 
criminal offence and fewer still will arguably be convicted. Even the books of 
evidence prepared by police officers will rarely be tested before the court by simple 
virtue of the fact that most criminal cases will be dealt with by way of plea-
bargaining. The opinions of the suspects about the lawfulness of their treatment and 
the procedural probity of the police officers’ investigation will ultimately rarely find 
scrutiny in court. The relative inability of the courts to hold police officers to account 
is well reflected in Herbert Packer’s famous crime control and due process typology, 
wherein the notion of ‘due process’ explicitly acknowledges the fallibility of police 
officers and the courts system thereby demanding extremely robust mechanisms of 
accountability.
558
 More particularly, the criminal courts by and large are concerned 
predominantly with legal wrongs, not the establishment and implementation of 




The civil court it would seem offers most hope of remedy but it is a costly and time 
consuming exercise largely beyond the financial and practical reach of low earners. 
Judicial review, for its part, cannot be used to adjudicate on the fairness of a police 
operation in terms of a hierarchy of ethics or an optimum allocation of resources but 
only on the interpretation and application of the relevant legal rules, which can be a 
semantic dialectic. It is somewhat ironic and unfortunate that Beggs and Davis should 
convey in 2009 that coroner inquests into police fatalities are one of the few legal 




From an accountability perspective, it seems strange that the ethos of vicarious 
liability is used frequently to shield individual police officers from liability in the civil 
court but the same principle does not enjoy similar traction within the realm of 
disciplinary accountability. At civil law, it is not unusual for police chiefs to be held 
liable for errant actions committed by constables acting under their direction and 
control in the performance of their functions, particularly where the rules, regulations 
and instructions in place could and should have prevented the reasonably foreseeable 
harm from occurring but the prevailing managerial ethos would appear to be the polar 
opposite within the disciplinary realm. The thesis conveyed that the traditional ethos 
of police management to disciplinary accountability was to either hold errant police 
officers individually accountable for disciplinary infractions, thereby shielding police 
managers from culpability, or else to act only to cover up the malpractice altogether. 
It is submitted that police forces and the various mechanisms of accountability should 
be systematically applying the ethos of vicarious liability in a non-discriminatory 
manner across both legal and disciplinary realms to ensure that police managers are 




The normative dimension of ‘democratic accountability’ is arguably the most 
conceptually unstable and convoluted area of police accountability. The obscure 
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nature of democratic accountability is attributable in part to the fact that its constituent 
mechanisms can be found at both the national and local levels, ranging from 
parliamentary committees at the national level to local consultation forums at the city 
and regional levels. The landscape is complicated by the fact that the shape and form 
of local mechanisms of democratic accountability generally differ across time and 
place, not only between jurisdictions but within them. Local mechanisms may take the 
form of directly elected bodies or unelected bodies bestowed with either substantial 
powers of inquiry or more simple powers of consultation. Significant variations can 
also occur within jurisdictions over a relatively short period of time as political parties 
rebrand the local constructs in their own image in line with their political ideologies. 
The thesis will show that although no jurisdiction appears to have established local 
mechanisms for democratic accountability which are considered to be emblems of 
best practice, the three jurisdictions have increasingly converged towards a common 
approach to local democratic police accountability. Similarly, the thesis will convey 
that on the national level, although the three jurisdictions have long pursued a 
common approach to parliamentary accountability, there remain disparities in 
standards which need to be addressed. 
 
The local and national mechanisms for democratic police accountability serve broadly 
the same function, to facilitate the airing of complaints, concerns, questions and 
simple misunderstandings by members of the public about the propriety of police 
actions or omissions so that the conduct of the police force can be amended. As 
Bayley conveys, democratic accountability should ultimately ensure that the needs 
and wants of the local people who empower, finance, trust in and cooperate with the 
public police are reflected in police policies and practices.
561
 At the national level, the 
national parliament typically serves as the primary construct of democratic 
accountability. The national parliament generally functions, in a constitutional 
democracy, as the primary forum within which the quality and adequacy of the 
national laws governing the structures, powers and procedures of the police can be 
questioned, reviewed and potentially amended. Moreover, it is the forum within 
which the Minister for Justice can be questioned about the propriety and adequacy of 
any secondary regulations or codes of practice issued to the police under the primary 
statutes. Stenning observes that police scandals are invariably followed by public 
demands of parliament to introduce new legislative formulas and procedural codes 
that serve to further limit police powers and behaviour as well as the establishment of 




The local level of democratic police accountability, on the other hand, represents the 
mechanisms that should enable civilians to ask the police force to amend the conduct 
of its police officers and its strategic and tactical policies in order to address 
community issues, concerns and complaints.
563
 The mechanisms of local democratic 
accountability should serve to ensure that police chiefs remain abreast of community 
needs and deploy their police officers accordingly. To echo the popular Greek nautical 
metaphor of governance, if the national level determines the shape of the ‘police’ ship 
and the size of its masts, then the local level should determine the speed of travel and 
the direction it sails.
564
 The chapter will proceed to evaluate the nature and form of the 
                                                 
561
 Bayley (n10) 160, 182 
562
 Stenning (n23) 3 - 5  
563
 Marshall (n46) 626 
564
 See Foucault (n284) 123  
 79 
local and national levels of democratic police accountability to elucidate whether and 
to what extent comparable approaches can be identified across England, Ireland and 
Denmark. 
 
The purpose of local democratic accountability 
 
Marshall explains that the entire concept of police accountability in a democratic 
society revolves around the boundless capacity of civilians and their political 
representatives to require information, answers and reasons from an ‘explanatory and 
cooperative’ police force whether on the national or local level.565 More particularly, 
such responses by the police force should, if appropriate, include a commitment by 
the police commander to amend the conduct or deployment of its police officers in 
order to address issues, concerns and complaints.
566
 Dixon comments that the primary 
job of the police chief is not to independently eradicate crime on behalf of the 
community but to carry out a public policing function with the support of and in 




Wilson conveys that community ‘input’ into local police policies, strategies and 
tactics is crucially important because it serves to ensure that police forces do not 
under-appreciate the individual and collective senses of insecurity within the 
community by attaching too much weight to their insular policing expertise.
568
 In 
other words, without systematic community inputs, police officers and their 
commanders might assume that they know what kind of policing service the 
community needs without actually asking. Numerous dramaturgical police studies, not 
least Wilson and Kelling’s ‘broken windows’ study, have shown that without 
constructive community-police dialogue, police forces invariably leave some 
vicinities ‘untended’ and de-prioritise some crucial crime areas by overly relying on 




The central ethos of local democratic accountability is that police forces must tailor 
their deployment of resources and the exercise of police discretion to reflect not only 
their professional judgment and their statistical indicators but also the needs and 
wants of the local community. For example, local residents may appreciate that 
loitering gangs are intimidating some older members of the community or that drug 
dealing on the local street corners is gradually increasing, thereby undermining 
feelings of safety and security in the community, but the police may not be aware of 
the full scale of the problem or, more particularly, may be actively contributing to 
it.
570
 By relying solely on their own professional expertise, police officers might 
consider that the loitering gangs or petty drug takers are relatively harmless, engaging 
in ‘victimless’ crimes, and might therefore exercise a wide degree of discretion and 
decide to take no action, even redeploying patrols to other crime hotspots. 
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Without regular local community-police consultation a ‘communicative gap’ 
invariably opens up between the police and the public. Members of the community 
might feel increasingly unsafe and insecure but the police, to all intents and purposes, 
may do nothing about it because they do not realise the full effects of their actions or 
inactions. Zedner conveys eloquently that ‘security’ is not just about physical security 
but emotional security, the individual feeling of safety and freedom from 
apprehension coupled with individual sensitivities to risk and danger.
571
 As Banton 
iterates, even the simple deployment of more patrols can serve to placate fears since 
the mere visibility of a police uniform carries the symbolic reassurance that assistance 
is nearby.
572 
Fielding and Innes refer to such patrol work as ‘reassurance policing’.573  
 
Moreover, another scenario can arise at the other end of the spectrum. The police 
force may be ‘over policing’ a particular crime hotspot through over-zealous stop and 
searches thereby regularly subjecting local residents to undignified bodily searches, 
without realising the full extent of their actions.
574
 Residents may be feeling 
oppressed, discriminated against and disenfranchised without the police officers fully 
realising it. Ericson and Haggerty indicate that instead of a culture of partnership and 
consent existing between the police and the public in England, the lack of community 
consultation means that police-community relations are often more characterised by a 
‘culture of distrust’.575 A litany of policing scandals and regular over-policing has 
reportedly caused various demographics to lose respect for the police and police 
authority over successive generations, particularly in England.
576
 Lord Scarman 
observes that the lack of public consultation can also cause the professional police 
force to adopt an us-versus-them ‘siege mentality’.577 He noted that the police do not 
create social deprivation but inflexible and hard policing tactics can make it worse.
578
 
Loader and Mulcahy convey that one of the major effects and objectives of 
community-orientated policing should ultimately be to facilitate and engender respect 
between the police and the public.
579
 Bayley observes that even the simple 
conveyance of explanations by the police can help to ameliorate police-community 
tensions.
580
 Otherwise, as Foucault outlines, perceived or real injustices that go 
unremedied have always and should always give rise to some form of resistance, a 
condition he referred to as ‘counter-conduct’.581 
 
Most importantly from a legal perspective, as Brogden and Nijar convey, local 
democratic input into police policy ensures that the exercise of police discretion is 
made public, explicit and most importantly afforded ‘legitimacy’ through community 
consent and validation.
582
 Klockars observes that local democratic accountability 
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should effectively enable the local community to ‘regulate’ the exercise of police 
discretion by encouraging police officers to narrow their exercise of discretion in 
areas of growing community concern or by applying a wider application of discretion 
in areas where hard policing tactics are proving profoundly unfair and immoral.
583
 
The much-lauded Scarman Report into the Brixton riots in England concluded that 
police discretion lies at the heart of maintaining public order and that the proper use of 




Klockars remarks that, because the tenet of police discretion cannot be found in legal 
statutes, local democratic accountability is particular important for validating and 
legitimating the exercise of discretion.
585
 Wilson noted in 1975 that the habitual 
public denial of police discretion by police chiefs, who bizarrely tend to hide behind a 
mask of full enforcement or zero tolerance, meant that police officers were routinely 
left frustrated, lacking in confidence and unsure of their mission, often resulting in 
citizens being poorly treated.
586
 Effective mechanisms of local democratic 
accountability should ultimately enable police forces to point to local community 




Local democratic accountability not only facilitates a more responsive, proactive 
police force but the community dialogue also enables the police to motivate civilians 
to become more vigilant about their own security or encourage them to report deviant 
or radical behaviour witnessed in a familial, neighbourhood or even a business setting. 
Denmark’s counter-terrorism officers, for instance, participate in local community 
boards and visit schools to raise awareness of local terrorism and encourage citizens 
to report suspect radical fundamentalist behaviour even at its earliest stages. Simple 
information updates or crime bulletins which outline the nature of relevant local crime 
occurrences and the emerging modus operandi of local criminals can greatly enhance 
the ‘explanatory’ nature of the police force as well as the responsiveness of the 




The liaison between the police, community, local government and relevant non-
governmental organisations can also help to address criminality by way of economic 
and social means. The establishment of new drug addiction centres, juvenile 
rehabilitation programmes, the re-zoning of particular areas to restrict or allow for 
gambling or prostitution, the dispersal of social housing or even the simple instalment 
of street lighting to deter petty crime at night are important preventative strategies.
589
 
Ericson and Haggerty, in their work on Policing the Risk Society, comment that the 
modern attraction to the idea of ‘risk management’ demands the establishment of 
‘communication systems’ between the police, the public, probation services, drug 
addiction centres, hospitals, schools, youth clubs, football clubs and any other relevant 
agencies so that the police can work to address risks and reassure the public, whether 
or not such risks are real or imagined.
590
 Loader and Sparks convey that modern 
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society is increasingly moving away from the State-dominated administration of 
justice to a wider ideal of multi-institutional ‘governance’.591 They refer to the 
evolving partnership between the police, the community and relevant public and 
private agencies in terms of the ‘co-production’ of order and security.592 
 
The aim of local democratic accountability is ultimately to ensure that police forces 
tailor their conduct and resource deployments according to the needs and wants of the 
local community as well as attaching weight to the wisdom of their professional 
expertise and their indicative crime statistics. The key of local democratic 
accountability is that the ‘virtue ethics’ of the police officer is not sufficient on its 
own to determine what is a good or right course of discretionary action. It must factor 
in the fluctuating needs and wants of the local community. The ethos of local 
democratic input effectively represents one of the modern embodiments of the ideal of 
‘policing by consent’ and the traditional Peelian principle that the ‘police are the 
public and the public are the police’ within modern constitutional democracies. Reiner 
comments that the ethos of ‘democratic policing’ ultimately demands that police 
forces are organised and controlled by local means in order to facilitate 




The evolution of local democratic accountability in England 
 
The evolution of the mechanisms for local democratic accountability has been 
remarkably haphazard, particularly in England. Local democratic accountability was 
initially delivered by town and borough Watch Committees in the 19
th
 Century but the 
gradual amalgamation of police forces in England throughout the late 19
th
 Century 
and the early 20
th
 Century required their replacement with more novel regional 
constructs. Initially, in the 19
th
 Century, Robert Peel’s project was built upon the 
promise that the community was simply transitioning from the prime performer of the 
policing function through the Watch and Ward construct to a new supervisory and 
directorial role through the construct of Watch Committee.
 594
 Instead of carrying out 
the policing function, the community could use the Watch Committee to guide and 
amend the conduct of their new permanent, paid and professional police officers. The 
only English police force which did not originally have a Watch Committee was the 
London Metropolitan Police. It was controversially deprived of a local political entity 
with powers of dismissal partly due to fears that too many local watch committees 
would be required to cover the expansive, heavily populated metropolitan area which 
would serve only to paralyse the ability of the Police Commissioners to act 
decisively.
595
 Instead the Home Secretary was bestowed with the role of political 
oversight which clearly served only to render the police force far too remote from 




Throughout the rest of England, the Watch Committees on the town and borough 
level and the Quarter Sessions or Standing Joint Committees (SJC) on the county 
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level, which had traditionally overseen the medieval Watch and Ward and 
constabulary system, reportedly worked quite well to bring the concerns of the local 
community to the attention of the police chief by way of regular general policy 
instructions, guidance and regulations.
597
 Marshall states that Watch Committees 
regularly issued notices outlining their alarm at the number of muggings, robberies or 
assaults in an area or by advising the police force about concerns over the presence of 
loitering gangs, vagrant drunks and prostitutes on the high street.
598
 Brogden notes 
that it was not uncommon for Watch Committees to ask a police chief to take action 
against brothels as well as criminal gangs known to be extorting traders, robbing 
neighbourhoods and running pick-pocket ruses in particular business areas and 
residential neighbourhoods.
599
 In London, for instance, the ‘local’ Home Secretary 
issued numerous notices in the 19
th
 Century calling for a clampdown on inter-faction 
rivalry assaults as well as requesting the police to curtail the over-zealous arrest of 




Reiner conveys that the ability of the local community entity to scrutinise the work of 
the police chief, to issue general policy directions and to subsequently dismiss the 
police chief for poor performance was integral to the English concept of policing by 
consent.
601
 Loader conveys that the idea of policing by consent was ultimately not 
some obscure principle pertaining to the absence of complaint but it was the very real 
feature of local political involvement in shaping the conduct of the public police.
602
 
Local political involvement in police oversight was considered to be so important that 
the Desborough Committee sitting in 1918 stated that the provision of law and order 
was the concern of the local authority and that the imposition of a unitary national 
police force would ultimately distance policing from local political control to an 
unacceptable and possibly unconstitutional degree.
603
 Walker conveys that vesting the 
responsibility to issue general policy instructions and the power of dismissal in a 
democratic and representative political entity is entirely legitimate and, most 




However a retreat of the Watch Committees and Standing Joint Committees following 
the distortion of the Fisher judgment in 1930 ultimately set in train a number of 
developments that enhanced the national role of the Home Secretary at the expense of 
local democratic accountability. In the seminal case of Fisher v Oldham Corporation 
1930, a Watch Committee was sued over the actions of local constables on foot of 
guidance issued by the Watch Committee.
605
 Drawing on American, Canadian and 
Australian jurisprudence, McCardie J presiding reiterated the absence of a master-
servant relationship between Watch Committees and constables and reaffirmed the 
individual responsibility of officers for their actions as servants of the public, not as 
employees of local or national government. McCardie J cited the Australian case of 
Enever v The King 1906 which found that ‘a peace officer is not exercising a 
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delegated authority but an original one’.606 The Fisher judgment effectively did little 
other than reiterate the ancient common law principle of ‘operational independence’, a 
principle which held that constables were individually responsible for the legality of 
their own actions and could not defend indiscipline or avoid criminal prosecution or a 
civil suit for unlawful action on the basis of orders received from commanding 
officers or directions received from local political entities such as a Watch 
Committee.
607
 Manning explains that the principle of operational independence 
ultimately ensures that police chiefs are sensitive to the needs and wants of local 




The logical corollary to the principle of operational independence was that if police 
officers received orders or directions that were lawful, moral and appropriate they 
were obliged to follow them or they would face disciplinary proceedings and possible 
dismissal from the top down. The principle of operational independence only served 
to embody the legal requirement that police officers should refuse to follow unlawful 
or inappropriate orders and would be held individually accountable if they failed to do 
so.
609
 It served largely to preserve the lawfulness and propriety of orders and 
directions so that police officers or police chiefs could not be directed by their 
commanders or Watch Committees to carry out unlawful and immoral deeds. Reiner 
remarks that the principle is crucial for the ‘legitimacy’ and popular support of the 
police for it serves to ensure that police officers will not allow themselves to become 
partisan or politicised in fear of dismissal by their commanding officers or by the 
local political entity.
610
 Walker states that the principle of operational independence 
was a matter of constitutional convention, pragmatic empiricism or simple 
constitutional ‘common sense’.611 Marshall’s research indicates that, by and large, the 
local Watch Committee members were well aware of their legal obligation to refrain 
from interfering in specific police investigations and prosecutions, for fear of being 





However the ambiguous wording of the Fisher judgment and subsequent political and 
practitioner rhetoric generated a misinterpretation that Watch Committees were not 
legally entitled to issue general policy instructions pertaining to operational matters.
613
 
Marshall argues that Lord Denning presiding in R v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner ex part Blackburn in 1968 regrettably exacerbated such confusion by 
remarking in obiter that no government official can tell a police chief that ‘he must or 
must not keep observation on this place or that or that he must or must not prosecute 
this man or that one’.614 Lord Denning was similarly reiterating the basic raison d’etre 
of ‘operational independence’, simply that it was strictly unlawful for a Watch 
Committee or police chief to issue policy instructions which required police officers 
                                                 
606 
Geoffrey Marshall, Police and Government: The Status and Accountability of the English Constable 
(Methuen, London, 1965) 35 - 45 citing Fisher v Oldham Corporation (1930) 2 K.B. 364 & Enever v 
The King (1906) 3 CLR 969 
607
 Walsh (n43) 13, 14, 50 – 70 
608
 Manning (n39) 200, 201 
609
 Marshall (n606) 18 
610
 Reiner (n48) xi, xii, 11, 17 
611
 Walker (n107) 16 - 18, 79 
612











Bayley remarks that many police chiefs, even in America, zealously promoted the 
misconstrued idea that police forces were not accountable to local political entities but 
instead were ‘accountable only to the law’.616 He argues that police chiefs promoted 
the ideal as a badge to enhance their claims to ‘professional’ status and expertise on 
all local policing and crime-related matters.
617
  As outlined in the section on ‘legal 
accountability’, this argument was ludicrous since only a small volume of police 
malpractice comes before the court and, more particularly, a court cannot decide on 
the appropriate allocation of resources, the hierarchy of police priorities or the ethics 
of police discretion, such matters are for the local political entity to resolve in 
consultation with the police chief.
618
 Accountability only to the law would ultimately 





Nevertheless, Samuel Walker remarked in 1977 that police chiefs were increasingly 
using the vague rhetoric of professionalism to effectively deflect almost all forms of 
criticism and external scrutiny.
620
 Brogden states that police chiefs and their 
subordinates were to all intents and purposes putting themselves ‘above criticism’.621 
Marshall added that the notion of being independent of either municipal or 
government control was ‘a doctrine so unconstitutional as to appear absurd’.622 As late 
as 1999, the Patten Commission in Northern Ireland suggested that the misinterpreted 
maxim of operational independence should be better understood as ‘operational 
responsibility’ so that the expectation of chief officers to consult with and account to 




The fact that the issue was not clearly addressed in the Police Act 1964, which 
abolished Watch Committees in favour of regional Police Authorities, led to growing 
concerns about the increasing centralisation of influence and power towards the Home 
Office in the absence of local oversight.
624
 Marshall’s seminal research conveys how 
the Royal Commission 1962, which was established in part to address the growing 
ineffectiveness of Watch Committees following the Popkess Affair, remarkably 
subscribed to the misinterpretation of the Fisher judgment without much 
consideration, leading to the establishment of Police Authorities which were similarly 
inclined.
625
 Emsley argued that the part-time Police Authorities, which were filled 
with councillors who were far more concerned with other issues of local government, 
generally followed the previous approach of the Watch Committees and often 
deferred passively to the preferences of their police chiefs without substantial scrutiny 
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 At the time, Professor Goodhart wrote a cogent dissenting 
memorandum to the Royal Commission arguing that there needed to be either a 
significant element of local control or a significant element of national control but 




Regrettably, the situation was exacerbated considerably by the case of R v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority in 1988 
which held that a Police Authority could not seek to amend a chief constable’s policy 
decisions if the chief constable secured the support of the Home Secretary for those 
policies.
628
 The development significantly undermined the ability of Police 
Authorities to enter into negotiations with the police chief over the local policing plan 
with any seriousness.
629
 Walker described the prevailing situation as a major ‘policy 
vacuum’.630 Reiner vociferously joined the debate in 1985 arguing that the influence 
and power of the Police Authorities had been reduced to nil. His overarching 
argument in the seminal Politics of the Police (1985) was that the ambiguous 
condition of police governance in England at the time was leading to a significant 
politicization of the police.
631
 He subsequently conducted a number of interviews with 
chief constables in the early 1990s which indicated that chief constables viewed the 
Home Office as the most influential policy decision-maker, attaching greater weight 
to Home Office Circulars and its financial expectations over and above the concerns 
of Police Authorities.
632
 Critchley remarks that the ‘advice’ and guidance contained in 
Home Office Circulars had incrementally become a euphemism for ‘direction’.633 
Mawby suggested that the community-orientated nature of the English policing model 
was shifting more towards the control-dominated model of continental police forces 
which were traditionally closer to government control and less accountable to the 
public.
634
 Tupman and Tupman remarked that the side-lining of mechanisms of local 
democratic accountability in favour of centralised state bodies represented the 





Furthermore, Loader and Walker warned in 2006 that the unbridled State was 
naturally ‘partisan’, with its own political preservation at the forefront of its concerns, 
not the welfare of minority communities.
636
 They convincingly argued that the State 
should always be considered to be an ‘idiot’ and a ‘cultural monolith’ when it comes 
to the issues and concerns of diverse local communities, for politicians are rarely if 
ever in touch with minority and vulnerable demographics and are certainly not aware 
of the peculiar concerns of all neighbourhoods at all times.
637
 Referring to Habermas’ 
typology of policy action, Loader conveyed in 1996 that police policy needed to 
return to its roots of ‘communicative action’, which uses public discourse and 
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concerns as the basis for police policy rather than continue on the prevailing path of 
‘instrumental action’ whereby government officials and technocrats could manipulate 
the policy subjects in a certain way to bring about a desired end or state of affairs.
638
 
Lustgarten lamented in 1986 that Marshall’s observations on the misinterpretation of 
operational independence had been so ignored that his 1964 book ‘might as well never 
have been written’.639 
 
Modern mechanisms of local democratic accountability 
 
England has since appeared to have reinstated the ethos of local democratic 
accountability but only remarkably recently. The Police and Crime Commissioner 
(PCC) construct was introduced in 2011 on foot of a Conservative Party pre-election 
promise to stem the tide of increasing centralisation and dwindling community 
influence over policing matters.
640
 The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 
2011 abolished the Police Authority mechanism, replacing it with a Police and Crime 
Commissioner (PCC) for each police territory. Each PCC is to be directly elected by 
the residents of each police territory for a four year term on the strength of their 
proposed Police and Crime Plan.
641 
The London Metropolitan area is again an 
exception wherein the elected Mayor doubles as the PCC. It was envisaged that the 
PCC election process would generate debate and competition amongst prospective 
candidates and stimulate community consultation all across England since the local 
citizenry would presumably want to elect the candidate with the most rounded and 
convincing agenda.  
 
Once elected it is the PCC’s responsibility to maintain a Police and Crime Plan in 
consultation with the Police Chief which should set out the needs and wants of the 
local citizenry. The 2011 Act provided that the local police and crime plan should set 
out the annual local targets for the force and the financial requirements deemed 
necessary to fulfil those priorities.
642
 The PCC should ultimately voice the 
community’s concern and ensure that the police chief is fully aware of local 
community concerns. The PCC, acting in cooperation with its Police and Crime Panel, 
can proceed to dismiss a territorial police chief on the basis of inadequate attainment 
of the objectives set out in the Police and Crime Plan.
643
 The Police and Crime Panel 
(PCP) of sitting local councillors is essentially expected to serve as a second layer of 
democratic oversight and transparency by scrutinising the performance of the PCC, 
requesting the PCC to submit a written report on police activities or by calling the 
PCC before its public meetings to answer questions.
644
 The Panel may make 
recommendations to the PCC, publish any oral or written responses received from the 
PCC or request an inspection by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary 
(HMIC).
645
 HMIC can subsequently issue directions to the PCC to remedy any 
budgetary, financial or procedural irregularities identified upon inspection.
646
 The 
Panel must also be notified by the IPCC about any complaints made about the PCC 
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and may move to dismiss a PCC but only on the basis of a criminal conviction.
647
 In 
the case of London, the functions of the Panel are carried out by the London 
Assembly, which must secure the consent of the Home Secretary before dismissing 




While the PCC is tasked predominantly with focusing on issues of local concern, to 
ensure that the official does not prioritise local initiatives over and above the needs of 
regional and national police cooperation, the PCC’s Police and Crime Plan, like the 
plans of the traditional Police Authorities, must take cognisance of any national 
strategic priorities issued by the Home Secretary.
649
 A degree of national coordination 
and policy making is particularly important in the areas of terrorism, drug trafficking 
and human trafficking, crimes which are typically carried out by and coordinated 
through criminal organisations and networks with a national profile and reach.
650
  Not 
only do the criminal organisations stretch across police areas but national 
governments have a particular vested interest in protecting the ‘specific order’ of 
government and parliamentary democracy from the threat of subversion and 
terrorism.
651
 The Home Secretary may also provide PCCs with guidance on the 
development of their plans, particularly the financial aspects of their plans which will 
ultimately form part of the national police budget presented to and approved by 
Parliament.
652
 The Home Secretary may also require police forces to share equipment 
and other resources to realise financial efficiencies in the form of ‘mutual aid’.653 
 
Although the PCC construct represents the re-establishment of a clear mechanism of 
local democratic accountability for the first time in decades, obvious questions arise 
around the ability of a single elected officer to gauge the concerns and needs of 
countless disparate communities over an entire police area, which typically consists of 
numerous towns, cities and millions of inhabitants. A perusal of the election literature 
disseminated throughout the country would suggest that candidates are not even 
seeking to represent each and every constituent community for they only require a 
majority turnout to be elected. Moreover there is nothing which requires PCCs to 
continuously engage in grass-roots community consultation once they take office. 
Once elected, their jobs are effectively safe regardless of whether or not they actively 
seek out dialogue with each and every neighbourhood. In essence, there is absolutely 
no guarantee of significant consultation with minority communities either before or 
after an election.  
 
There appears to be every possibility that PCCs, like many Police Authorities before 
them, will become wholly unrepresentative of the minority communities within their 
catchment areas. As Brogden and Nijar convey, the ethos of local democratic 
accountability advocates that police policy and action should be guided not just by the 
majority of working class voters but by the needs of each and every neighbourhood, 
each with their own distinctive crime problems and resident concerns.
654
  Skogan adds 
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 Brogden and Nijar (n582) 1 – 7, 23 - 27  
 89 
that a central element of community-orientated policing is that police forces do not 
take a ‘one size fits all approach’ but are guided by and responsive to the acute needs 
of each and every neighbourhood.
655
 Similarly Reiner argues that the mechanisms for 
local democratic accountability need to be explicitly representative of race, gender 
and culture to the greatest extent possible.
656
 He outlines that inclusive mechanisms of 
local democratic accountability are particularly important in overcoming and 
addressing the increasingly fractured concept of ‘community’ caused by the 
acceleration of plurality, social division, cultural diversity and fragmentation in the 




Loader and Mulcahy remark that late or post-modernity demands a cosmopolitan 
policing culture that is responsive to the new dynamic of community, one that is 
constantly in flux, inhabited by strangers with even greater demands.
658
 Jackson et al 
argue that in the post-modern world it is absolutely vital to systematically integrate 
the input of diverse communities into the policing policy process to ensure the 
continued ‘legitimacy’ of the public policing and future claims of ‘policing by 
consent’.659 McGarry and O’Leary convey, with reference to Northern Ireland, that 
powersharing through proportional representative and parity of rights is crucial for 
policing a divided society.
660
 Loader and Walker argue that it is ultimately the State’s 
responsibility to help produce trust and solidarity between strangers since the State 
construct is supposed to be the very embodiment of the resident community, namely 





Unfortunately, depending on the individual nature of the PCC there is every 
possibility that the PCC construct can be reduced to little more than a superficial 
‘public relations’ exercise which promotes the idea of local democratic accountability 
without the substance. As Skogan notes, by virtue of the simple establishment of 
constructs of local democratic accountability governments can merely advertise and 
assume that there is a degree of civic participation but without actually facilitating it 
in practice.
662
 Regrettably, the inherent weaknesses of the PCC project chimes with 
Banton’s observations of 1973 that police forces have a tendency to promote an image 
of community-orientated policing but that this mythical ‘image’ is often based on the 
creative expressions of a ‘public relations’ PR specialist employed to portray an 
attractive image and narrative to the media without actually engaging in ‘public 
relations’ or ‘community relations’ by way of grass-roots consultation.663 Arguing 
along similar lines, Mawby states that police forces should be image conscious and 
engage in ‘image management’ but that such ‘image work’ must be based on the 
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ethical conduct of its police officers during interactions and engagements with the 




Manning suggests that the ‘creative’ media presentations of ‘community-orientated 
policing’ have contributed significantly to the convolution of the concept of local 
democratic accountability.
665
 He argues that police forces have increasingly attached 
the label of community-orientated policing to everything from basic police patrol to 
neighbourhood watch, all the time losing sight of the fact that community-orientated 
policing was traditionally a precise concept, symbiotic with local democratic 
accountability, pertaining to systematic community input into all facets of local police 
policy, strategies and tactics.
666
 Similarly, Reiner remarks that chief constables 
display a broad affinity with the idea of community-orientated policing because it is 
so easy to claim that all of the functions carried out by police forces, whether remote 
or inclusive, are undertaken on behalf of the public and therefore community-
orientated.
667
 Brogden and Nijar comment that the label of ‘community-orientated 
policing’ has increasingly become obfuscated not only within States but within the 
wider transnational discipline of ‘security sector reform’ because politicians and 
police forces increasingly consider the concept to be ‘value free’, as an antidote for all 




Although the PCC construct appeared to hold the promise of enhanced local 
democratic accountability, it has arguably been more successful in reinforcing the 
superficial, value free notion of community input. Moreover, PCC candidates are 
generally tied to political parties which suggests that some political parties may 
exploit the opportunity of running candidates who promote the party’s brand of 
politics within the constituency rather than prioritising and addressing the needs and 
wants of the constituent neighbourhoods. Such party politics in the past have, for 
instance, promoted the ideologies of police ‘consumerism’ and Hayekian free-market 
policies which guided the Sheehy Inquiry’s recommendations for privatisation and 
deregulation in English policing in 1992, resulting in a major crisis of confidence in 
the public police service.
669
 As Reiner conveys, local democratic accountability 
should require significant human and administrative resources, voluminous 
community meetings, consultative strategy formulation and the proactive deployment 
and instruction of police officers, it is by no means ‘policing on the cheap’.670 
 
Another English initiative in the area of local democratic police accountability which 
held similar promise at the outset is the multi-agency Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships (CDRP). The Crime & Disorder Act 1998 ultimately required each 
police chief to participate in a formal partnership with representatives from local 
government, the probationary service, the health authority, drug and alcohol addiction 
centres, youth centres and neighbourhood watches amongst other interested 
community groups to ensure that police chiefs were well appraised of community 
concerns and could encourage more social and economic solutions to prevailing crime 
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 Each CDRP was required to develop a multi-year rolling partnership 
plan to tackle the priority crime areas identified by the forum. Police chiefs were also 
encouraged to include the commanders of each BCU in the CDRPs to engender closer 
working relationships between local communities and the BCU since each community 
normally has their own set of crime problems and anxieties.
672
 Unfortunately, it 
appears that community and police force engagement with the CDRPs has dwindled 
in recent years as CDRPs have focused increasingly on the simple compilation of 
statistics through local crime audits in partnership with the local divisional police 
commanders. The audits are, in effect, a public report on crime hot spots, youth 
offending, child abuse, drug crime and hate crime rates within the community 
amongst other priority crime areas. The audit is typically compiled by a Community 
Safety Unit (CSU) within the offices of local government and published for public 
consumption. 
 
England clearly needs to undertake additional reforms to develop more effective 
models of local democratic accountability but the prevailing system is undoubtedly a 
marked improvement from the pre-2012 arrangements. It is submitted that the 
government should give considerable thought to blending together the two constructs 
of PCC and CDRP. Both constructs depend almost entirely on the character and 
enthusiasm of the PCC which can ebb and flow across time and place. An 
amalgamation could potentially take the form of a ‘partnership’ of elected 
representatives each elected by disparate community groups and minority 
associations, not too dissimilar to the Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB), which 
serves to keep the police chief apprised of community concerns and subsequently 
holds him or her accountable for his or her performance by threat of possible 
dismissal.  
 
Although the mechanisms in England need vast improvement to meet the ideal of 
local democratic accountability, the English system appears to be quite advanced in 
comparison to Ireland. Ireland, for its part, only recently introduced a semblance of 
local democratic accountability in the form of Joint Policing Committees (JPC). Since 
Ireland’s single police force is unitary and centralised, in complete contrast to 
England’s decentralised model of 43 separate police forces, the government long 
considered it unnecessary to establish a police authority at the national level to 
oversee the strategies of the national Police Commissioner since it would arguably 
duplicate the role and responsibility of the Minister for Justice.
673
 As such, the power 
to issue general directions pertaining to policy, strategies, priorities, performance or 
any other matter relating to the management of the police force as well as the power 
of dismissal was long vested squarely within the office of the Justice Minister. The 
Minister, like the English PCCs, is required to form annual or multi-annual policing 




From an accountability perspective, the Irish government has long appeared to have 
fundamentally missed the entire point and importance of the ethos of local democratic 
accountability and community orientated policing. Police policy and conduct should 
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be guided not only by professional police expertise and national strategic policy 
objectives but by the needs of each and every neighbourhood, each with their own 
distinctive crime problems and resident concerns. Walsh remarks that even though the 
Irish standpoint remains considerably inept today, it was particularly surprising that it 
prevailed in the 1920s when Irish policy makers were trying to shake off the yoke of 
the widely disliked English colonial policing model of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary.
675 
He comments that although the Irish government signalled its 
intention to establish a democratic and consensual unarmed police force, it was 
remarkable that the Irish government blatantly avoided the development of Watch-
style Committees to oversee the work of local police commanders.
676
 The 
mechanisms of local democratic accountability were a central tenet of ‘policing by 
consent’ in England and could even be traced back to Ireland’s pre-19th Century 
baronial constabulary model.
677
 He conveys that the continuation of central 
government control from the RIC to the new Garda Siochana model was undertaken 
in part to ensure that the establishment of new Irish Police got off the ground and 
could effectively suppress the dissidents and their Republic Police in the 1920s.
678
 
Walsh observes that the government was so concerned with maintaining full policy 
and regulatory control over the new police force that the first major policing bill, the 
Garda Siochana (Temporary Provisions) Bill 1923, was introduced only after the first 
recruits had already been dispatched to barracks and stations, leaving little room for 




To all intents and purposes the Irish approach regrettably copper-fastened the Irish 
police force as a constitutional component of the executive government both in spirit 
and in principle, without any significant concern for local democratic policing.
680
 The 
effort by the newly independent Irish government to remove from the Irish psyche and 
the new policing legislation all controversial processes and terms associated with the 
RIC was almost entirely superficial since the quasi-military hierarchical structures of 
the RIC and, most importantly, its relationship to central government, were largely 
maintained.
681
 The toxic nature of this ongoing politicized relationship is well 
reflected in one particular case of cross-border police cooperation in the 1980s 
wherein the Minister for Justice instructed the Irish Police Commissioner to cancel 
meetings with the RUC Chief Constable until a political dispute over the prosecution 
of RUC police officers for apparent ‘shoot-to-kill’ incidents could be resolved.682 
 
Ireland has only taken steps in recent years to introduce a semblance, if only the 
appearance, of local civilian involvement in police policy making. It has not done so 
out of some enlightened thinking around local democratic accountability but largely 
because the Morris Tribunal recommended the establishment of mechanisms for local 
civilian input to address major findings of police malpractice and corruption. The 
subsequent Garda Siochana Act 2005 provided for the establishment of Joint Policing 
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 The JPCs, containing a mix of local councillors, community 
representatives, non-governmental organisations and Garda officers from the relevant 
division, are required to hold periodic public meetings to discuss the nature and 
patterns of crime and policing responses in the local area. However they are 
completely devoid of any power of dismissal or the authority to issue formal general 





Unfortunately local consultative committees like the JPCs have long been a staple of 
English towns and cities, complementing Police Authorities and PCCs since the 
Brixton riots of 1981.
685
 More importantly, they have long been considered to be 
highly ineffective. Numerous studies, not least Loader’s research in 1996, have shown 
that the agendas of local consultative committees, which have no power of police 
chief dismissal, are generally dominated by the police.
686
 Moreover meetings are 
largely attended by community activists, not the common working class members of 
the community, ethnic minorities or vulnerable segments of society that frequently 
come into contact with the police.
687
 Topping’s analysis of almost identical local 
policing partnerships in Northern Ireland, which are known as District Policing 
Partnerships (DPPs), found that they have been reduced in practice to public meetings 
of less than 20 participants, often dominated by the same handful of community 
activists.
688
 Similarly, his research indicated that police policies and priorities 




Furthermore, Lord Scarman noted in 1981 that within community consultation forums 
senior police officers typically consider operational police matters to be inappropriate 
topics for community consultation and refuse to divulge explanatory answers.
690
 
Morgan observes that local consultative committees are not only largely ineffective 
but there is often little awareness of the existence of the committees amongst 
members of the public.
691
 Similarly Manning writes that neighbourhood 
representatives are typically not involved in meetings and meetings rarely find a 
problem on which the attendees and the police representatives agree.
692
 Walsh’s 
research indicates that the JPC’s scattered throughout Ireland have had a negligible 




Denmark’s system for local democratic accountability, on the other hand, appears to 
be a hybrid between the extant Irish and English systems. Denmark’s 12 District 
Police Commissioners (Politidirektorerne) are required to work closely with the 
mayors of municipalities that fall within their respective districts and tailor their 
activities to local needs. The respective commissioners, or their deputies, are required 
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to chair a council (Kredsradet) alongside the constituent mayors and community 
representatives at least four times a year to discuss crime trends and community 
policing issues and initiatives.
694
 The Commissioners, together with the local mayors, 
must set local performance targets for the district but these should be broadly in line 
with policies agreed with the National Police Commissioner (Rigspolitichefen) within 
their respective annual contracts. 
 
Most importantly, the National Police Commissioner should, in theory, facilitate local 
democratic accountability by agreeing annual performance contracts with each police 
chief individually so that the peculiar needs and wants of the local community can be 
accommodated. The annual contracts agreed between the National Police 
Commissioner and each district Commissioner generally set out priorities, targets, 
budget allocations and other issues for the coming year.
695
 To ensure transparency, the 
contracts are typically published on the Danish district police websites. Poor 





Denmark also employs another novel construct at the national level to ensure that 
Danish police chiefs are performing well but, most importantly, to ensure that they are 
not being overly influenced by either local mayors or national government. The 
relationship between the police chiefs and the National Police Commissioner, who 
effectively carries out the traditional regulatory and budgetary functions of the 
Minister for Justice (Justitsministeren), is shaped by way of a round-table meeting 
(Koncernledelsen) involving all of the officials at least six times a year.
697
 The 12 
Police Commissioners meet together with the National Police Commissioner and the 
DPP (Rigsadvocaten) to discuss strategic and performance issues and the status of 
priority cases, especially those of interest to the media.
698
 The idea of the round-table 
forum is to ensure that no one official dominates the policing agenda.
699
 The National 
Police Commissioner essentially acts as a chairman to stimulate investigations, 
coordination and cooperation amongst the district commissioners. In practice, the 
National Police Commissioner and the DPP only interfere with operations on the 
ground by way of offering additional finances or resources to enhance an 
investigation or by requesting that joint investigations be led by a more suitable 
district. The National Police Commissioner partakes primarily to proffer regulatory or 
budgetary advice and solutions while the DPP partakes primarily to stimulate 
cooperation and resolve conflicts of jurisdiction. 
 
It is fundamentally clear from the comparative analysis that neighbourhood 
communities are highly unlikely to participate in community-police consultative 
groups which have no power of chief officer dismissal since they will be dominated 
by the agenda of the police force rather than vice versa. Moreover, if constructs of 
local democratic accountability are developed which are bestowed with a power of 
chief officer dismissal, such as a police authority or PCC, steps must be taken to 
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ensure that such constructs are not too remote or under-resourced to address the needs 
and concerns of each and every unique neighbourhood community to the greatest 
extent possible. The national legislature that gives shape and form to these constructs 
of local democratic accountability cannot simply assume that residents will engage 
with local partnership and liaison bodies once established. The founding statutes 
should be highly detailed, outlining precise obligations and relationships at multiple 
local, regional and national levels in a similar fashion to the Danish approach.  
 
Future constructs must do more to ensure engagement with disenfranchised 
communities. In particular, as Skogan notes, in many cases communities are 
systemically averse to engaging in community-police dialogue out of hostility and 
distrust caused by prolonged periods of over-policing, abusive practices, perceived 
prejudices and generational neglect.
700
 Moreover, Loader remarks that teenagers, who 
are the most likely demographic to come into frequent contact with the police due to 
their habitual loitering, are the least likely to be represented at police-community 
meetings.
701
 Loader’s research indicates that the police generally empathise with 
youths due to the lack of opportunities available to them but he argues that the police 
must do more to develop ‘institutional spaces’ which facilitates open and inclusive 
dialogue and communication between the police and youths and all affected parties, 
which he refers to as ‘discursive policing’.702 Although the English and Irish 
constructs for local democratic accountability are in particular need of reform to 
address significant weaknesses, the most important feature for the purposes of this 
analysis is that each jurisdiction has a tangible construct in place to facilitate local 
democratic accountability in the first instance. Each jurisdiction evidently claims to 
adhere to an ethos of community input into local police policy albeit there are 
significant variations in approach and effectiveness in practice. 
 
The importance of national democratic accountability 
 
The mechanisms of national democratic accountability take a different shape and form 
to the constructs of local democratic accountability but the purpose of both is largely 
the same, to facilitate the airing of complaints, concerns, questions and simple 
misunderstandings by members of the public about the propriety of police actions or 
omissions so that the conduct of the police force might be amended. Mechanisms of 
local democratic accountability facilitate civilian guidance of local police policy 
whereas the national mechanisms of democratic accountability should facilitate 
civilian guidance and scrutiny of national laws, regulations, codes and policies 
governing the structures, powers and procedures of the police. National democratic 
accountability should facilitate the questioning, review and amendment of the laws 
that shape and define the police organisation, the codes of procedure that define police 
processes and human rights protections, the criminal laws that police officers are 
expected to enforce and, most importantly, the laws and policies that define 
mechanisms of complaint and inquiry. The primary mechanism for national 
democratic accountability is the national parliament and legislature.
703
 As Breathnach 
observes, it is the role of parliament to decide the nature and limitations of police 
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powers, the ways in which the police should apply their powers, what their function 




In the aftermath of a policing scandal, commentators and theorists often question‘quis 
custodiet ipsos custodies’ or ‘who guards the guardians’?705 Although the question is 
often posed as a ‘thorny conundrum’, the answer by and large is rather simple, in a 
constitutional democracy the ‘people’ do.706 Wilson remarks that when the police 
come under attack for doing the wrong thing or the right thing in the wrong way, there 
are usually calls for institutional or procedural change.
707
 Walsh remarks that when 
there is an inexorable rise in crime or a policing scandal, it is the parliament and its 




As Reiner has famously observed policing is unescapably political.
709
 It is the elected 
parliamentary legislators who typically decide whether statutes are introduced to 
define and re-define the structures and processes of the police force and the 
concomitant criminal law.
710
 Anderson et al remark that it is the quality of the 
criminal law and policing acts that ultimately define the character of the police force 
and the subsequent quality of civil and political life in the State.
711
 Similarly, it is the 
legislative statute that defines the role of the Minister for Justice in regulatory and 
policy matters. The powers, nature and transparency of the internal and external 
mechanisms of complaint and inquiry are determined by the legislature so too is the 
extent of involvement that local democratic bodies enjoy in matters of local police 
policy. 
 
The legislature is ultimately the architect of the mechanisms of police accountability 
and, by extension, the architect of police-community relations. Such is the 
relationship between policing and politics that Miller cogently observes that the 
peoples’ contact with the police generally colours their perception of government.712 
In the context of cross-border police cooperation, it is similarly the parliament that has 
the power to develop legal frameworks to complicate, simplify, facilitate and regulate 
the conduct of cross-border police cooperation.
713
 Due to the fact that parliaments 
bear such responsibility, the mechanisms that they have in place to ‘signal’ when and 
to what extent new laws, structures and processes are required are crucial.  
 
Walsh notes that one of the most fundamental ingredients for the proper functioning 
of the policing architecture in a constitutional democracy is informed debate.
714
 He 
conveys that democratic parliaments must function as a forum for the relatively 
fulsome disclosure of reports and inquiries concerning policing matters so that 
problems and concerns can be aired, debated and solutions subsequently 
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Marshall observes that, without an effective mechanism for local 
democratic accountability, parliament is often the most direct and appropriate way for 
a citizen to demand information, answers and reasons about police force 
performance.
716
 Walker and Loader remark that parliamentary disclosure and debate 
is not only important for amending police conduct but it is often crucial for placating 
social fears, anxieties and alarm about rising crime or police performance.
717
 Loader 
and Mulcahy eloquently convey that not only does policing symbolically shape 
people’s judgements about the present but it is a potent medium through which they 
can channel fears and longings for the future.
718
 The role of parliament is a 
fundamental feature of Marshall’s concept of ‘explanatory accountability’.719 Patten 
comments that the democratic ideal is that everything should ultimately be made 
available for public scrutiny unless it is specifically in the public’s best interest for the 




In line with the ideology of local democratic accountability, Foucault’s standpoint 
was that governments should ultimately be driven not by a partisan or fascist majority 
but be inclusive of, representative of and ultimately guided and directed by the multi-
cultural citizenry.
721
 He states that the legislature should not prioritise the preservation 
of governments but act in the complete service of all those who are governed, both the 
majority and the minority, in order to let populations and the common good 
flourish.
722
 Punch observes that, since social conditions and the needs, wants and 
anxieties of the citizenry are ever changing, the process for review, accountability and 
amendment is never finished and must be constantly enhanced.
723
 To echo Kleinig’s 
eloquent summation, police accountability is not only a normative demand that can be 
made but should be thought of structurally as a condition that exists.
724
 Unfortunately 
very few studies of parliamentary oversight of the policing function have been 
undertaken. Brogden’s 1982 publication on The Police: Autonomy and Consent makes 
vague reference to ministerial powers, Walker’s 2000 thesis on Policing in a 
Changing Constitutional Order makes reference to various parliamentary-established 
commissions of inquiry but Walsh’s ground-breaking book on the Irish Police appears 
to be one of the only in-depth analyses of parliamentary apparatus. Unfortunately the 




The main apparatus for responding to complaint and inquiry within Parliament is 
typically the Minister for Justice but the main apparatus for monitoring and evaluating 
the policing system, as well as the performance of the Minister, is typically the 
Standing Parliamentary Committee. Parliamentary members’ questions to the Minister 
are particularly useful for making inquiries on behalf of constituents and bringing 
matters to the attention of the parliamentary select committees but such questions 
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typically pertain to a very particular policing action or function and are usually asked 
ad hoc on behalf of a constituent or on foot of a media report. Walsh remarks that 
members of parliament tend to focus their questions on narrow operational 
controversies in their local constituency as opposed to discussing national strategic 
priorities.
725
 Moreover, parliamentary debates typically only occur on an ad hoc basis 
in response to major crime occurrences or policing scandals if and when they arise. 
For example, of the 20 debate days available to the opposition in the House of 
Commons in 2009, only one day was set aside for issues of law and order and one day 
for knife crime.
726
 In the context of cross-border policing, the Government itself 
scheduled only 2 days of debate on European affairs, during which time matters of 




Due to their regulatory responsibility for policing matters and their broader obligation 
to promote new legislation if needed, it is a matter of common convention that 
Ministers strive to provide answers pertaining to all non-sensitive areas of policing, 
whether the question relates to drug trafficking, armed robberies, violence against 
women, community orientated policing, street patrol or local crime.
728
 Prior to 
parliamentary debates or in response to written or oral questions, the Minister for 
Justice or Home Affairs will normally request a report on the matter from the relevant 
police chief or commissioner pertaining to the issue at hand.
729
 In practice, the 
Minister rarely ever deals directly with a police chief or commissioner, usually 
communicating instead through a permanent secretary from the ministerial 
department.  
 
It is not unusual for Ministers to answer questions by reminding their critics within 
Parliament that they are unable to instruct police officers to carry out operations in 
one way and not another since such instructions may impinge upon the force’s 
operational independence.
730
 They may typically only issue general strategic 
directions pertaining to policy, priorities, performance or any other matter relating to 
the management of the police force and may proffer advice that police chiefs are only 
bound to consider. However Marshall remarks that successive Home Secretaries have 
evidently not understood the precise meaning of operational independence by 
consistently claiming that they could not be questioned in Parliament about the 
discharge of duties by individual police officers from the London Metropolitan Police 
even though such questions typically pertained to policy matters for which the Home 
Secretary could traditionally issue general policy instructions.
731
 The Danish Auditor 
General conducted an inquiry into the quality of the Danish Minister’s reporting to the 
Parliament in 2009 and reported that the quality of the key indicators provided were 
sufficiently good to represent fairly the results achieved by the police.
732
 Nevertheless, 
the mechanism of parliamentary debate is far from comprehensive since the matters 
covered are haphazard and piecemeal, addressing only a small ambit of policing 
issues. 
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One problematic feature is that the respective Minister for Justice or Home Affairs 
tends to praise the ‘excellence’ of the police force rather than lead with criticisms.733 
If a Minister for Justice proceeds to criticise a police force, they are in effect 
criticising their own political performance as the primary elected official responsible 
for police regulation, strategic direction and resourcing.
734
 Similarly, as Walsh 
observes, police chiefs are highly unlikely to criticise the resources provided by the 
national government or the policy performance of the Minister for fear of causing a 
rift with the Minister which may lead to calls for their dismissal or weaken the ability 




Even the annual or multi-annual national police budget which must typically be 
approved by Parliament does not engender much constructive debate within 
Parliament.
736
 The national police budget is generally presented and treated as a fait 
accompli since it is widely appreciated that the Ministry of Justice or Home Affairs 
will already have pored over the financial figures outlined in the police estimates to 
ensure that the force expenditure is in line with government policy and, most 
importantly, will have prioritised those crimes of national concern such as organised 
crime and terrorism which parliaments are invariably interested in.
737
 Walsh conveys 
that disagreement typically arises only over whether too much money is being spent 
on major crime initiatives, taskforces, IT projects and equipment upgrades rather than 
whether and to what extent the budget apportioned to each police division is sufficient 
to enable each police department to perform to its potential in line with community 
needs and wants.
738
 Neyroud and Beckley observe that parliaments have a tendency to 




Since the Parliamentary chambers offer little opportunity for the constructive 
development of solutions to community concerns and inquiries, it is the construct of 
the parliamentary committee that is supposed to address concerns and developments 
in a systematic way. Unlike the individual Member of Parliament who typically does 
not have the time or resources to conduct inquiries or investigations into police 
practice or the adequacy of ministerial oversight, the Parliamentary Committee is 
tasked with such responsibility and generally bestowed with the powers necessary to 
inquire into prevalent issues of concern. All three jurisdictions maintain parliamentary 
committees which oversee the policing function. In England, the Home Affairs 
Committee which corresponds to the work of the Home Office is the House of 
Commons Standing Committee responsible for policing matters.
740
 Each department 
of government typically has at least one standing committee overseeing its legal and 
administrative activities.
741
 Each committee typically consists of a dozen or so 
members, each of whom represent one of the political parties or affiliations while the 
chairperson of each committee is elected by parliamentary vote.
742
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The primary functions of the select committees, whether departmental or cross 
departmental, is to carry out reviews of key legislation already in force, to evaluate 
whether the legislation has achieved what the legislators had in mind and to contribute 
to the drafting and introduction of new legislation.
743
 The select committees will 
typically keep legislation under review by holding regular inquiries whereby they are 
empowered to summon witnesses to provide oral or written evidence, whether public 
or private sector, and may ask the government to produce documents for the purposes 
of shedding light on an issue.
744
 Committees typically hold weekly meetings, choose 
their own agenda and topics of inquiry and generally publish the details and findings 
of their inquiries. Crucially, their meetings are normally open to the public and 
usually recorded on dedicated internet and television channels. The Home Affairs 
Committee’s agenda is often driven by the policy agenda of the Home Office as well 
as any new legislation under consideration, any regulations under consideration, 
annual reports from the territorial police forces, inspection reports from HMIC, 
complaints under investigation at the IPCC, local reports from the PCCs and their 
Police and Crime Panels and concerns raised by the local, national and international 
media.  
 
The Westminster Parliament also maintains a number of cross-departmental select 
committees, of which the European Scrutiny Committee is particularly relevant for 
matters of cross-border police cooperation.
745
 Established in 1974, the European 
Committee receives all EU Council and Commission proposals, white papers and 
reports, necessitating a weekly sift of dozens of documents.
746
 Matters of cross-border 
police cooperation fall under the rubric of the Committee’s Justice and Home Affairs 
sub-committee. The European Committee functions in a similar fashion to the Home 
Affairs Committee. Upon request, government departments must provide the 
Committee with explanatory memos and reports outlining the government’s position 
and the considered effects of new laws and policies.
747
 Although the Committee exists 
in part to unburden the departmental select committees from having to consider EU 
matters as well as national ones, it frequently requests comments from the relevant 
departmental select committee due to their national expertise in the relevant areas.
748
 
Ministers may also be called upon to appear before the Committee prior to EU 
Council meetings but the Committee has no legal authority to force a Minister to 
follow its advice or even to wait for it to reach a decision before entering negotiations 




The European Scrutiny Committee also works in partnership with the House of Lords 
EU Committee which is largely responsible for carrying out thematic reviews of 
legislative and policy developments.
750 The House of Lords’ Committee also has a 
Home Affairs sub-committee which typically carries out reviews in the area of cross-
border police and judicial cooperation.
751
 Like the departmental select committees, the 
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Lords can take oral and written evidence to inform its reviews and 
recommendations.
752
 The reports published by the relevant committees and, in 
particular, their opinions on various EU Commission white papers and judicial 
decisions are considered to be crucial for providing a counter-balance against the 
rhetoric of the national and supranational executive. 
 
A number of other departmental and cross-departmental committees tend to play a 
more incidental role in policing matters. The Commons’ Joint Committee on Statutory 
Instruments as well as the Lords’ Delegated Powers Committee and Secondary 
Legislation Scrutiny Committee are tasked with keeping the regulative performance 
of ministers under review, ensuring that they introduce any and all secondary 
instruments demanded by statute, such as the PACE Codes of Practice, and that such 
regulations are appropriate.
753
 Any regulation issued by the Home Secretary may be 
subject to annulment by Parliament if it is deemed unsuitable.
754
 The Public Accounts 
Committee also plays a key role in keeping the financial expenditure and budgets of 
each governmental department under review, which may include a review of the 
national police budget upon an inquiry into the Home Office’s expenditure. The cross-
departmental Joint Committee on Human Rights has also conducted reviews of 





Ireland and Denmark have similar parliamentary committees in place. Ireland’s Joint 
Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights is responsible for 
matters of public policing and a European Committee scrutinises matters concerning 
EU law and policy.
756
 Denmark’s Parliament (The Folketing), maintains a similar 
Justice Committee as well as a European Affairs Committee.
757
  In a similar fashion to 
the Westminster Home Affairs Committee, the Justice Committees can typically 
compel witnesses, whether in the public or private sector, to attend meetings or 
produce documents in order to address relevant concerns and to keep its members 
briefed on topical issues. They normally have recourse to the police force’s annual 
report, any multi-annual policing plans, any reports issued by the external complaints 
body or inspectorate as well as any reports requested by the Minister albeit in redacted 
form to safeguard case sensitive information and national security. From a 
transparency perspective, the Annual Report and Crime Reports published by 
Denmark’s National Police Commissioner provide particularly detailed descriptions 
of major and special operations undertaken, statistics on the number of patrolmen 
deployed and the total patrol hours in each district as well as the nature of future 
threats along with the standard lists of statistics outlining the number of crimes 




With respect to European matters, like the English parliamentary system, the Irish and 
Danish Parliamentary European Committees must normally be provided with a copy 




 ibid 91 – 99 
754
 Police Act 1996 s 53 
755
 Norton (n726) 187-189 
756 Dermot Walsh, ‘The Garda Siochana: a legal and constitutional perspective’ in Paul O’Mahony (ed), 
Criminal Justice in Ireland (Institute of Public Administration, Dublin 2002) 469, 470 
757
 National Police Commissioner (n736) 25 
758 
Lars Holmberg, Policing Stereotypes: A qualitative study of police work in Denmark (Galda and 
Wilch Verlag Publishers Berlin 2003) 35 
 102 
of all relevant planned EU legislative measures together with a statement outlining the 
content, purpose and likely implications of the proposed measures. As a working rule, 
the respective European Committees are normally provided with a report compiled by 
the Minister every six months which provides a general overview of the initiatives 
introduced and the immediate plans of the various EU institutions within all areas of 
the Minister’s competency. In Ireland, the Minister is only required to have regard to 
the recommendations made by the European Committee and may undertake 
negotiations against the recommendations of the Committee or, in urgent 




However in Denmark, the Danish European Affairs Committee has formed a number 
of contracts with the Danish Folketing, one of which demands that the Minister for 
Justice attain its approval before committing to new policy initiatives on the EU 
level.
760
 To reinforce parliamentary authority, the Danish Folketing even maintains a 
Parliamentary Ombudsman who may conduct tribunal-style investigations into the 
unlawful, unreasonable or errant actions of serving ministers upon receiving a 
substantiated complaint.
761
 Furthermore, a mixed High Court (Ringret), presided not 
only by sitting judges but representative members of the parliament, can subsequently 





Regrettably, the Irish Parliament’s Justice Committee has been considerably 
weakened in recent years. A Supreme Court ruling in the case of Maguire v Ardagh in 
2002, which concerned the police shooting of John Carthy, appears to have generated 
a significant degree of confusion around the Irish Justice Committee’s powers of 
inquiry.
763
 The Court effectively ruled that the Committee could not reach findings of 
fact about the culpability of a particular police officer or civilian, in much the same 
fashion as a Tribunal of Inquiry. The ruling has been somewhat distorted by Irish 
police officers who thereafter began to blatantly refuse to answer the committee’s 
questions on procedural or operational matters where such answers could incriminate 
or tarnish their reputation or that of any other officer.
764
 The prevailing situation 
creates the remarkable scenario that the Minister for Justice is able to instruct the 
police Commissioner to carry out internal inquiries and to afford the Minister full 
disclosure but the parliamentary committee, which is responsible for overseeing the 
functioning of the Department of Justice and for gauging whether and to what extent 
legislation is having the desired effect does not enjoy nearly the same powers of 
inquiry.  
 
The weakened powers of the parliamentary committee is considerably problematic in 
light of the fact that the Morris Tribunal found that the Minister for Justice was 
habitually placing too much faith or trust in the Police Commissioner to provide the 
Department of Justice with spontaneous and regular briefings, particularly when they 
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concerned police complaints, corruption and internal inquiries.
765
 Remarkably, the 
Irish Government addressed Justice Morris’ concerns, not by enhancing the capacity 
of the parliamentary committee, but by introducing a requirement in the Garda 
Siochana Act 2005 for the Police Commissioner to provide any police records, 
statements or any other document in the possession of the police force to the Minister 
upon request and to report any matters of national significance to the Minister of 
Justice spontaneously and immediately as such issues arise.
766
 Walsh comments that 
the prevailing situation fundamentally limits transparency, accountability and 
democratic debate and participation around public policing in Ireland, effectively 
enabling the Minister to shield the Department of Justice and the police force from 






England, Ireland and Denmark not only maintain similar mechanisms for national 
democratic accountability in the form of parliamentary committees for policing and 
European matters but they also maintain somewhat similar inspectorates which serve 
primarily to conduct thematic inspections on behalf of the parliament and the broader 
public. To enhance the transparency of the police organisation, largely for the benefit 
of parliamentary and public consumption, the creation and enhancement of national 
independent police inspectorates has become increasingly popular. Although 
England’s Inspectorate, namely Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), 
has been conducting inspections and publishing reports on the organisational practices 
and financial efficiencies of English police forces since 1856, the relatively recent 
development of modern codes of procedure such as the PACE Act 1984 have 
demanded radically new inspections in the areas of police procedure and  
compliance.
768
 Neyroud remarks that, although HMIC was long considered to be 
empathetic towards the territorial police forces since it was almost always led by 
retired chief constables, following the introduction of PACE, which formally 
extended its mandate to scrutinise legal police procedures, its inspections have 
become increasingly open and critical of police work.
769
 HMIC typically carries out at 
least one inspection of each police force annually as well as a number of thematic 
inspections, whether focusing specifically on interrogation procedures, stop and 
search processes, the policing of domestic abuse, anti-social juvenile behaviour, child 
protection arrangements, the preparation of cases for trial or the standard of custody 
suites and processes.
770
 HMIC must not only be given complete access to police 
premises, documents, information and evidence in order to conduct their inspections 
but police forces are required to prepare and provide the inspectors with vast 





Ireland and Denmark established police inspectorates relatively recently, which 
indicates that the construct is gradually becoming a feature of international best 
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practice. Unfortunately it took a policing scandal in Donegal in the early 2000s and 
another recommendation of the Morris Tribunal to set up the Garda Inspectorate in 
Ireland.
772
 Remarkably, the Irish legislation did not provide for annual budgetary or 
procedural reviews like its English counterpart but only enabled the Inspectorate to 
carry out thematic inspections upon the consent of the Minister for Justice.
773
 This 
meant that in practice the Inspectorate had to apply to the Minister to conduct each 
and every inspection or must simply wait until the Minister demanded that an 
inspection be carried out into some particular area of the police force. Although the 
Irish Inspectorate was designed to be independent, it was by no means independent in 
substance in the sense that it could not carry out routine inspections on a year by year 
basis but was, in effect, an external investigative agency to be employed at the will of 
the Minister. Denmark, on the other hand, uses a National Audit Office 







England, Ireland and Denmark all appear to have conceptually similar mechanisms in 
place across the disciplinary, legal and democratic fields. They each have mechanisms 
for the external civilian investigation of police complaints, facilitate broadly the same 
judicial avenues for addressing police misconduct and have the same basic processes 
and structures for democratic accountability in the local and national spheres, not least 
consultative community constructs on the local level and similar parliamentary 
committees on the national level. More particularly, across the various areas the three 
States have taken remarkably similar evolutionary steps which suggest that there is a 
considerable degree of ‘knowledge transfer’ as well as an emerging ethos of best 
practice in police accountability. All three jurisdictions established new independent 
‘investigative’ police complaints bodies between 2002 and 2012 respectively in order 
to enhance the transparency and effectiveness of their regimes for disciplinary 
accountability. In the concomitant area of local democratic accountability, Ireland has 
recently introduced Joint Policing Boards which has brought it much closer into line 
with similar English PACE committees and the Danish ‘Kredsradet’. Unfortunately, 
like much police reform, it only did so in the aftermath of a major police scandal. 
 
Although the constituent dimensions of complaint and inquiry appear to be broadly 
similar across the three jurisdictions, there remains a considerable gap in standards 
within the realm of democratic accountability in particular. On the local level, Ireland 
is apparently one or two evolutionary steps behind both England and Denmark for 
both have developed novel constructs to address the issue of community consultation 
in recent years. England’s establishment of PCCs in 2011 and Denmark’s police 
reform of 2007, which gave effect to the round-table forum of police management 
(Koncernledelsen) and the simplified publication of police chief contracts, were 
designed in part to engender greater transparency. 
 
However, as a word of caution, no major English-language analyses have been 
undertaken as of yet which convincingly show whether the Danish reforms have 
significantly enhanced democratic police accountability relative to the previous 
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regime. The amalgamation of 53 district police forces into 12 in 2007 may 
conceivably have rendered police forces less responsive to the needs and wants of 
local communities as the police districts were recast as ‘regional’ rather than local. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that it should ultimately boil down to the question of 
proactivity. Local democratic accountability demands that police forces are 
responsive to the needs and concerns of each neighbourhood as a unique client but 
whether that responsiveness comes through a small decentralised police force or 
through the local basic command unit of much larger centralised or regional police 
forces appears to be immaterial. The main issue is that the local police department, 
whether decentralised or centralised in nature, has both the flexibility and the 
stimulation to respond proactively to community needs. Regardless of the 
decentralised or centralised nature of the police force, the same ethos of local 
democratic accountability should apply. 
 
It is submitted that the chapter on ‘complaints and inquiry’ and the preceding chapter 
on ‘codes and co-option’ represent a useful addition to modern epistemology. The 
thesis developed and tested a theoretical framework through which police 
accountability could be evaluated and measured. It ultimately found that England, 
Ireland and Denmark each have constructs and processes that fit relatively seamlessly 
within it. Most importantly, it found that the mechanisms and approaches were 
broadly similar to one another, albeit with some constituent variations. Although the 
dimensions of disciplinary, legal and democratic accountability had already been 
signposted and broadly accepted by the academic community, the comparative 
analysis and consolidation of the relevant structures and processes should enable 
policy makers, legislators and academics to view the issues and deficiencies in a way 
that was traditionally unfeasible due to a lack of such analyses. 
 
Most importantly, the thesis added the issues of ‘codes’ and ‘co-option’ to the 
traditional framework of police accountability, not as supplementary addendums but 
as crucial sources which underpin the effectiveness and quality of the mechanisms of 
disciplinary, legal and democratic complaint and inquiry. ‘Codes’ arguably take 
centre-stage for they set the standards against which the disciplinary, legal and 
democratic mechanisms must ultimately measure police conduct. It is submitted that 
policy makers and legislators should adopt the relatively clear and concise framework 
of ‘codes, co-option and complaint’ to view, appreciate and subsequently enhance 
their national structures and processes for police accountability, some of which 
remain considerably weak from a comparative perspective.  
 
The chapters have shown that the organisational weaknesses which facilitate police 
malpractice, brutality, secrecy and impunity can be significantly affected by key 
reforms, almost all of which can be introduced by way of legislative action. Continued 
failure to do so arguably generates a degree of parliamentary complicity in future 
cases of systemic police brutality, unlawful investigative practices, racism and 
internal secrecy, issues which have severely tainted the image and legitimacy of 
public policing in the very recent past.
775
 Unfortunately, as Bayley observes, major 
statutory reforms are normally only introduced in the immediate aftermath of major 
policing scandals and, most importantly, typically emanate not from the police force, 
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As Manning indicates, the simple fact that a State practices a brand of democratic 
political government does not simply translate to the existence of a ‘democratic 
police’.777 It is the nature, form and effectiveness of the extant processes of police 
accountability that ultimately determines whether a police force can be considered to 
be democratic in the final analysis.
778
 The issue is not just about how a police officer 
behaves but how police officers are directed and regulated by the hierarchical police 
organisation, government, the legislature and broader civil society. Mawby observes 
that governments and police chiefs typically claim that they are ‘high on 
accountability’ and point to various mechanisms that they maintain but in many cases 
the rhetoric does not match the reality, quantity does not invariably equate to 
quality.
779
 In other words, police accountability is only as strong as the processes, 
structures and mechanisms established to deliver it. 
 
The purpose of the next sequence of chapters is to determine whether and to what 
extent the EU project has incorporated or affected these conventional legal and 
administrative structures and processes for police accountability. In particular it aims 
to investigate whether and to what extent the EU has incorporated the various 
principles, approaches and mechanisms on the EU level in order to enhance the 
accountability of cross-border policing. The thesis aims to deduce whether any 
similarities between the national and supranational approaches serve to reinforce the 
idea of a common approach to police accountability across the wider EU or whether 
and how any substantial differences in approach on the supranational level have been 
reconciled with the Member States’ conventional legal and administrative 
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Ch. 3 Codes as EU law and policy 
 
The thesis will proceed to critically analyse the constitutional, legal and 
administrative values that shape the modern landscape of police accountability on the 
EU level. It can be anticipated that the development of common transnational 
measures and the challenges that they raise have been met by drawing upon and 
reconciling the Member States’ long-standing national approaches to police 
accountability which are rooted in constitutional, legal and administrative traditions 
and values. To facilitate the critical and comparative analysis, chapters 3, 4 and 5 will 
apply the same theoretical framework to the EU dimension as the one applied in 
chapters 1 and 2 to the Member States, namely codes, co-option and complaint. The 
thesis will first examine the EU regime through the principal lens of ‘codes’. Where 
weaknesses are identified, the thesis will attempt to draw upon national approaches 
and international best practice to mould constructs to enhance the transparency and 
accountability of EU cross-border policing in line with conventional legal and 
administrative values. 
 
Codes as a raison d’etre of the EU project 
 
The EU was bestowed with a legislative and policy competency for cross-border 
police cooperation not because of some enlightened ideology around transparency and 
accountability. The conduct of cross-border police cooperation was inflicted with 
various obstacles prior to the 1990s which the Member States showed little interest in 
addressing through the EC/ EU institutions. Obstacles included a discernible lack of 
legal frameworks for hot pursuit at border crossings throughout Europe, a lack of 
clarity around the legal immunities enjoyed by visiting police officers, complicated 
processes for the exchange of evidence through diplomatic channels and a marked 
unwillingness amongst counter-terrorism police units to share intelligence with one 
another. If anything, the efforts by the EC Justice Ministers to enhance counter-
terrorism cooperation through the secretive Trevi organisation in the 1970s and ‘80s 
had been marked by almost complete failure. 
 
The primary reason for the EU’s involvement in matters of cross-border police 
cooperation pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty 1993 was far more banal. The EU 
institutions were initially concerned with removing the internal border controls 
between the Member States in order to facilitate the four freedoms of movement, 
namely the free movement of people, goods, services and capital. It was suggested 
that the ‘open’ market could lead to the creation of 5 million new jobs and re-direct 
€24 billion which was being spent on the maintenance of border crossings and related 
technical functions.
780
 It was widely held that the ability of commercial companies to 
operate easily across the Member States in a ‘single market’ would better enable them 
to compete with American and Japanese conglomerates and the EU would be able to 
negotiate better trading agreements as an integrated ‘economic bloc’.781 The Member 
States of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, referred to as the Benelux 
States, had long benefitted from the abolition of their internal border controls and 
played a part in convincing the other EU Member States of the economic benefits. 
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At a meeting in Fontainebleau in June 1984, the Heads of State and Government of 
the Member States agreed to work towards the removal of internal border controls 
throughout Europe in order to create a single economic market by 1992.
782
 At the 
time, there was widespread vociferous concern amongst police forces and politicians 
that the EU governments were naively putting economic integration ahead of security 
considerations.
783
 The EC Commission’s seminal White Paper on ‘Completing the 
Internal Market’ published the following year merely contained a few vague 
compensatory security recommendations, which revolved around the ratification of 
various extant conventions concerning the harmonisation of offence prohibitions and 
sanctions which had been developed by the Council of Europe (CoE) and United 




Chief amongst the concerns was the widespread fear that upon the removal of border 
controls the highly lucrative markets of Member States would incur an influx of 
transient criminals, illegal immigrants and stolen and counterfeit goods which would 
otherwise have been stymied by the traditional border checks.
785
 Benyon et al state 
that the uneasy political and public discourse about the arrival of foreign organised 
crime and immigration in the absence of border checks coupled with the traditional 
limits of jurisdiction which tied police powers to the national territory created fears 
about a perceived ‘internal security deficit’.786 Bigo observed that many chief police 
officers and politicians amplified the security concerns by treating organised crime, 
terrorism, drugs, immigration, and asylum as a single ‘internal security’ problem.787 
He argued cogently that the rhetoric was useful in drawing attention to the need to 
address the loss of the traditional border checkpoint which was perceived to carry out 
an important security as well as economic function but that such rhetoric also served 
to blur the discernible differences between the various crime problems and the ability 




Bigo conveyed that the distinct problems of organised crime, terrorism, immigration, 
asylum and any other crime problem of note were being emotionally treated as mere 
objects on an ‘internal security continuum’ rather than unique and peculiar 
problems.
789
 Zedner outlines how the term ‘security’ is not a single immutable 
concept but is a promiscuous semantic concept that is applied and conceptualised 
differently in different academic and policy disciplines ranging from national security 
to social security, financial security, commodity security and private security.
790
 
Nevertheless, the terms ‘internal security’ and ‘security deficit’ were regularly 
employed by chief police officers and politicians to underpin their emotive rhetoric 
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but without addressing the substantive problems with the necessary degree of 
erudition.  
 
Bigo argues that not only were politicians using the rhetoric of internal security to 
avoid addressing the substantive issues but they were also closely associating 
problems of terrorism and organised crime with largely unconnected issues of 
immigration thereby promoting a palpable brand of xenophobia and the introduction 
of unwarranted counter-terrorism measures to address unfounded fears of 
uncontrollable immigration.
791
 Ellison and Pino similarly convey that globalisation, 
which was originally idealised in terms of technological and engineering 
advancement, has increasingly been linked colloquially and conceptually to migration, 
rapid urbanization, cheap labour, unemployment, social dislocation and rising 
crime.
792
 Loader and Sparks indicate that this modern internal security discourse has 
contributed to the portrayal of criminal and terrorist groups operating in foreign 
countries as a ‘global’ crime problem instead of a foreign problem, which has 
contributed significantly to a highly illusory ‘globalized crime anxiety’.793  
 
Zedner notes that it is precisely because of its linguistic imprecision, that policy-
makers prefer to use the term ‘security’ since its lack of definitional clarity permits 
expansive interpretation and wide application.
794
 She argues that politicians like to use 
the term ‘security’ as a rhetoric lever to create a perpetual sense of crisis which in turn 
legitimates their vague and often illusory ‘law and order’ policy initiatives.795 Garland 
argues in his cogent treatise on The Culture of Control (2001) that politicians have 
played a central role in transforming the victim of crime, who is by and large little 
more than an unfortunate citizen, into a much more representative character whose 
experience is taken to be common, collective and symbolic rather than individual and 
atypical so much so that every mistake by a police officer becomes a scandal and 
every decision subject to political contention.
796
 Zedner suggests that a far more 
pragmatic and reasonable approach is to avoid the use of the term security and instead 
define and measure the actual threats themselves so that initiatives and measures are 




Although the rhetoric of the internal security deficit helped to draw attention to the 
need for enhanced cross-border police cooperation in order to address the loss of the 
traditional border checkpoint, almost all of the academic commentators at the time 
conveyed that the perceived ‘internal security deficit’ was largely illusory and 
unfounded.
798
 Benyon et al pointed out that the removal of internal border checkpoints 
would make little difference to international immigration, drug trafficking and 
terrorism since borders were always highly porous.
799
 Bresler conveyed that only a 
small proportion of travellers were typically stopped and checked at border crossings 
on mainland Europe, most travellers were simply waved through.
800
 Moreover, it was 
                                                 
791
 Bigo (n787) 163 - 165 
792
 Ellison and Pino (n98) 11 - 26  
793
 Loader and Sparks (n591) 97 – 201  
794
 Zedner (n571) 10 - 22 
795
 ibid  
796 
David Garland, The Culture of Control (OUP 2001) 8 - 20 
797
 Zedner (n571) 14, 15 
798
 Anderson (n102) 10  
799
 Benyon et al (n64) 23 - 32 
800 
Fenton Bresler, Interpol (Sinclair Stevenson London 1992) 10 - 16, 413, 414 
 110 
not unheard of for criminals to forge identity papers and bribe border officials at 
border checks whilst most countries had so many points of entry by road or sea that 
border checks could be circumnavigated with relative ease.
801
 Fijnaut and Paoli’s 
research indicates that Dutch criminal gangs habitually crossed between the Benelux 





 Centuries to commit burglaries, armed robberies and the highway robbery of 
horse-drawn carriages.
802
 Rail travel in Europe from the mid-19
th
 century had also 
greatly exacerbated the movement of criminals and stolen property.
803
 Thieves and 
fraudsters reportedly moved habitually between the lucrative European capitals of 
London, Paris and Vienna, often bringing with them a distinct modus operandi.
804
 
Interpol’s files dating from the 1930s, for instance, contained thousands of profiles on 
currency forgers, hotel fraudsters, cheque swindlers, art thieves, house breakers, 




Police cooperation on the other hand was far from non-existent. It was considerably 
more multi-faceted than the simple manning of border checkpoints. As early as the 
1850s, the Vienna police was famous for circulating newspaper alerts throughout 
Europe, translated into English, French and German, in order to provide European 
police forces and members of the public with details about the known activities, 
whereabouts, physical description, photographs and, from the early 1900s, 
fingerprints, of wanted criminals.
806
 Police forces in Germany and England also 
published similar gazettes with a European circulation.
807
 The publication of 
international notices has since become the responsibility of Interpol which rebranded 
the Vienna policing gazette as the International Public Safety gazette and began to 
issue colour codified notices pertaining to wanted persons (red), police requests for 
investigative action (green), police request for information (blue), missing persons 




Throughout the first half of the 20
th
 Century, police forces in all of the major capital 
cities in Europe maintained vast card-based criminal files describing crimes by 
offence type, suspect description, alias and various other categories.
809
 Moreover, 
information was regularly exchanged between police forces particularly where such 
information pertained to threats against heads of State.
810 
It was not unheard of for 
parallel investigations to be coordinated across jurisdictions and for police officers to 
occasionally travel abroad to discuss cases with their foreign counterparts and to 
attend international police conferences.
811 Deflem observes that Austria’s relationship 
with the Police Union of German States in 1863 was one of the first formal multi-
national police cooperation networks in Europe.
812
 Formalised through a Convention, 
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 Centuries, only a few national parliaments in Europe showed a keen 
interest in formally enhancing cross-border police cooperation with their neighbours 
by legislative means. The Benelux and Nordic States were largely the exception to the 
rule. Both regions developed systems for cross-border hot pursuit, surveillance and 
the exchange of evidence from the first decades of the 20
th
 Century. Most other 
national parliaments appeared to place their faith in Interpol, the Council of Europe 
(CoE) and the United Nations (UN), in particular, to devise solutions to the major 
challenges encountered during cross-border police cooperation. The three principal 
organisations produced an array of initiatives to minimise and alleviate some of the 





Interpol, which was funded and supported by the participant governments albeit 
indirectly via the participant police forces, served primarily as a liaison bureau within 
which liaison officers from each participant police force could develop working 
relationships and through which the police headquarters of each of the participant 
police forces could contact one another directly and relatively rapidly.
815
 The Council 
of Europe (CoE) developed a number of key legal frameworks that were designed to 
simplify and streamline various bureaucratic diplomatic and judicial procedures which 
served to delay and impede cross-border police cooperation. The United Nations, like 
the League of Nations before it, introduced a number of instruments to encourage 
States to harmonise their criminal definitions particularly in the areas of drugs, human 
trafficking and terrorism so that police and judicial cooperation in major crime areas 
would not be impeded by differing definitions and legal interpretations.
816
 Most of the 
measures introduced by the CoE and the UN were signed by all of the States in 
Western Europe but they were rarely ratified in their entirety by the participant State 
governments.
817
 The relevant codes and initiatives that were introduced by the CoE, 
the UN and Interpol will be discussed throughout the chapter. 
 
By any objective standard, the crime anxiety and internal security discourse that 
emerged in Europe following the decision to remove the internal border controls was 
considerably theatrical.
818
 Anderson argued that even the statistics on international 
crime were very weak in comparison to domestic ordinary crimes so it was relatively 
clear that the internal security deficit was based mainly on fantasies and fears which 
were far from convincing.
819
 Even a cursory acknowledgment of the amount of drugs 
being trafficked into European countries and the number of terrorist attacks carried 
out on mainland Europe and the islands of Ireland and England in the 1970s and ‘80s 
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indicated that border checkpoints served little more than a tax and excise function.
820
 
Drug seizures depended almost entirely on intelligence-led policing and the quantities 
of drugs found spontaneously at border checkpoints were reportedly miniscule in 
comparison.
821
 Neyroud and Vasillas observe that, in hindsight, the removal of border 




Although it was relatively clear that the prevalent internal security fears and anxieties 
around the planned removal of internal border controls were largely unfounded, the 
EU policy competency was established in the original Maastricht Treaty 1992 to 
appease those fears.
823
 It was apparent that the EU did not enter the policy field 
organically or naturally because it had some novel new invention or enlightened 
approach to offer. It was clear that the illusory internal security deficit, particularly the 
perceived problems of organised crime and terrorism as a by-product of the removal 
of internal border controls were the driving forces behind the development of the 
competency. Fijnaut and Paoli convey that it was essentially deemed to be a political 
imperative for the governments ‘to be seen to be doing something’ about the 
perceived ‘internal security deficit’ which they had caused.824 Using the terminology 
of functionalist theory, Anderson described the EU policing project as little more than 





Due largely to the illusory nature of the internal security concerns the Maastricht 
Treaty avoided setting out highly proscriptive policy objectives, expectations, 
priorities or definitive timescales for progress.
826
 Moreover, no attempt was made to 
clarify whether and to what extant the EU project would coexist with the extant 
international organisations already active in the ‘crowded policy space’, not least the 
CoE, the UN and Interpol.
827
 No considerable attempt was even made to prove that 
the EU framework was the most suitable environment within which to build new 
trans-European initiatives.
828
 Anderson et al characterised the project as an abstract 
lofty political ambition to be determined by a fluctuating political environment of 
negotiation, absent of any tangible structural determinism.
829
 Walker referred to the 
act of prioritising lofty political ambitions over identifiable practitioner needs as an 




Before the vague Treaty was introduced, the respective justice ministers outlined 
some of their ideas and intentions within the Palma Document in 1988 and a joint 
statement in Paris in 1989, known as the Paris Declaration.
831
 The Document and 
Declaration outlined the Ministers’ intention to develop ‘compensatory measures’ in a 
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 They indicated their intention to develop a common law 
enforcement information system; to facilitate joint training activities; to establish 
national drugs intelligence units; to engender closer cooperation between police 
liaison officers; to promote joint investigations; to examine ‘hot pursuit’ across 
borders; to harmonise laws in major crime areas and to further simplify extradition 
procedures amongst other measures.
833
 The objectives were restated in a more formal 
Action Plan in 1990.
834
 For the most part, the initiatives appeared to draw almost 
entirely upon multi-lateral initiatives already in place in the Benelux and Nordic 
regions as well as various aspects of Interpol’s institutional character. In effect, the 
Member States outlined their intention to develop ‘Euro’ versions of the extant 
regional and international constructs and procedural frameworks in order to placate 




By and large, the policy objectives have not changed drastically between the Paris 
Declaration and the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty policy objectives around the 
collection storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information; the 
coordination of police training and research; the introduction of common investigative 
techniques in relation to the detection of serious forms of organised crime; the 
development of measures concerning operational cooperation; and the enhancement 
of Europol to support such objectives looks remarkably similar to the original 
prescription. The Lisbon Treaty is considerably broader if anything. Where the Paris 
Declaration outlined the intention to promote joint investigations and to examine ‘hot 
pursuit’ across borders, the Lisbon Treaty formally expands the EUs competency to 
look beyond joint investigation teams to any types of common investigative 
techniques and beyond ‘hot pursuit’ to any and all forms of operational cooperation 
which concerns the detection and investigation of serious and organised crime with a 
cross-border dimension. 
 
Although the treaty basis for the EU regime remains vague and ambitious, most of the 
measures that have been introduced by the EU take statutory form and concern 
operational processes and procedures. The thesis will show that the lofty treaty 
objectives have ultimately been translated by and large into codes of procedure that 
serve to determine how various facets of cross-border police cooperation are carried 
out in practice. In other words, the EU has attempted to fill the conceptual deficit or 
void with agencies and procedural codes in order to give shape and form to cross-
border policing. Although the initial raison d’etre of the remarkably vague and 
abstract EU project was the ambitious treatment of the illusory ‘security deficit’, it is 
submitted that its raison d’etre at present appears to be the codification of some acute 
processes of cross-border policing. 
 
For clarity and simplicity, the chapter will divide EU policy and legislative activity 
into three specific areas, focusing on Europol, the Schengen Acquis and ‘mutual 
assistance’ respectively. The three areas should sufficiently capture the five policy 
objectives outlined in the Lisbon Treaty. The section on Europol will capture many of 
the measures introduced to enhance the collection storage, processing, analysis and 
exchange of information and intelligence as well as the development of the institution 
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itself. The section concerning the Schengen Acquis will reflect many of the measures 
introduced regarding operational cooperation. The issue of ‘mutual assistance’ for its 
part will address the development of joint investigation teams and the introduction of 
common investigative techniques. The remaining Lisbon Treaty objective which 
relates to police training will be discussed in the final chapter since the EU’s primary 
training mechanisms such as Cepol do not enumerate descriptive codes of police 
procedure. 
 
It is submitted that it would not be appropriate to evaluate the performance of the EU 
project under each of the five Treaty objectives since there is a considerable degree of 
overlap across the various dimensions. For instance, measures concerning the 
collection storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information and intelligence 
have been individually developed for the Europol, Schengen and Joint Investigation 
Teams initiatives respectively. Evaluating the EU project by mechanism appears to be 
the most prudent analytical course to follow in order to engender clarity and 
transparency.  
 
Although the Lisbon Treaty is relatively new, the thesis will show that it has been 
used by and large to build upon and enhance the agencies and codes previously 
developed by the EU institutions under the previous Maastricht and Amsterdam 
Treaties. Moreover, although all of the Maastricht and Amsterdam era measures must 
be re-constituted as ‘regulations’ pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty in order to facilitate 
greater legislative responsiveness and co-decision, at the time of writing almost all of 
the key regulations had yet to be formally agreed upon and ratified by the relevant EU 
institutions. The chapter will refer to key constructs and codes as they are currently 
formed, typically as conventions, decisions or framework decisions. From a perusal of 
the draft regulations, it is not expected that the first round of regulations will introduce 
drastic changes. The character and basic functions of the principal agencies and codes 
have remained relatively stable since their initial introduction under the Maastricht 




Although the European Police Office (Europol) initiative was the only EU cross-
border policing measure clearly prescribed in the original Maastricht Treaty, it was a 
highly illusory and ambitious concept at the outset. Reflecting the fact that the EU 
Governments were evidently caught unawares by the perceived ‘security deficit’, the 
concept had never been piloted or tested and the heads of State and Government had 
only spoken about it previously in conceptual terms.
836 
The abstract idea for the 
Europol project was formally tabled at a meeting of the EC European Council in 
Luxembourg only a year earlier.
837
 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s reasons for 
tabling the initiative apparently lay in the fact that the perceived internal security 
deficit was particularly discernible in Germany since the ongoing unification between 
East and West after the fall of the Berlin Wall had exacerbated public fears over an 
influx of criminal counterfeiters, smugglers, fraudsters and murderers from the former 
Soviet bloc.
838
 The Europol project that was tabled at the summit depended almost 
entirely on the opportunistic development of cutting-edge transnational computer 
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linkages that were neither tried nor tested on an international level. More particularly, 
the project depended upon a profound degree of goodwill and cooperation between 
governments and police forces which were traditionally characterised more by self-




The proposal first presented by Chancellor Kohl revolved around the radical creation 
of a federal European Criminal Police Office, to be known as Europol, which would 
focus initially on information exchange between European police forces but would 
eventually evolve into a federal organisation with independent investigative 
powers.
840
 The heads of State and government present at the Luxembourg summit in 
1991 reportedly roundly rejected the idea of a European policing agency with 
executive police powers.
841
 There was apparently no misunderstanding at the meeting 
that the Member States would not countenance a European supranational federal 
police agency with unilateral police powers. Member States such as the UK and the 
Netherlands which had highly decentralised policing systems with a high degree of 
territorial autonomy reportedly had no enthusiasm to start permitting a new brand of 
police officer to conduct investigations within their jurisdictions.
842
 Chancellor Kohl’s 
Germany, on the other hand, used a federal policing model which could adapt 
relatively easily to accommodate the proposed European federal model. 
 
Walker remarks that the audacity of the proposal for a European federal police, which 
challenged traditional attachments to sovereignty, appeared to shock the more 
moderate States into action.
843
 At the following European Council in December 1991, 
the Member States agreed to establish the European Police Office (Europol) but only 
for the strict purposes of information pooling and analysis.
844
 The initiative was 
largely in line with their earlier vision for a new European police information sharing 
network outlined in the Paris Declaration 1989. The conceptual Europol project was 
centred around the idea that Member States would systematically feed their policing 
intelligence into a central European database and subsequently coordinate 
‘intelligence led’ investigations based on the collated intelligence.845 It was envisaged 
that the pooling of police data and intelligence would greatly enhance intelligence-led 
policing throughout Europe by improving the quality of intelligence and criminal 
records available so that linkages could be made, overviews developed and 
investigations coordinated.
846
 There was reportedly a widespread belief that the 
systemic sharing and analysis of information through Europol was going to be the 
most effective and important tool for enhancing, promoting and facilitating cross-
border police cooperation in Europe over and above other international measures, 
particularly Interpol. Interpol, for its part, served primarily as a communications link 
between police forces by linking together each participant’s National Central Bureau 
(NCB) to facilitate rapid and structured communication. Interpol did not physically 
connect together the Participant States’ national police computers and intelligence 
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databases. This specific intelligence function was the role envisaged for Europol. 
Lemieux remarks that Europol was effectively envisaged as an intelligence or 





The participant States were evidently banking heavily on major advancements which 
had taken place in computer technologies throughout the 1980s which enabled 
information to be stored electronically and linkages to be established between 
independent computers both within and between countries.
848
 The technological 
advancements were being used zealously by the English government and police forces 
to create electronic linkages between the decentralised forces.
849
 The UK had sought 
ground-breaking information sharing and money laundering agreements with France, 
West Germany, Spain and Switzerland from the late 1980s but without realising 
substantial electronic linkages.
850
 The Schengen Member States had formally 
commenced the establishment of a complex transnational Information System (SIS) 
from 1990 but it was still at the incubatory stage when the Europol initiative was 
tabled.  
 
Towards a code of procedure 
 
From the outset, police forces voiced concerns about the ability of the envisaged 
Europol Information System (EIS) to protect the integrity of sensitive and secretive 
information submitted to it.
851
 The misappropriation of information and intelligence 
by corrupt police officers or system hacks represented a real risk to the success of 
major ongoing criminal investigations.
852
 Moreover the unintentional dissemination or 
storage of intelligence had the potential to jeopardise informers, undercover officers, 
policing techniques and prosecutions amongst other unforeseen consequences. It 
became immediately apparent that participant police forces were not prepared to 
routinely send criminal intelligence through the Europol network without robust data 
safeguards which could protect the secrecy and integrity of their files and hold police 




As a result, the Europol Convention 1995 contained a number of heavily descriptive 
processes. The Convention provided first and foremost that the Member States would 
retain ownership of any information submitted to Europol in the interests of data 
security and protection and could withhold any information or intelligence from 
Europol or from other designated States in the interests of ongoing investigations, the 
safety of individuals or national security.
854
 The participant States evidently would not 
countenance the idea of foreign authorities having complete access to all files 
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submitted to Europol, particularly those that were case sensitive. In practice, searches 
of the Europol database were limited by and large to ‘hit’ or ‘no hit’ results only.855 
Police officers could not sit at an EIS enabled computer terminal and browse through 
all of the criminal files maintained by foreign police forces on the EIS. In the event of 
a search producing a ‘hit’, the user would generally be presented with a name and a 
list of aliases and known associates and would then have to contact the police force 




The new rigorous data protection regime was reflected most acutely in the 
Convention’s new Europol National Unit (ENU) construct. The ENUs in each 
Member State were deemed to be the only national units authorised to upload, modify 
or delete information on Europol’s databases.857 Each ENU was legally responsible 
for the accuracy of the data uploaded to the EIS in line with their own national data 
protection, national security and privacy laws.
858 
ENUs were required to 
systematically forward any relevant information and intelligence relating to major 
cross-border criminality such as drug trafficking, money laundering and terrorism to 
the central Europol Information System while such uploads were to include the facts 
of the case, personal details such as physical descriptions, birth details; nationality, 
fingerprints, criminal record, modus operandi, associates and details on the law 




ENUs were required to remove information from the EIS where cases had not 
developed after a number of years and where personal details pertained to persons 
acquitted of alleged offences.
860
 In addition, a Europol Joint Supervisory Board (JSB), 
consisting of national data protection commissioners’ from each Member State, was 
established to periodically review the standards for handling information.
861
 Many of 
the major data protection safeguards in the Europol Convention were inspired by the 
previous Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 1981. Following the replacement of the 
Europol Convention with a Europol Decision in 2009, an independent Data Protection 
Officer was employed by the Europol Management Board to monitor the data 
protection processes of the Member State ENUs, the Europol liaison officers and 
Europol’s own processes for storage, analysis and dissemination of information.862 
 
Aside from the Europol Information System, stringent processes were also applied to 
the opening of analysis work files (AWFs) and the deployment of liaison officers. 
Each ENU was required to second at least one Europol Liaison Officer (ELO) to the 
Europol headquarters in The Hague to stimulate cross-border investigations on behalf 
of their domestic police force. Individual secondments in areas of drug trafficking and 
counter-terrorism were encouraged.
863
 The ELOs were officially under the direct 
command of their domestic ENUs.
864 
On a day-to-day basis the liaison officers were 
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encouraged to hold regular intelligence meetings with other ELOs and Europol 
officials to discuss and stimulate joint operations on the basis of national requests or 
Europol’s own threat assessments.  
 
The grouping together of liaison officers under one roof was nothing new since it had 
been a staple of Interpol since the 1950s.
865
 Like Interpol, Europol has increasingly 
encouraged its ELOs to engage in more long-term major case investigations alongside 
its analysts through distinct crime centres which prioritise major cases and compile 
and disseminate regular intelligence reports.
866
 Modern counter-terrorism centres, 
cybercrime centres and criminal assets bureau amongst others can be found within 
both Europol and Interpol.
867
 Gerspacher and Lemieux report that ELOs have 
increasingly become involved in coordinating short-term parallel investigation and 




The case specific AWFs, which could only be opened upon the consent of the Europol 
Management Board, were exempt from the data protection provisions that applied to 
the EIS and essentially enabled Member States to collate and analyse intelligence 
derived from personal and unsubstantiated information, potentially with the help of an 
intelligence analyst employed by Europol.
869
 Europol’s analysts can reportedly use 
their software programmes to rapidly search through thousands of scanned 
documents, even in non-European languages such as Arabic, to find matching 
terminologies, names and addresses across its intelligence files. Due in part to the 
overly stringent and bureaucratic application process for opening an AWF, the 
original system was not extensively used. The AWF system was reconstructed 
pursuant to the Europol Decision 2009 as a function of Europol’s own analysts who 
were required to compile and maintain AWFs for organised crime and terrorism, 




Upwards of one hundred analysts are directly employed by the Europol Management 
Board to collate the information submitted to the central database and to identify 
linkages and gaps in the information dossiers.
871 
The collation and analysis of 
intelligence is designed to generate ‘new intelligence’ which the analysts can 
disseminate to the relevant police forces to augment their files.
872
 Europol’s analysts 
can also integrate additional data by way of direct requests to national ENUs, general 
media news sources, online sources and third party sources. Europol’s access to third 
party sources has been incrementally increased by way of bilateral information 
sharing agreements between Europol and non-EU Member States such as Russia, 
Turkey, Serbia, Switzerland and the USA amongst others.
873
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Agreements have also been established between Europol and other EU agencies such 
as Eurojust (the College of Prosecutors and Magistrates), Frontex (the Border 
Management Agency), OLAF (the European Anti-Fraud Office), Airpol (the Network 
of Airport Police), Tispol (the Network of Transport Police) and Seapol (the Network 
of Maritime and Port Guards) in addition to non-EU agencies such as Interpol and the 
OECD Financial Action Task Force (FATC).
874
 Eurojust, for instance, was 
established in 2000 to maintain a network of national criminal prosecutors from the 
Member States who would meet regularly to stimulate and coordinate prosecutions of 
serious and organised crime and terrorism in Europe which affected two or more 
Member States.
875
 In continental legal systems, prosecutors and magistrates generally 
play a major role in deciding the shape and form that investigations can take even 
before a police case file is submitted for prosecution.
876
 For this reason Europol is 
required, pursuant to the Europol Decision 2009, to maintain a close working 
relationship with Eurojust with respect to the performance of its tasks. 
 
Frontex on the other hand was established in 2004 to coordinate the voluntary 
strategic deployment of border guards, airport police, customs officials and even naval 
vessels to interdict illegal immigration while Airpol, Tispol and Seapol are essentially 
conferences that meet annually with full time secretariats for the purposes of 
disseminating knowledge and best practice.
877
 Annual and biannual conferences of 
airport, traffic and railway police have been a staple of the international police 




 Eurojust and Interpol both have 
representative liaison officers posted to Europol headquarters for the purposes of 
engaging with Europol’s analysts and ELOs on a daily basis. The ability for Europol 
to enter into third party agreements for the purposes of data sharing was enumerated 




Europol’s analysts play a crucial role in assessing crime phenomena to identify 
linkages and develop broad overviews of criminal networks and threat assessments.
880
 
The analysts presently develop major crime reports and threat assessments which help 
to form Europol’s priorities and strategies and inform the Member States’ police 
forces.
881
 The Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) and the 
European Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) are the two most 
comprehensive reports. Both reports are published for perusal by the general public on 
Europol’s websites. Additional analysis sub-projects within Europol include a Russian 
Organised Crime Threat Assessment (ROCTA) and an Organised Crime Treat 
Assessment on West Africa (OCTA-WA) published periodically.
882
 The analysis 
reports are reportedly used increasingly by police forces as well as other EU agencies 
such as the European Police Chiefs Task Force (EPCTF) and Frontex as well as 
ministries of justice and the JHA Council to guide their strategic decision making. 
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The EPCTF, established in the aftermath of the Tampere summit in 1999, is an annual 
meeting of European police chiefs convened to discuss pressing issues and to 
formulate joint strategies.
883
 A Scanning, Analysis and Notification unit (SCAN) was 
also established within Europol to issue EU-wide alerts on immediate threats or 
emerging trends on the basis of the analysts’ intelligence work.884 For example, the 
SCAN unit issued six organised crime notices (OC-SCAN) in 2010 concerning the 
expansion of the Nordic Hells Angels motorcycle gangs into the Balkan region and 




The Europol project is evidently defined by a number of procedures that outline in 
highly legalistic fashion the functions and responsibility of Europol’s analysts and the 
participant police forces’ ELOs and ENUs. Fijnaut remarks that the demands of the 
participant police forces and their parliamentary overseers means that Europol has 
ultimately become one of the most regulated police information systems in the 
world.
886
 Information that is uploaded to Europol is subject to rigid security checks at 
both the national and international levels. Moreover, intelligence that is already 
uploaded typically requires the consent of the State of ownership before it can be 
shared with foreign police forces. As Anderson observes, the ethos of rigid procedural 
regulation is clearly due by and large to a high degree of caution and distrust between 




The evolution of the domestic codes of procedure like PACE and the Danish 
amendments to the AJA share some fundamental similarities with the development of 
Europol’s procedural regime, particularly the fact that the programmatic procedures 
were borne out of concern about institutional police malpractice. The domestic codes 
serve to enhance the transparency and accountability of police procedure within the 
State whereas the Europol framework was designed to enhance the transparency and 
accountability of police procedure in the arena of information exchange across 
borders. Europol’s legal foundations are evidently marked by comparable concerns 
for legal precision and procedural clarity which have similarly been addressed through 
highly formulaic and programmatic statutory codes. 
 
The Schengen Acquis 
 
Bruggeman and Den Boer describe Europol as an example of the ‘institutionalisation’ 
of cross-border police cooperation whereas they refer to the Schengen framework as 
an example of the ‘operationalisation’ of cross-border police cooperation.888 The 
Schengen ‘Acquis’ refers to the Schengen Agreement 1985, the Schengen Convention 
1990 and a number of protocols which regulate border checks at the participant 
States’ external border points as well as facilitating some specific cross-border police 
operations at their internal borders. Like the Maastricht Treaty, the Schengen Treaty 
and Convention regulate far more than policing matters, covering a wide range of 
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internal security matters ranging from immigration and asylum, to judicial 
cooperation.
889
 On the policing side, the Schengen Convention establishes key legal 
frameworks for cross-border hot pursuit, cross-border surveillance and information 
exchange and, most importantly, it enumerates highly formulaic codes of procedure 
on each count. The Schengen processes and procedures concern not only serious 
crime and terrorism but petty crimes and public order disturbances. 
 
With respect to cross-border hot pursuit, the Schengen Convention provides that 
police officers from one State can continue an uninterrupted pursuit of a suspect 
caught in the act of committing or participating in an extraditable offence for a 
distance of 10km into the territory of another Participating State.
890
 The 10km 
boundary can be extended even further on the basis of bilateral agreements between 
the Participant States. Showing a clear concern for sovereignty and accountability, the 
framework requires that police officers undertaking a border crossing must contact the 
domestic police force at the earliest possible opportunity and follow any and all 
instructions of the local police commanders.
891
 Telephone, radio and telex lines are to 
be installed and maintained in order to facilitate rapid communication, particularly in 
the border areas.
892
 Visiting officers are to be easily identifiable by their uniform or 
insignia and are allowed to continue carrying their service weapons for the purposes 




Clearly respecting the unquestioned supremacy of the domestic police force, the 
Convention provides that pursuing officers are prohibited from entering private homes 
and places and are only permitted to apprehend persons for the purposes of awaiting 
the arrival of the local police.
894
 Upon completion of a ‘hot pursuit’ a mission report 
must be forwarded by the pursuing officers to the competent foreign authorities 
outlining the reasons for and the nature of the pursuit.
895
 Most importantly, the 
Convention provides that in the event of injury or property damage, officers operating 
in the territory of another are to be regarded as officers of that State with respect to 
offences committed against them or by them.
896
 Visiting officers are required to assist 
in any subsequent enquiry or judicial proceeding connected to a border crossing.
897
 
Moreover, payments made on foot of civil claims arising from harm caused by a 
visiting officer are to be reimbursed by the officer’s home State.898 
 
The Convention took a similar approach to the conduct of cross-border surveillance. It 
provided that foreign officers undertaking an urgent cross-border surveillance 
operation had to make immediate contact with the local competent authorities as soon 
as possible after a crossing, follow any directions received and were entitled to the 
same legal immunities and responsibilities as those listed under the hot pursuit 
framework.
899
 Unlike the hot pursuit provisions, the surveillance measures place a 
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significant emphasis on pre-authorisation which is largely impractical in the context 
of a hot pursuit. Due largely to the fact that surveillance operations are typically 
undertaken on the basis of intelligence-led policing, surveillance officers are expected 
to have some indication in advance of the likelihood of a border crossing. 
Applications should be made to the designated authority of the neighbouring State, 
usually the neighbouring divisional headquarters or the national investigative or 
intelligence agency, so that the relevant police force can make appropriate 





Applications should provide clear evidence that the surveillance target intends to 
commit or has committed serious criminal offences within the Participant States.
901
 
Respecting the supremacy of the local police force, the Convention provides that the 
host police force can attach conditions to an approved application, such as requesting 
that the surveillance is carried out in a certain manner in line with local practice or be 
entrusted to domestic officers upon the entry of a surveillance target.
902
 In urgent and 
unforeseen cases, authorisation can be secured post factum as long as the 
neighbouring police force is notified as soon as the border crossing occurs. 
Telephone, radio or other forms of communications systems must be established to 
ensure the timely transmission of information for the purposes of facilitating both 




Another important feature of the Schengen Acquis is the Schengen Information 
System (SIS) which was designed largely for the benefit of customs and police 
officials operating at the ‘external’ border checkpoints. Alerts concerning illegal 
immigrants, asylum seekers, wanted persons and stolen vehicles can be uploaded to 
the system for the purposes of cross checks by border police, immigration and 
customs authorities.
904
 Alerts are to be accompanied where possible with information 
indicating the nature and legal classification of the relevant criminal offence, the 
circumstances of the offence and details of an appropriate court order or warrant.
905
 
Names and profiles of inadmissible aliens, such as failed asylum seekers, and ‘watch 
lists’ of risk categories, such as terrorists, are maintained by each Member State and 
regularly and systematically uploaded to the SIS ‘blacklists’.906 Police, customs and 
immigration authorities are obliged to take an appropriate course of action if a person 
or item is matched to an alert or blacklist stored on the system, including the 
immediate notification of the issuing party and the compilation of a detailed record of 
the interdiction.
907
 Schengen Alerts should be treated in accordance with domestic 
laws and all basic domestic standards for employing coercive powers should be 
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In a similar fashion to the Participant Sates’ approach to Europol, to ensure that 
Participant States can be held to account for the quality of the alerts uploaded only 
designated national units are permitted to upload information to the SIS.
909
 Each 
Participant State is deemed to be legally responsible for the data uploaded to the SIS 
and is obliged to refund in full any amounts paid in damages by another State as a 
result of an operation carried out on foot of an unsubstantiated or unlawful request.
910
 
The national desk, known as the Schengen Information Request at the National Entry 
(SIRENE), is typically housed alongside the Europol ENU and the Interpol NCB 
within the national police headquarters.
911
 Representatives from the respective 
national data authorities must be appointed to a Joint Supervisory Authority (JSA) 
which is responsible for overseeing the general data compliance of the SIS in 




The Schengen Convention is clearly as formulaic and programmatic as the Europol 
Convention if not more so. It establishes a highly descriptive code of procedure 
concerning a number of key processes for operational cross-border police cooperation. 
Moreover, the movement of police officers across borders and the maintenance of the 
SIS are subject to stringent controls that strive to respect the fundamental supremacy 
of the domestic police forces whilst ensuring that cooperating police forces can be 
held to account according to a clearly identifiable and prescriptive standard of 
conduct. However one crucial aspect, from an accountability and transparency 
perspective, is that the Schengen Convention was not established by the EU 
institutions. The Schengen Acquis was developed as a regional project by the Benelux 
States, France and Germany in the mid-1980s and was only incorporated into the EU 




The Schengen system was premised upon a system of hot pursuit and surveillance that 
the Benelux States had put in place in 1962 following their decision to remove their 
shared internal border controls in order to stimulate economic activity through a 
Benelux Union four years earlier.
914
 The Benelux policing framework was outlined in 
the Benelux Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance 1962. It provided for ‘hot 
pursuit’ across their internal borders within a ten kilometre radius as well as enhanced 
processes for mutual assistance amongst other provisions. Similar in ways to the 
subsequent Schengen Convention, the supremacy of the domestic police force and 
territorial sovereignty was preserved by a highly descriptive code of procedure which 
prescribed that once the border was crossed, the officers in pursuit were to contact the 
domestic police force at the earliest possible opportunity to request their assistance 
and were to follow any and all instructions received under the same conditions as a 




Similar legal frameworks for hot pursuit between Belgium and the Netherlands could 
be traced back to agreements from the 1910’s and ‘20s. These enabled police officers 
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to legally cross over into a neighbouring border area, armed and in uniform, to warn 
their counterparts, to hold intelligence meetings, to carry out observations on known 
offenders in designated border zones and to assist in arrests without prior executive or 
judicial authority.
916
 Fijnaut observes that the procedures for police cooperation 
within the border regions flourished prior to the 1940s.
917 
He notes that the Benelux 
processes only started to get particularly strict from 1949 onwards following the 
collapse of the European empires and the introduction of tighter border and passport 
controls by the national governments.
918 
The Benelux framework and a remarkably 
similar Nordic Framework were long considered to be the most advanced and 
effective operational cross-border policing frameworks in Europe.  
 
In light of the political agreement of the broader EU Member States to remove all of 
the internal border controls throughout Western Europe, the Benelux States decided to 
invite France and Germany to join their regional cross-border policing framework.
919
 
France and Germany are the only two Member States bordering the Benelux States so 
the extension of the policing framework effectively enhanced the Benelux States’ 
policing capacity not only at their internal border crossings with each other but at their 
only outer borders crossings with France and Germany. France and Germany, for their 
part, were largely amenable to joining the proposed Schengen initiative for they had 
already signalled their intention to proceed with the establishment of joint border 
posts, regular meetings of commanders, radio links and a regime for cross-border hot 
pursuit and surveillance at the Franco-German border.
920
 They had outlined their 
intentions through a formal Convention in 1977 and reaffirmed their ongoing 




The broader EU Member States evidently realised immediately that the application of 
the cross-border policing framework throughout the wider EU could serve as a 
panacea for the perceived ‘security deficit’ caused by the planned removal of border 
checkpoints.
922
 The traditional customs checkpoints, which were to be abolished, 
could effectively be replaced by a new and unprecedented system which would enable 
police officers to pursue suspects across the frontier and issue alerts to border police 
stations. During the negotiation of the Convention, the original Schengen participants 
invited the European Commission to send representatives to attend and observe the 
negotiations.
923
 Provision was made in the Convention for the framework to be 




The EU Commission strongly encouraged the Schengen participants to ensure full 
ratification by 1 January 1990 so that the compensatory measures could be evaluated 
by the EU institutions before the Member States proceeded with the wider abolition of 
internal border controls throughout Europe in 1992.
925
 The Schengen initiative was, 
by and large, considered to be a laboratory or pilot project for ‘enhanced cooperation’ 
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and broader integration at the wider European level.
926
 In fact, the Schengen 
Convention was considered to be so favourable and legally balanced that Portugal, 
Spain, Italy and Greece all voluntarily signed up to the Schengen Convention before 




The only EC Member States not to sign up to the Convention were the UK, Ireland 
and Denmark. Ireland and the UK avoided participating in the Schengen Convention 
due primarily to the fact that they were island nations which did not suffer porous 
borders and immigration problems to the same extent as countries on continental 
Europe.
928
 Denmark was initially reluctant to get involved in the Schengen initiative 
primarily because it was cautious about undermining the integrity of the Nordic 
Passport Union which had abolished all border controls between Denmark, Sweden 
and Norway in the 1970s.
929
 Denmark’s 68 kilometre land border with Germany was 
already highly porous but if Denmark unilaterally joined the Schengen Convention at 
the outset, which it was keen to do, it would have exposed Sweden and Norway to the 
full brunt of unchecked immigration at the Danish-German border. Once Sweden and 
Norway proved receptive to the Schengen initiative, Denmark successfully applied for 
membership in 1995. The Danish Police not only use the Schengen framework to 
pursue suspects into Northern Germany but it is now the primary procedural 
framework regulating the pursuit of suspects across the 8km long Oresund Bridge 
which connects the greater Copenhagen area to Malmo in Sweden.
930
 The police 
district of South Jutland routinely uses the hot pursuit provisions to pursue suspects 
into Northern Germany and the complementary surveillance provisions are often used 
to keep GPS tracking devices activated as vehicles travel to and from Sweden and 
Germany to avoid charges of unlawful surveillance. 
 
Ireland and the UK subsequently opted into various aspects of the Schengen policing 
framework. The UK Government applied to join the full gamut of cross-border 
policing provisions of the Schengen Convention in 1999.
931
 However France, a 
founding member of the Schengen Convention, rejected the UK’s application to join 
the Convention’s provisions for cross-border hot pursuit due primarily to the fact that 
the UK and France already had very specific procedures for police cooperation in 
place. The Channel Tunnel is the only physical rail and road link connecting England 
to continental Europe and police cooperation therein was already regulated by the 
Anglo-French Treaty of Canterbury 1986, the Channel Tunnel Act 1987 and the 1991 
Protocol Concerning Frontier Controls and Policing, Cooperation in Criminal Justice, 
Public Safety and Mutual Assistance Relating to the Channel Fixed Link. 
 
The various bilateral Channel Tunnel protocols provided for the establishment of a 
unique ‘control zone’ in Dover which would contain French officials who could 
conduct all police, passport and documentary checks for passengers before they 
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embarked on a train for France.
932
 A comparable ‘control zone’ in Calais, containing 
English officials, was to carry out similar functions before trains departed for 
England.
933
 The English control zone in Calais originally consisted of officials from 
the Immigration Service supported by detectives from the Kent Special Branch but 
this job is now carried out by officials from the UK Border Authority (UKBA).
934
 The 
control zones were considered to be sovereign territory in a similar fashion to an 
embassy in the sense that any offences detected within the control zones were to be 
treated as offences committed within the jurisdiction of the country operating the 
control zone.
935
 The primary rationale behind the establishment of the control zones 
was to carry out exit and entry checks simultaneously so that passengers would not be 
subjected to laborious checks at the points of disembarkation, leading to much faster 
travel times.
936
 It was readily apparent that powers of ‘hot pursuit’ were impractical  
since police officers had ample time to stop and board a train before it left the 
domestic jurisdiction or to request their counterparts to locate and arrest a passenger 
on the other side before they exited the control zones. 
 
The UK was however permitted to participate in the Schengen Convention’s cross-
border surveillance provisions. The nature of a surveillance operation very often 
demands that a suspect is not stopped and arrested until the investigating police 
officers have gathered the requisite evidence. Undercover police officers who board a 
Euro-star train travelling through the Channel Tunnel are naturally reluctant to 
disembark at the border for fear that their foreign counterparts may not be able to plan 
and execute a surveillance operation quickly enough to take over a surveillance 
operation before a passenger disembarks. Moreover, crucial evidence may be missed 
as an operation is handed over between different surveillance teams. It may also be 
beneficial for the visiting police officers to assist the local surveillance team due to 
their knowledge about the nature of the case, the modus operandi of the suspect and 
the identities and backgrounds of likely associates. 
  
The UK enacted the Schengen cross-border surveillance provisions by way of the 
Crime (International Cooperation) Act 2003. However the Home Secretary, in 
cooperation with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), introduced a 
Circular in 2005 which established very strict guidelines for the conduct of a cross-
border surveillance operation in the UK.
937
 The Circular outlined that prior 
authorisation should be secured in advance of a border crossing but that in cases of 
urgency foreign officers could continue to maintain surveillance within the State for 
up to five hours while a request for assistance was being considered as long as they 
bring themselves to the immediate attention of the local territorial police force, the 




The Circular definitively outlined that foreign officers who were engaging in a 
surveillance operation were prohibited from stopping, questioning, arresting or 
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entering private places independently and were required to operate under the direction 
and control of the relevant territorial police force upon arrival in the UK.
939
 Moreover, 
the Circular required the relevant domestic territorial police force to assume full 
operational control of the surveillance operation as soon as practicable within the five 
hour window.
940
 The rigid and highly proscribed nature of the UK’s cross-border 
surveillance provisions suggest that police chiefs and the Home Office are particularly 
uncomfortable with the idea of visiting foreign police officers employing police 
powers in the UK.  
 
Remarkably, Ireland has almost entirely avoided the adoption of the Schengen cross-
border policing framework despite the fact that it shares a 300 mile land border with 
Northern Ireland. Ireland has only joined the SIS provisions of the Schengen 
Convention which it mainly uses for immigration and customs purposes.
941
 It is 
readily apparent that neither Ireland nor Northern Ireland has applied to join the 
Schengen hot pursuit and surveillance provisions due primarily to long-standing 
political and social animosities between the two States.
942
 More particularly, when the 
Irish police force was first established in the 1920s no legal provisions were 
established to facilitate cooperation with the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in 
Northern Ireland, with no clear intention to do so in the future.  
 
As Walsh conveys, the nascent Irish police force was proactive in its efforts to 
distance itself from its counterpart in Northern Ireland.
943
 The public perception of the 
RUC was tainted at the outset for visiting many injustices on the Irish citizenry in its 
previous guise as the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), which had jurisdiction over the 
whole island during the preceding decades.
944
 The RIC was largely synonymous with 
the eviction of tenant farmers and the brutal suppression of protests, riots and 
rebellions resulting in the death of thousands of peasants and protestors seeking 
property rights, civil rights and democratic representation.
945
 Such was the disdain of 
the Irish public towards the RIC that during the war of independence between 1919 
and 1921 some 442 RIC constables and auxiliaries, known as the Black and Tans, 
were killed and thousands of officers assaulted and threatened.
946 
The new Irish Police 
force itself had suffered a traumatic few years in the mid-1920s as it strived to 
differentiate itself from the RUC by deploying unarmed, locally recruited and 
working-class professional police officers.
947
 A number of new Irish Garda officers 
were murdered and assaulted by the IRA and its illegal Republican Police before the 
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The antagonistic relationship between the Irish Garda Siochana and the Northern Irish 
RUC did not improve significantly over the course of the 20
th
 Century. In the latter 
half of the 20
th
 Century, the RUC was long considered to be particularly heavy-
handed when dispersing protestors promoting universal civil rights and voicing their 
concerns over religious prejudices within the public service.
949 
Ellison and Smyth note 
that the RUC on occasion baton charged largely peaceful protestors for simply 
carrying the Irish flag, which was prohibited.
950
 Critically, in the force’s efforts to 
locate and investigate members of the IRA, which was actively committing terrorist 
atrocities on the streets of Northern Ireland in name of an independent Ireland, RUC 
officers shot and killed numerous unarmed and innocent Catholics. Along with the 
British Army which patrolled alongside the RUC in the 1970s, disproportionate force 
was used with remarkable regularity resulting in over 300 civilian fatalities between 
the late 1960s and the early 1990s.
951
 The Stalker and Sampson inquiries which were 
established to examine 19 unarmed fatalities between 1980 and ’82 and the perceived 
existence of a shoot-to-kill policy within the RUC suggested that some particular 
police and military units were carrying out summary executions of suspected Irish 
terrorists.
952
 In one case, the RUC was accused of unlawfully crossing the Irish border 
to covertly keep terrorist suspects under surveillance before summarily executing 
them when they crossed back into Northern Ireland.
953
 There were also claims that 
RUC Special Branch officers were actively colluding with militant loyalists and 
manipulating and staging crime scenes so that police officers were not prosecuted for 
corruption.
954
 Nationalists and Catholics who were arrested and detained also 
frequently complained that the RUC subjected them to brutal beatings and oppressive 
interrogation techniques throughout the normal custody process and during the 




Brady succinctly observes that the RUC effectively painted itself as a partisan police 
force which prioritised British rule and patronage over Irish civil liberties.
956
 McGarry 
and O’Leary convey that the Northern Irish Police Authority was also perceived to be 
highly prejudiced since it conducted no major and comprehensive public enquiries 
throughout the 1970s and regularly claimed that the RUC was the best police force in 
the world.
957
 The prevailing situation meant that the Irish public south of the border, 
their politicians and police officers invariably sympathised with the plight of Irish 
men and women in Northern Ireland and decried the tactics and ethos of the RUC.
958
 
The attitude of the Irish public was particularly well exemplified by protests in Dublin 
                                                 
949 
Graham Ellison and Jim Smyth, The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland (Pluto Press 




 ibid 116 - 132 
952
 ibid  
953
 An Taoiseach, Statement to Dail Eireann on alleged Activities of the RUC (Debate Vol 349:8 & 
348:9, 1984) 
954 
Ellison and Smyth (n949) 134 - 149 
955
 ibid 80 - 97 
956
 Brady (n946) 2 
957 
John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, Policing Northern Ireland: Proposals for a New Start 
(Blackstaff Press Belfast 1999) 99 - 103 
958 
Dermot Walsh, ‘Police Cooperation across the Irish Border: Familiarity Breeding Contempt for 
Transparency and Accountability’ (2011) 38:2 Journal of Law and Society 305, 306 
 129 
in the 1970s which resulted in the burning of the British embassy in Ireland in support 




To avoid extending a modicum of legitimacy to the conduct of the RUC, the Irish 
government for a long time avoided forming any official agreements with the RUC 
and the Irish Garda Commissioner avoided publicising the nature or degree of any 
ongoing cooperation for fear of igniting a public backlash. More particularly, RUC 
police officers as well as Irish Gardaí ran a significantly high risk of being targeted by 
terrorist groups if it was suspected that police officers were engaging in cross-border 
police cooperation.
960
 Conway reports that a number of police officers stationed at the 
Irish land border suffered physical assault and suffered petrol-bombings in order to 




Although the dynamic has vastly improved since the 1980s, the Schengen policing 
provisions have not yet found favour in Ireland. The Irish and UK governments called 
for the development of closer, more permanent ties in the Sunningdale Agreement 
1973, the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 and the Anglo-Irish Agreement 2002 but 
without major effect. The Sunningdale Agreement, for instance, helped to formalise 
the establishment of radio and telephone lines in order to facilitate the issuance of 
alerts, the exchange of intelligence and the coordination of operations between several 
Irish and Northern Irish police stations along the 300 mile land border.
962
 The 1985 
Agreement, subsequently, required the Irish and Northern Irish police chiefs to 
develop a cross-border work programme which would facilitate the exchange of 
information; joint threat assessments; the coordination of operations and border 
patrols, rapid communication, the secondment of liaison officers and joint training.
963
 
However the respective chiefs of police were reportedly unable to reach consensus 
over the vague objectives of the work plan and a new comprehensive regime for 
information exchange and operational cooperation never materialised.
964
 The police 
chiefs reportedly indicated to government that many of the problems were outside of 
the police chiefs’ remit since processes such as the posting of liaison officers 
demanded new legislation which would set out the formal powers, privileges and 




The 1985 Agreement also established an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, 
renamed the British-Irish Council in 2002, of officials from both States which was 
required to meet every three months to suggest and develop new ways to enhance 
cross-border cooperation in political, legal and security matters. The Conference 
encouraged more regular high-level strategic meetings between the Irish and Northern 
Irish police chiefs, who had already been meeting at least bi-annually on foot of the 
1973 Agreement.
966
 It also encouraged the superintendents of border police stations 
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and the respective heads of the detective branches to meet at least biannually to 




The Anglo-Irish Agreement 2002, which largely restated the policing objectives of the 
1985 Agreement, subsequently held the promise of more structured cooperation in 
light of the transformation of the RUC into the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI) and the devolution of security and justice powers to the Northern Ireland 
Executive pursuant to the Good Friday Peace Agreement 1998.
968
 The police chiefs 
subsequently published a ‘three-year cross-border policing strategy’ in 2009 which 
outlined their intention to establish a joint Garda Siochana/ PSNI Tasking and 
Coordination Group (T&CG) to review operational procedures; to introduce new 
interoperable radio systems; and to create of a manual of guidance in relation to cross-
border operations but there was no mention of introducing a Schengen-type 




From an accountability and transparency perspective, the implementation of the 
Schengen provisions would clearly be highly beneficial at the Irish land border for the 
simple reason that the absence of an operational framework means that criminals can 
escape justice if foreign police units cannot be contacted and mobilised quickly 
enough to intercept a hot pursuit. The Irish land border was arbitrarily designed in 
1920, cutting through the middle of townlands, farmlands and hundreds of concession 
roads which provide multiple routes for the cross-border escape of a suspect.
970
 
Remarkably, the absence of a compatible radio system means that urgent inter-force 
communications must be relayed from central dispatch to central dispatch thereby 
significantly delaying urgent communications between police teams.
971
 The thawing 
of relations and the passage of time suggests that the general public are undoubtedly 
more receptive to the introduction of systems of cross-border police cooperation than 
at any other time over the past century but unfortunately there are no concrete plans to 
introduce a framework of hot pursuit and surveillance. Regrettably, the Irish 
government and the police chiefs continue to portray a superficial ‘image’ of police 
cooperation at the Irish border, purporting that cooperation operates at a very high 
level, with quick response times and to the fullest extent possible.
972
 This is clearly 
not the case since the Schengen policing framework would clearly enhance the ability 
of the respective police forces to bring offenders to justice. 
 
The Schengen cross-border policing framework, to all intents and purposes, is the 
primary mechanism for cross-border hot pursuit and surveillance throughout Europe. 
Most importantly, the Schengen regime has become so central to the EU cross-border 
policing regime that any new EU Member States are forced to comply with the code 
of procedure upon joining the Union.
973
 One of the main reasons behind the decision 
to incorporate the Schengen framework within the EU regime in 1997, even though 
almost all of the EU Member States had already joined the initiative on a bilateral 
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basis, was to force the ten accession States planning to join the EU in the early 2000s 
to accede to the framework. The Schengen Convention is clearly considered to be 
fundamental to the security of the inner and outer borders of the EU Member States. 
 
It is submitted that the Schengen Convention 1990 serves as a fundamental pillar of 
cross-border policing in the EU not only because of the types of cooperation that it 
facilitates but because of the ethos that it represents. It preceded the entire EU project 
by a number of years and the level of detail that it afforded to matters of basic 
procedure, powers, liability and monitoring appeared to amount to a benchmark or 
standard of transparency and accountability that the Europol Convention later 
replicated. The shape and form of the intelligence processes, structures and 
requirements outlined in the Schengen Convention with respect to the SIS are 
remarkably similar to those subsequently adopted in the Europol Convention 1995.  
 
The Schengen Convention was arguably representative of an ethos and standard of 
legal precision, procedural clarity and accountability that future cross-border 
frameworks would mimic. The thesis will show in the chapter on ‘complaint and 
inquiry as EU law and policy’ that the level of detail and the focus on accountability 
evident within the Schengen Convention and the subsequent Europol Convention was 
engendered in part by the involvement of highly specialised working groups of police 
officers and judicial officials and, most importantly, by the scrutiny, inquiry and 
mediation of the national parliaments. The processes of dynamic input, arbitration and 
conciliation clearly produced a framework for cross-border policing that was largely 
considered to be balanced, effective and legally warranted. However the thesis will 
argue that the EU institutions quickly lost sight of the ethos and key ingredients of the 
Schengen Convention and subsequent Europol Conventions as it amassed more 
autonomous powers and functions pursuant to the Amsterdam Treaty. 
 
Mutual Police Assistance & Joint Investigation Teams 
 
The last major area of EU procedural law that the thesis will address is the relatively 
ambiguous area of mutual police assistance. The term ‘mutual assistance’ is generally 
used to refer to the exchange of evidence between judicial authorities and police 
forces but its use is wide ranging and highly ambiguous.
974
 Measures of mutual police 
assistance frequently include processes of information sharing, operational 
cooperation and common investigative techniques, which represent three distinct 
objectives of the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, the former areas of information sharing 
and operational cooperation were originally regulated by and large by the Europol and 
Schengen initiatives, resulting in a significant degree of conceptual and functional 
overlap. Furthermore, the Europol and Schengen constructs are also concerned with 
the exchange of evidence. Europol is concerned primarily with the collection, 
exchange and analysis of information in order to support investigative evidence 
gathering. Similarly, the Schengen Convention facilitates information sharing and 
powers of hot pursuit and surveillance so that suspects can be identified, searched and 
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The ambiguous use of the term ‘mutual assistance’ is well reflected in a number of 
transnational legal instruments. The Benelux Treaty on Extradition and Mutual 
Assistance 1962 for example contained frameworks for hot pursuit across borders, 
extra-jurisdictional police powers, the exchange of evidence between courts and the 
harmonisation of judicial processes across jurisdictions. Similarly, Article 2 of the 
Constitution of Interpol 1956 states that the aim of the organisation is ‘to ensure and 
promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities’. 
Nevertheless, Interpol’s activities fall largely within the realm of information 
exchange and analysis. Although various aspects of the Schengen and Europol 
frameworks could potentially be considered under the legal concept of ‘mutual 
assistance’, colloquially it has taken on more specific procedural and administrative 
connotations, particularly since the introduction of the Council of Europe’s European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1959. When academics, police 
officers and judicial officers refer colloquially or juridically to ‘mutual assistance’ it is 
usually the legal and administrative processes originally enumerated in the 1959 
Convention that they refer to. 
 
The 1959 Convention primarily provided for the streamlined and simplified 
transmission of requests for police and judicial assistance between the participant 
States.
976
 Requests for assistance traditionally covered anything from a request for a 
duplicate copy of a case file, a request for old forensic evidence or even for urgent 
property searches to be carried out to gather evidence that can potentially assist a 
foreign criminal investigation. The Convention outlined that letters of request for 
mutual assistance should be drawn up by a local judge or magistrate with jurisdiction 
over the relevant offence in question.
977
 Letters of request, known as commission 
rogatoires, should detail the nature and exigencies of the case along with the relevant 
local laws prohibiting the specific offence.
978
 If the specific offence is an offence in 
the requesting State but not an offence in the requested State then property searches or 
arrests cannot be carried out as requested under the principle of nullum crimen, nulla 
poena sine lege. More particularly, letters are to be accompanied by a domestic 
warrant to show that the requested measures are, at least, considered lawful, necessary 
and proportionate in the requesting State even though such warrants have no lawful 
effect in the executing State. 
 
In addition, the Convention provided that letters should be sent ideally to a designated 
national central authority, preferably the ministry of justice, for the purposes of being 
screened and forwarded to the most appropriate judicial authority. It encouraged the 
participant States to allow their judicial authorities to send letters of request directly to 
familiar foreign judicial authorities using bilateral and international police channels 
such as Interpol as intermediaries.
979
 A key element of the Convention was the 
removal of the ministries of foreign affairs from the mutual assistance process. Prior 
to the 1950s, in order for a court to issue a search warrant for the purposes of assisting 
a foreign criminal investigation or prosecution, the application generally needed to be 
screened and approved by the respective ministry of foreign affairs beforehand.
980
 The 
difference in substantive and procedural criminal laws between States across Europe 
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meant that it was highly impractical, often impossible, for judges to take the time and 
effort to access foreign criminal codes, invariably enumerated in a foreign language. 
Judges typically needed to do so in order to ensure that a foreign request for police 
assistance met all of the relevant domestic legal standards of legality, necessity and 
proportionality. As such, diplomatic and judicial courtesy demanded that foreign 
applications be directed to the ministry of justice via the ministry of foreign affairs so 
that officials in the ministerial departments could secure, translate and cross check the 
relevant documentation in partnership with their foreign ministerial counterparts 
before the application was forwarded to the relevant judge for consideration. This 
meant that a relatively simple request generally had to travel from the requesting 
detective through the offices of the local police chief to the justice ministry and on to 
the foreign ministry so that it could be communicated through diplomatic channels to 
the relevant foreign ministry, then onto the foreign justice ministry and the foreign 
police chief until finally reaching the foreign police officers, prosecutors or judges for 
possible execution. Not only was the application system highly bureaucratic but the 
requested evidence, whether old forensic materials or new evidence gathered during a 
property search, once secured would have to be transmitted back through the same 
bureaucratic channels. 
 
A major disadvantage with the system was that the preliminary considerations of the 
diplomatic channels were not only detrimentally slow but the ministries typically 
demanded a wealth of information about the case and the foreign legal system that far 
exceeded the standard applied to routine local warrants.
981
 Moreover there was little 
certainty that the application would eventually find approval.
982
 Some Member States, 
such as Spain and France, were reportedly well known for adding onerous conditions 
and for taking an inordinate amount of time to process requests through the designated 
central authorities.
983
 Nadelmann remarks that the idea of extra-territorial jurisdiction, 
practiced effervescently by the USA, was almost entirely illusory since foreign States 





The aim of the 1959 Convention was to reduce the element of political variance from 
the processes of request and exchange within Europe by outlining in relatively precise 
terms what information a request should contain and by removing the ministries of 
foreign affairs from the process. Anderson comments that the objective of the 
Convention was ultimately to minimise the ‘kaleidoscope’ of political and 
professional views and interests that influenced the process.
985
 It was effectively a 
procedural framework or code of procedure designed to induce a measure of 
procedural clarity and legal precision, to give more shape to the idea of the ‘rule of 
law’ in cross-border policing and judicial matters. 
 
The CoE was not only interested in establishing common processes and procedures 
for the handling of requests for assistance but it also managed to reconcile its 
Participant States’ self-interests in order to form common values and minimum 
standards which gave further definition to the ‘rule of law’ in numerous other areas. 
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Landmark conventions included the European Convention on Human Rights 1950, a 
European Extradition Convention in 1957, the Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism 1977, the Convention for the Protection of individuals with regard to the 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data 1981 and the Convention on Laundering, 
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime in 1990 amongst others. 
Not only did it manage to secure the consensus of the Participant States to adopt these 
ground-breaking instruments but it did so with remarkable speed and efficiency while 
the issues were still considered, on a political level at least, as emerging and often 
contentious issues.
986
 The 1981 Data Convention, for example, was introduced in the 
midst of the first generation of computer mainframes and established new 
mechanisms for safeguarding information privacy.
987
 Under the data protection 
guidelines, all participating states were encouraged to enact national legislation to 
regulate the storage of data on individuals and establish a national regulatory 
institution to oversee the maintenance, retrieval and use of personal information by 
State bodies. The initiative was modelled in part on data protection institutions 
established in Hesse, Germany in 1970 and later in France in 1978.
988
 Both the 
Schengen Convention 1990 and the Europol Convention 1995 made direct reference 
to the 1981 Data Convention, requiring its Participant States to fulfil the obligations 
set out therein. 
 
The EU’s Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
 
The EU institutions moved to further streamline the processes of mutual police and 
judicial assistance following a systematic review of the processes in each Member 
State in 1998.
989
 The review teams found, by and large, that it was not uncommon for 
requests between neighbouring European countries to be sent directly between 
judiciaries wherein only a duplicate copy was being sent through the bureaucratic 
ministerial channels to ensure procedural formality.
990 
The study appeared to suggest a 
widespread, but by no means unanimous, change in attitude of lower courts to the 
acceptability of foreign requests for assistance. On foot of the review, the EU Council 
of Ministers issued a ‘Joint Action on good practice in mutual legal assistance in 
criminal matters’ in 1998 which encouraged courts to send letters of request directly 
to one another where possible.
991
 A ‘Joint Action’ was essentially a Maastricht Treaty 
era instrument which enabled the Justice Ministers to form a mutually agreeable 
strategic plan within the confines of their existing domestic regulatory and policy 
functions.
992
 More controversially, following a subsequent EU summit in Tampere, 
Finland in 1999, the Heads of State and Government decided to streamline the process 
even further by incorporating the principle of ‘mutual recognition’, which had long 
been used in the EU’s economic community policy area.993  
 
The concept of mutual recognition effectively revolved around the premise that 
judiciaries would be required to officially recognise the courts of neighbouring 
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jurisdictions as authoritative equals to the greatest extent possible without seeking 
further validation or legal clarity from their ministries of justice or foreign affairs.
994
 
The concept rested primarily on the assumption that each Member State guaranteed 
minimum procedural human rights standards across their investigative, prosecution 
and detention processes in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR).
995
 The implication was that judiciaries should simply 
assume that the minimum standards that are required to issue a letter of request and 




One of the major controversies around the desire to incorporate the principle of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters was the fact that it suited some judiciaries in 
Europe but not others. The principle had long been applied informally within the 
Benelux, Nordic systems and federal German systems in particular.
997
 Fijnaut 
observes that since the Benelux Treaty 1962 encouraged prosecutors and courts to 
exchange letters of request directly, prosecutors had even become accustomed to 
making oral requests instead of using formal letters.
998
 Den Boer conveys that judges 
accepted such practices because Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had been 
harmonising or ‘tuning’ their basic criminal laws, investigative procedures and 





 She observes that the degree of understanding, trust and 
professionalism which had developed was highly unique and largely unknown in 




However, many other national court systems were not nearly as familiar with their 
neighbouring police and judicial systems to the same extent. France, Spain and the 
UK, for instance, were historically reluctant to engage in systematic judicial 
cooperation with each other due to significant differences in criminal laws, policing 
processes and, most importantly, long standing political tensions.
1001
 They did not 
share nearly the same trust, understanding and routine cooperation that was evidently 




Nevertheless, the principle of mutual recognition was incorporated in spirit in the EU 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 2000.
1003
 The EU Convention 
largely reiterated the processes outlined in the prior CoE Convention on Mutual 
Assistance 1959. It encouraged courts to send letters of requests directly between 
themselves but still required copies of letters of request to be sent to designated 
national central authorities, usually the ministries of justice. The EU Convention also 
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proceeded to regulate some very specific areas of mutual assistance concerning the 
transfer of criminal and civil judgments, writs, warrants, prisoner transfers, the use of 
tele-conferencing in criminal trials as well as the exchange of letters of request within 
the context of a Joint Investigation Team (JIT). The new concept of a Joint 
Investigation Team in particular provided for the structured secondment of foreign 
police officers and prosecutors for the purposes of assisting with cross-border criminal 
investigations. Such secondments had traditionally been subject to the diplomatic 
letter of request process. 
 
The simple secondment of foreign police officers or even prosecutors to an 
investigative unit can potentially provide significant added value to ongoing 
investigative work. Foreign detectives with key knowledge of particular foreign 
criminals and criminal gangs may be able to identify key information or material 
relatively quickly due to their knowledge of the transient criminals under 
investigation. In the context of a surveillance operation, they can potentially identify 
voices and persons known to them and immediately understand the language and 
terminologies of the individuals concerned.
1004
 Short secondments are particularly 
popular during major events such as the Olympics and the UEFA football world cup 
so that foreign officers can identify travelling football hooligans and extremists 
known to them.
1005
 Most importantly, the participation of a seconded official can, in 
effect, create a de facto joint command whereby investigations into a cross-border 
criminal network across two jurisdictions can be synchronised and intelligence files 
collated.
1006
 Such collaboration can avoid duplication, misunderstandings and 
communication and information gaps.
1007
 As Anderson conveys, joint investigations 
can ultimately succeed where separate parallel would otherwise fail.
1008
 He observes 
that joint investigations can also enhance feelings of trust and camaraderie between 
the participant detective bureaus which can ultimately lead to further collaborations 




Although secondments could traditionally be facilitated by way of letters of requests 
pursuant to the CoE Convention 1959, the new EU Convention aimed to clarify and 
simplify the process. It provided that a single Agreement signed at the start of a joint 
investigation would function as an overarching letter of request which could facilitate 
the secondment of officers, the execution of investigation measures and the sharing of 
evidence and criminal records within the jurisdiction of operation without the need for 
further or multiple letters of request.
1010
 Courts were even encouraged to accept 
requests for mutual assistance from domestic police officers or prosecutors who were 
seconded to a foreign JIT as if they were still operating within the domestic 
jurisdiction.
1011
 The Convention elaborated that an Agreement should outline, at the 
very least, the nature and objectives of the case, the exact content of the team, the role 
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of the seconded officials, the expected duration of the investigation and the Member 




Most importantly, to preserve the supremacy of territorial jurisdiction in a similar 
fashion to the Schengen Convention, seconded officers were only legally entitled to 
be present when investigative measures were being carried out but could potentially 
be entrusted to carry out investigative measures subject to the approval and direction 
of the local commander and the relevant police forces involved.
1013
 The relevant 
domestic police commander was to have full powers of direction and control over the 
seconded officers.
1014
 The Convention also brought structure and clarity to the 
ambiguous legal issue of the liability of seconded officers. It provided that any foreign 
police officers or prosecutors seconded to the team under the terms of the EU 
Convention would assume the legal status of a comparable official of that country 
with respect to offences committed against them or by them.
1015
 Any damages paid by 
the host State on behalf of the seconded officers were to be repaid by the seconding 
State.
1016
 The Convention also provided for more short-term secondments in the 
context of controlled deliveries under the same conditions. 
 
Furthermore, the Convention made express provision for the participation of Europol 
analysts in JITs in line with a previous requirement enumerated in the Amsterdam 
Treaty 1997.
1017 It was well appreciated that Europol’s analysts, who had almost 
unfettered access to the EIS and expert analytical skills, would readily enhance and 
complement the ability of the participating detectives to collate and analyse any 
information or intelligence gathered and shared.
1018
 Europol’s Director at the time, 
Jürgen Storbeck, had been calling for such a role for Europol in multilateral joint 
investigations since the organisation was first established.
1019
 The Member States 
subsequently ratified a Protocol to the Europol Convention in 2002 to enable analysts 
to leave Europol Headquarters to join a foreign JIT temporarily. Moreover, a 
subsequent amendment to Article 16 of the Protocol served to ensure that the 
diplomatic immunity of Europol’s analysts could be waived in respect of any offences 
committed by the analysts themselves upon the decision of the Europol Director. 
Blanket diplomatic immunity was afforded to Europol’s analysts pursuant to the 
Europol Convention in order to ensure that they could not be called upon to testify by 
a prosecutor or defendant’s defence team and therefore forced to divulge sensitive 
information derived either from a JIT’s investigative activities or from Europol’s own 
information system. Most importantly, the subsequent Europol Decision 2009 also 
provided that Europol could formally issue requests to Member State police forces or 
prosecution services to participate in JITs on the basis of its intelligence analyses, 
requiring any refusals to be accompanied by a written explanation.
1020
 It remained the 
preserve of the participant police forces and prosecution services to individually 
decide whether to comply with such requests. 
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The EU’s Mutual Assistance Convention 2000 was still undergoing the ratification 
process when the USA suffered the 11 September terrorist attacks. In the immediate 
aftermath, the JHA Council identified the JIT provisions of the Mutual Assistance 
Convention as a priority measure that needed to be implemented as soon as possible 
in order to actively investigate and prosecute terrorist groups in Europe in a cohesive 
manner.
1021
 The Council took the remarkable decision of bypassing the Convention’s 
ongoing ratification processes within the national parliaments by introducing a 
Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams 2002 which copied the relevant 
provisions from the Mutual Assistance Convention verbatim. The use of Framework 
Decisions as alternatives to Conventions and, more particularly, their undemocratic 
flavour will be discussed in-depth within the chapter on ‘complaint and inquiry as EU 
law and policy’.  
 
On a national level, the UK subsequently enacted the JIT Framework Decision 2002 
by way of sections 103 and 104 of the Police Reform Act 2002, Denmark 
incorporated it by way of Act No. 258 of 8 May 2002 and Ireland enacted it by way of 
the Criminal Justice (Joint Investigation Teams) Act 2004. The Westminster 
Government, in particular, issued a complementary Circular to the Police Reform Act 
2002 which outlined the precise extent to which English police forces could engage 
with the construct. The Circular reinforced the tenet that the territorial police forces 
and any relevant national agencies should respond favourably to foreign requests to 
establish JITs but it emphasised that they were under no obligation to establish or 
participate in one if an alternative way of conducting a cross-border investigation was 
deemed to be more appropriate.
1022
 The Circular also contained the particularly telling 
double-standard that foreign officers participating in a UK-based JIT were not 
permitted to exercise coercive powers such as search and seizure but that UK officers 
seconded to a foreign JIT could be bequeathed with full police powers if permitted by 
the host government.
1023
 Like the UK’s approach to the Schengen Convention, it is 
readily apparent that the Government and broader public are uncomfortable with the 
idea of foreign police officers operating in the UK with the benefit of coercive police 
powers. The Government also had to subsequently introduce the Crime (International 
Cooperation) Act 2003 in order to address the fact that the earlier Criminal Justice 
(International Cooperation) Act 1990 did not list police officers as competent 
authorities to issue a request for mutual legal assistance, only prosecutors and judicial 
officials. This effectively meant that the UK had to amend a long standing legal rule, 
which was designed to facilitate prosecutorial and judicial supervision and scrutiny, in 
the interest of giving effect to a largely marginal cross-border policing measure. 
 
The EU ultimately hoped that the new streamlined procedural regime for joint 
investigation teams across Europe would not only assist and simplify cooperative 
efforts against transnational organised crime networks but that it would also placate 
calls amongst radical politicians and practitioners to create an executive or federal 
policing competency within Europol.
1024
 The EU’s mutual police assistance regime 
effectively established a highly descriptive code of procedure pertaining to the 
submission of letters of request, the establishment of simplified joint investigation 
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teams and the secondment of officers. Almost all of the major administrative steps in 
the letter of request and joint investigation team processes were outlined. The 
European procedures for mutual assistance have since been extended to the USA 
through an EU - US Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty which provides for the exchange 
of evidence and the establishment of JITs under almost identical conditions.
1025 
Mutual assistance processes between the USA and EU Member States were 
traditionally regulated by way of bilateral mutual assistance treaties. Notable ones 
included bilateral agreements with Switzerland from 1973, the Netherlands from 
1981, Italy from 1982 and Belgium from 1988 amongst others.
1026
 Anderson remarks 
that the US is notable for its pursuit of bilateral cooperation treaties, unsurpassed by 
any other nation-state in the modern era, facilitating the issuance of thousands of 




Limiting the grounds for refusal 
 
More recently the EU has outlined its intention to intimately regulate almost all forms 
of requests for mutual assistance between police forces and judicial authorities in 
Europe.
1028
 The EU Mutual Assistance Convention 2000 was followed by a number of 
highly specific, bespoke measures. A Framework Decision on the freezing of property 
and evidence in 2003 required courts to mutually recognise a properly structured 
foreign warrant pertaining to the freezing, confiscation and forfeiture of potentially 
vital and at-risk evidence.
1029
 The Framework Decision provided that requests could 
be rejected only if there was a distinct possibility of an adverse effect on an ongoing 
criminal investigation or national security.
1030
 A much broader European Evidence 
Warrant (EEW) was subsequently introduced by Framework Decision in 2005 so that 
a ‘standard’ warrant could be used to request almost all forms of evidence already in 
the possession of another State.
1031
 Quite remarkably, even before the EEW came into 
force, the EU moved to replace it with an even more expansive European 
Investigation Order (EIO) which is designed to function as a standard warrant that can 
be used to not only request evidence already in the possession of the State but to 
request a wide array of investigative measures. It is envisaged that police forces, 
prosecutors and judicial officials can potentially use the proposed European 
Investigation Order (EIO) to request foreign police forces to carry out investigative 
measures ranging from property searches to electronic surveillance, communication 





Most importantly, the EEW and the EIO are premised not only upon the principle of 
mutual recognition but they are designed to be more authoritative than traditional 
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letters of request by limiting the grounds for refusal that a court can rely upon.
1033
 
Courts are effectively expected to take the integrity of the request at face value and 
can only delay or reject a request if there is a distinct possibility of an adverse effect 
on an ongoing criminal investigation or national security. However, much like the 
broader application of mutual recognition, an obvious discrepancy in the EU’s 
approach is that judges of a common law, adversarial tradition generally expect to 
scrutinise the integrity of any application for a warrant by questioning the applicant 
police officers in court. They do so to ensure that the principles of legality, due 
process and fundamental human rights are respected. By requiring common law 
judges to take foreign applications for warrants at face value without the ability to 
question the applicant police officers in person undoubtedly undermines the integrity 
of the criminal justice system by eroding crucial judicial safeguards.  
 
Furthermore, although the principle of mutual recognition is premised upon the 
existence of similar judicial standards across the EU in many continental systems 
warrants and letters of requests can be issued independently by prosecutors absent of 
any comparable judicial scrutiny. If a common law court accepts such a warrant at 
face value it could potentially be authorising a warrant that has not been subject to any 
judicial scrutiny or adversarial examination. Judges would effectively be unable to 
make the same basic enquiries of foreign police officers and prosecutors that they 
would of domestic officers and officials in many cases. To treat a judicial warrant as a 
mere superficial formality in the interests of transnational cooperation and expediency 
over and above legal integrity arguably risks pushing the criminal justice system 
towards Packer’s ‘crime control’ model.1034 Packer’s rudimentary conceptualisation of 
‘crime control’ places great faith in the integrity and virtue of police officers and 





The EU has not only confined its new ethos to evidentiary matters but it has also 
extended it to the simple sharing of information and, more particularly, to the sharing 
of profile identifiers. The EU Framework Decision on ‘simplifying the exchange of 
information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member 
States’, better known as the ‘Swedish Framework Decision’ in 2006, requires police 
forces to respond to requests for information from foreign police forces or EU 
agencies such as Europol in the same manner and with the same expediency as they 
would for requests between local police units under conditions not stricter than those 
applicable at local levels.
1036 
It holds that response times should not exceed eight 
hours upon receipt of an urgent matter or fourteen days if the request is of a less 
serious nature.
1037
 The new obligations are referred to as the ‘principle of 
availability’.1038 
 
With respect to profile identifiers, the original five Schengen participants together 
with Austria and Spain became discontented with the speed of EU policy negotiations 
in the mid-2000s and formed a new regional Convention ‘on the stepping up of cross-
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border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal 
immigration’, better known as the Prum Convention 2005.1039 The Convention was 
negotiated and enacted outside of the EU legal framework pursuant to Article K7 of 
the Amsterdam Treaty which facilitated ‘enhanced cooperation’ between Member 
States in the absence of wider EU consensus.
1040
 The Amsterdam Treaty 1997 not 
only facilitated ‘enhanced cooperation’ but provided that the EU could incorporate 
regional conventions that were adopted by at least half of the Member States acting 
together.
1041
 Such ‘EU’ conventions would only apply to those Member States that opt 
into them.
1042
 Following the accession of ten additional Member States to the Union 
in the early 2000s, the Lisbon Treaty provided that the EU could incorporate such 




With respect to policing matters, the Prum Convention required the Participant States 
to develop common registries and technological linkages so that their national crime 
fingerprint, DNA and vehicle registration databases could be remotely accessed by 
approved foreign authorities on a hit/ no hit basis.
1044
 In a similar fashion to the 
Europol information system, foreign authorities cannot simply browse the national 
databases but can merely enter a search term, whether a name, vehicle registration 
number, fingerprint or DNA profile, and their search will return a hit or no hit 
result.
1045
 They must then approach the Participant State of ownership to access the 
data. Fijnaut and Spapens observe that the Prum Convention has the potential to 
greatly reduce the administrative workload behind some 300 letters of request that are 
regularly sent between Germany, Belgian and Dutch police forces on an annual basis, 




The Convention also allows for police border crossings to avert imminent physical 
threats to individuals under conditions no different to the Schengen hot pursuit 
framework. In addition, a legal basis was established for the setting up of joint 
information centres staffed with seconded liaison officers as well as more peculiar 
activities such as the use of armed air marshals on domestic flights.
1047
 In a similar 
fashion to the Schengen Convention, the Prum Convention contains provisions 
enabling the entire Convention to be subsumed by the EU project.
1048
 However, 
unlike the Schengen Convention, the Member States only reached a consensus to 
incorporate the information-sharing fingerprint, DNA and vehicle database provisions 
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Another initiative to horizontally inter-link databases across the EU area has been 
pursued by the EU in recent years but has been impeded by major concerns over 
necessity and data protection. The Commission’s regular five year programmes have 
consistently featured a point of action which calls for the examination of ways in 
which information can move between Europol, the SIS, the Visa Information System 
(VIS), the European Dactyloscopy System (Eurodac) and the proposed European 
criminal records database (ECRIS).
1050
 The VIS is primarily an EU-managed central 
database which holds personal details on visa applicants across the EU Member States 
largely for the benefit of national immigration services. Similarly, Eurodac is an EU 
database of fingerprint profiles and associated personal details of asylum applicants, 
deported persons and applicants refused entry to a Member State, administered mainly 
for national immigration purposes. The most significant problem with the initiative is 
that police authorities are afforded significant freedom to gather criminal information 
and intelligence for the particular purposes of investigating crime, not to employ such 
information for immigration and asylum purposes. The Schengen Information System 
already allows for criminals and terrorists to be flagged so that they can be identified 
and apprehended when entering or exiting the Union. To use criminal intelligence for 
other purposes risks rendering unlawful or unconstitutional the very purposes for 




This chapter has largely avoided conducting in-depth critical and comparative 
analyses of the various mechanisms and processes. It strives to convey first and 
foremost that the EU institutions have actively regulated various aspects of cross-
border police cooperation through a number of key procedural frameworks. 
Procedures for analysing and exchanging information have been enumerated in the 
Europol Convention and Decision; the conduct of operational cooperation is outlined 
in both the Schengen Convention and the Mutual Assistance Convention while the 
development of common investigative techniques has been facilitated by various 
instruments, not least the Framework Decision on the freezing of property and 
evidence and the proposed European Investigation Order. The EU institutions have, to 
all intents and purposes, strived to address the perceived internal security deficit by 
filling the perceived deficit with common procedural codes. 
 
The thesis has consigned the key analytical arguments and criticisms to subsequent 
chapters in order to effectively sketch out the key EU measures on cross-border 
policing. Although the EU’s procedural frameworks cannot be compared like for like 
with the national codes of procedure within the Member States, the bare frameworks 
of the EU measures arguably show that the ethos of procedural clarity and, more 
particularly, legislative responsibility for providing such clarity has transcended to the 
EU level. It appears to be no longer sufficient that police procedure, whether within 
States or between States, can be determined or interpreted by police officers 
themselves but must be prescribed by highly formulaic, programmatic codes of 
procedure.  
 
The EU cross-border policing measures are arguably representative of the modern 
tenet that police powers and processes should be formulated with sufficient precision 
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to indicate with clarity the scope of any coercive powers conferred on public officials 
in order to afford a measure of legal protection against abuse. The statutory provisions 
which outline the highly detailed administrative responsibilities and procedures 
incumbent upon Europol National Units and Sirene teams are designed to establish a 
procedural standard against which police conduct can be measured. Similarly, the 
procedures enumerated within the Schengen and Mutual Assistance Conventions 
pertaining to police officers operating in foreign territories define the nature and 
parameters of police action in the interests of due process and domestic police 
primacy. The frameworks not only facilitate a degree of cross-border police 
cooperation that was previously unattainable in some areas but they enhance 
transparency and accountability by imbuing procedural clarity and legal precision 
which, by extension, facilitates and enhances the quality of police accountability. 
 
However the thesis has indicated that a fine line exists between using formulaic codes 
to enhance clarity, understanding and accountability and the use of codes to expedite 
and simplify cross-border policing which risks undermining the constitutional, legal 
and administrative standards of the Member States. The EU should arguably be far 
more concerned with enhancing police accountability and transparency, in the spirit of 
the Treaty preambles, rather than seeking to simplify and expedite police cooperation 
by lowering or eroding standards of due process. To do so risks prioritising Packer’s 
ideology of ‘crime control’ over and above due process protections. The EU appears 
to be employing procedural frameworks in order to realise the ‘ends’ of efficiency 
over and above constitutional, legal and ethical propriety in many respects. Before 
addressing the mechanisms of complaint and inquiry, the following chapter on ‘co-
option’ will subject the relevant EU frameworks to in-depth critical analysis. 
Although the EU is clearly attempting to regulate the field of cross-border policing 
through highly formulaic and programmatic codes of procedure, an important litmus 
test of the quality of the EU’s measures can be gauged by questioning whether and to 
what extent the Member State police forces are ‘co-opting’ them in practice. 
 
 144 
Ch. 4 Co-option of EU law and policy 
 
The chapter will convey that although the EU measures would appear at face value to 
be comprehensive there is ultimately a serious mismatch between the formal 
structures of cross-border police cooperation as expressed in EU instruments and the 
reality on the ground. It will show that there has long been a lack of enthusiasm for 
EU measures amongst the Member State police forces due in part to the fact that the 
EU policy makers tend to prioritise political ambition over practitioner needs.
1051
 This 
is arguably attributable to the desire of the EU institutions to introduce procedural 
legal frameworks as a political panacea for the perceived internal security deficit 
rather than addressing the practical needs of police officers on the ground. However, 
the chapter makes an exception for the Schengen procedural framework since it was 
not designed by the EU institutions and was already the dominant legal framework 
regulating the conduct of police border crossings throughout the EU area prior to its 
adoption. The chapter focuses specifically on the ‘co-option’ of the major EU 
measures that the EU institutions can lay claim to, namely the Europol institution and 
the EU processes of mutual assistance. 
 
The chapter will convey that, instead of enhancing the transparency and 
accountability of cross-border police cooperation in general, the EU institutions are 
evidently far more concerned with forcing police forces to use the EU’s own policing 
measures which are considerably ineffective and unattractive for many purposes. The 
chapter will show that most of the EU’s own measures are suitable only for a narrow 
range of cross-border policing needs. It will convey that the EU is, in effect, cheer-
leading a number of marquee measures which purport to ‘establish’ cross-border 
policing but in fact have left a vast expanse of cross-border policing activities 
untended.  
 
Within this vast untended expanse, police forces tend to pursue policies of informal, 
low visibility cooperation which satisfies institutional priorities in cross-border law 
enforcement at the expense of transparency and accountability. Although the practice 
of using home-grown and informal measures has the unfortunate consequence of side-
lining the role of Europol and thereby eschewing transparency and accountability, the 
bespoke home-grown measures serve a number of crucial functions. They tend to 
facilitate intimate working relationships between police forces and can consist of 
rapid and direct channels of communication and cooperation which are fundamentally 




The thesis will recommend that instead of imposing its preferred procedures upon the 
Member State police forces, the EU institutions should follow the lead of the English, 
Irish and Danish governments by striving to introduce legally precise and 
procedurally clear standards which serve to regulate almost all conceivable forms of 
cross-border police cooperation in the interests of transparency and accountability. In 
other words, rather than promoting its own marquee measures, the EU should be 
working with police forces to enhance the transparency and accountability of the 
Member States’ home-grown bilateral and multilateral measures in line with 
conventional domestic policing structures and values. The chapter will also show that 
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new mechanisms of accountability are needed to hold the ‘low visibility’ conduct of 






Although the Europol Decision 2009 requires the Europol National Units (ENU) to 
supply Europol with the information and intelligence necessary for it to carry out its 
tasks, it typically receives very limited information from the Member States.
1054
 The 
UK, Ireland and Denmark approach the new Europol Information System (EIS) in a 
remarkably similar manner. They each established the Europol National Unit (ENU) 
within a national agency or department, located alongside their respective Interpol 
NCBs. The English police forces originally established their ENU within the London 
Metropolitan Police until it was transferred to the stand-alone National Criminal 
Intelligence Service (NCIS) in 1997 then the Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA) in 2006 and eventually to the new National Crime Agency (NCA) in 2013. 
Ireland established the ENU within its Liaison and Protection Department which is 
housed alongside the Security and Intelligence Service within the national police 
headquarters.
1055
 The Liaison and Protection Service not only maintains the Irish 
Interpol NCB but manages Ireland police attachés stationed in Irish embassies around 
the world on a 24 hour basis. Denmark, for its part, set up its ENU in a 
Communications Centre alongside the offices of the Serious Crime Squad within the 
national crime unit (NEC) at the National Police Commissioner’s headquarters.  
 
In each case, the ENU shares its office space with the Interpol NCB. In Denmark, the 
same team of police officers handle the information uploads and incoming requests 
across the Europol, Interpol and Schengen systems.
1056
 The ENUs and NCBs typically 
consist of only a handful of officers who act as administrators and promoters for a 
wide and ambitious range of requests and projects.
1057
 The EU’s Action Plan to 
Combat Organised Crime 1997 had recommended the establishment of ENUs 
alongside NCBs so that foreign counterparts could become familiar with a single 




Unusually, each jurisdiction introduced legislation to formally establish their ENUs. 
The UK enacted the Europol Act 1996, Ireland introduced the Europol Act 1997, and 
Denmark passed Implementing Law no. 415 of 1 June 1997.
1059 
The use of legislation 
to create a unit within a police force was unusual due to the fact that it was 
traditionally well within a police chief’s competency to establish and abolish units of 
a police force.
1060
 Legislatures typically refrained from regulating the departmental 
aspects of police forces to ensure police chiefs had the necessary flexibility to rapidly 
move resources and personnel across the organisation to respond to the day-to-day 
exigencies of domestic policing. The need and usefulness of distinct police units often 
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became dated as crime trends changed. Moreover, the establishment of police units by 
the legislature could arguably set a precedent which could encourage newly elected 
governments to establish an array of policing units to tackle the concerns of their local 
constituents thereby emboldening the politicisation of the police force. Legislatures 
are responsible for defining substantive criminal laws and offences, police powers and 
duties but not the distinct employment of resources and personnel across the police 
organisation which is the function of the office of police chief. 
 
A major aim of the implementing Acts was apparently to ensure that the respective 
national data protection commissioners could scrutinise the propriety of data transfers 
from the national police computers to the Europol Information System (EIS). Ireland 
and Denmark had already enacted the relevant provisions of the CoE Convention on 
Data Protection 1981, establishing the office of Irish Data Protection Commissioner 
and the Danish Data Protection Agency (DPA) respectively. For the explicit purposes 
of participating in the Europol project, the UK introduced the Data Protection Act 
1998 to replace the Data Protection Act 1984, giving the new Commissioner an 




In terms of co-option, ENUs across Europe are reportedly actively forwarding 
criminal information and intelligence to Europol in significant volumes. Lemieux’s 
analysis indicates that the intelligence uploads to Europol have been increasing 
significantly year on year since 2000.
1062
 The EIS reportedly contained files on 35,585 
persons and 174,459 objects pertaining to drug trafficking, human trafficking, 
counterfeit currency, robbery and fraud in 2010.
1063
 Germany reportedly uploaded the 
most new information to Europol in 2010 followed by France, Belgium and Europol 
itself using information received from third parties.
1064
 The connected EIS search 
function was used 147,345 times the same year.
1065
 Moreover, investigations 
supported by Europol’s analysts and liaison officers amounted to over 12,000 cases in 
2010, supported by a €92 million budget.1066 The process of organising its intelligence 
files has also resulted in the creation of a number of ancillary databases within 
Europol. These include an Illicit Laboratory Comparison System (EILCS) which 
contains detailed photographic and technical information on synthetic drug production 
and illicit drug laboratories as well as a Bomb Data System which contains a library 
of photographic and technical data on explosive, incendiary, chemical and nuclear 
materials amongst other features.
1067
 A user satisfaction survey conducted by Europol 
in 2010 indicated that some 57 specific activities carried out by Europol were rated 




However, police force engagement with the Europol project hides a number of key 
elements around the nature of the information sent to Europol and the concomitant 
working practices. For reasons of data security, the Europol Information System (EIS) 
was eventually designed to exist as a stand-alone system which was not physically 
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connected to the national police computers or intelligence databases of the Member 
State police forces in order to safeguard the security and integrity of the national 
police computer systems from unauthorised foreign access. A primary function of 
each ENU is to manually upload all relevant information and intelligence to the EIS. 
In practice, this typically consists of moving electronic data from one computer 
system to another, often using a single computer screen or interface.
1069
 However, not 
all criminal information and intelligence pertaining to cross-border matters must be 
uploaded to the Europol system. Data that could prejudice ongoing investigations, 




England, Ireland and Denmark have taken a remarkably similar approach in 
determining whether and to what extent information and intelligence is passed to 
Europol on a systematic basis. The job of preparing intelligence uploads to the EIS 
was largely removed from the ENUs within the jurisdictions and instead assigned to 
analysis units within the respective national criminal intelligence bureaus.
1071
 The 
main rationale was that the national criminal intelligence analysts and detectives 
would not only ensure that information was relevant and cutting edge but their 
expertise on domestic investigations meant that they were in a strong position to judge 
what information could prejudice ongoing investigations, prosecutions or state 
security and should therefore be withheld. The role of the national criminal 
intelligence services in preparing files on behalf of the ENU effectively demotes the 
role of the ENU desks to a mere administrative function in practice, akin to the 
Interpol NCB. 
 
The role of the national intelligence analysis teams in providing the data uploads to 
the EIS shows that the participant States continue to prize the integrity of their 
national databases and police files over and above the spirit of cooperation. This is 
hardly surprising considering the fact that the Europol Convention was drafted and 
painstakingly negotiated in order to allay widespread concerns about the security and 
integrity of foreign police data systems. Den Boer observes that police officers were 
generally wary of sharing information and intelligence with foreign counterparts long 
before the introduction of the Europol project and will continue to be wary and 
distrustful long afterwards.
1072
 She suggests that the long-drawn out process leading 
up to Europol’s establishment and the lukewarm reaction to it thereafter reflects not 
only a continued lack of trust between foreign police officers but a particular lack of 




Guille observes that the acute lack of trust between Europol participants means that 
Europol not only receives a lesser quantity of intelligence than its founders expected 
but that the information it does receive is frequently of a low-grade quality and often 
outdated.
1074
 Fijnaut and Paoli’s research indicates that Europol’s analysts do not 
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receive the bulk of their intelligence data from spontaneous uploads from the Member 
States but must rely by and large on the annual reports submitted by each Member 
States and must follow-up them up with requests for additional information in order to 
build Europol’s intelligence files and threat assessments.1075 Gerspacher and 
Lemieux’s interviews with Europol officials indicated that the lack of quality data 
means that Europol is not only unable to reach its full potential but struggles to 
achieve its basic objective which is to stimulate cross-border police cooperation 
across Europe.
1076
 Brady reports, for instance, that upon Europol’s request for 
information for one of its Organised Crime Threat Assessments in the mid-2000s it 
received 500 pages of a report from one Member State but only received one page 
from another.
1077
 Den Boer remarked in the late 1990s that Europol receives so little 
information from the Member States that it is considered by many police intelligence 
officers to be a ‘lame duck’.1078 
 
Europol’s counter-terrorism role 
 
Another particularly under-appreciated aspect of the relationship between the national 
intelligence departments, the major detective bureaus and their ENUs is the fact that 
the national intelligence departments which are evidently a vital lifeline for the ENUs 
generally do not contain the country’s full library of counter-terrorism data. England’s 
counter-terrorism police files are maintained by the London Metropolitan Police 
Special Branch, designated as SO15, while Denmark’s national special branch, known 
as the PET, has its own database largely unconnected to the national police computer. 
Although the Irish police force is a unitary, highly centralised police force it too 
facilitates a similar disconnect between counter-terrorism bureaus and the national 
crime bureau. The Irish Police Security and Intelligence Service oversees two sub-
directorates, one for serious and organised crime and the other for counter-terrorism 
but the units responsible for each area maintain their personnel and files in different 
buildings at opposite ends of Dublin city. The Central Detective Unit (CDU) is based 
in the Phoenix Park and the Special Detective Unit (SDU) works from Harcourt Street 
in Dublin City centre. 
 
Raab observes that counter-terrorism police departments are generally permitted to 
maintain information and intelligence in databases which are not subject to the routine 
scrutiny of data protection commissioners as long as they adhere to the simple 
condition that the information and intelligence they collect, which invariably breaches 
data protection laws, privacy rights and more often than not would be deemed 
inadmissible in a court of law, is not shared or released to anybody unconnected to the 
immediate counter-terrorism investigation under any circumstances.
1079
 Anderson et 
al remark that counter-terrorism or ‘high policing’ is by its very nature highly 
secretive.
1080
 These counter-terrorism databases are largely unconnected to the 
national criminal intelligence services, namely the UK NCA and the Danish NEC 
respectively. NCA and NEC officers and analysts must normally apply to the counter-
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terrorism departments to get access to their files. Denmark’s PET database for 
example is exempt from standard data protection laws and the oversight of the data 
protection committee but it must be inspected periodically by a unique committee 
appointed by the Minster for Justice, called the Wamberg Committee.
1081
 The Home 
Office has plans to transfer the LMPs central counter-terrorism function to the NCA, 
pursuant to the Crime and Courts Act 2013 but the switch has not yet been approved.  
 
The fact that the central counter-terrorism departments in England, Ireland and 
Denmark remain somewhat separate from the respective national ‘criminal’ 
intelligence services suggests that the intelligence files that the national services 
upload to Europol are particularly, if not profoundly, bereft of comprehensive 
counter-terrorism intelligence.
1082
 Occhipinti’s research indicates that Europol’s 
counter-terrorism analysts are receiving only the most minimal amount of counter-
terrorism intelligence from the Member States.
1083
 The Europol Director made public 
his concerns over the amount and quality of counter-terrorism data submitted to 
Europol in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the US by stating that the 
participant police forces were only paying ‘lip service’ to the organisation.1084 The 
situation was hardly unexpected since the acute lack of clarity over the nature and 
extent of Europol’s competency to handle counter–terrorism intelligence had resulted 
in Europol’s counter-terrorism competency being postponed for a period of two years, 
only coming into force in 2000.
1085 
Walker notes that even though counter-terrorism 
cooperation was the original catalyst behind the establishment of Interpol and Trevi, 
the collection, storage and analysis of counter-terrorism intelligence files remains 




Counter-terrorism police units reportedly prefer to use informal networks for 
information sharing and conferencing on a case by case basis. Key networks include 
the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) which was developed under the umbrella of the 
informal Club de Berne network established in the 1970s but is now affiliated with the 
EU’s Sitcen.1087 Sitcen was originally established within the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) ‘second’ pillar following the Madrid bombings in 2004 to 
develop intelligence and to encourage counter-terrorism police units and national 
security services to cooperate with one another.
1088
 Similarly, the Police Working 
Group on Terrorism (PWGOT) was a forum set up independently by representatives 
from the major counter-terrorism police units from England, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Germany following the assassination of the British Ambassador to The 




The PWGOT quickly grew to include police special 
branches and security services from all EC Member States including Norway, Sweden 
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The aim of the group was to meet informally on a bi-annual basis in 
order to develop common counter-terrorism strategies and share relevant intelligence. 
The PWGOT established its own unique rapid communication system between the 
participant counter-terrorism units which enabled written and graphic material to be 
transmitted speedily and securely throughout the fifteen country network.
1091
 Annual 
information and training conferences were also held covering topics such as the 
activities of the Provisional IRA in Europe and the preservation of evidence at the 
scene of a terrorist attack.
1092 
Participants in the PWGOT have reportedly stated to 
researchers that they tend to trust each other implicitly and normally exchange 
information immediately and without question.
1093
 Many Member State counter-
terrorism units also deal bilaterally with non-EU states such as the United States. 
Germany and the US, for instance, signed a bilateral agreement concerning the 




Bruggeman observes that in light of the practical needs and exigencies of both 
‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ detective bureaus there is little likelihood that the culture and 
ethos of detectives will naturally change in order to accommodate Europol’s 
needs.
1095
 Moreover, the very fact that counter-terrorism information is highly 
sensitive indicates that even if national criminal intelligence services are granted 
unfettered access to counter-terrorism intelligence they will presumably choose to 
withhold such data from Europol in the interests of national security and investigative 
integrity in a similar fashion to the way that they handle data pertaining to ordinary 
crime.
1096
 It appears that one of the only ways to enhance information-sharing is to 
develop robust processes which foster greater trust between counter-terrorism 
bureaus. 
 
Rather than prioritising the simple conveyance of intelligence, as Europol does, the 
EU should arguably be focusing on developing general codes of procedures and codes 
of ethics to ensure that counter-terrorism cooperation is being conducted according to 
procedurally clear standards. Most importantly, in the interest of transparency and 
accountability, it should be focusing on establishing oversight bodies, such as the 
Danish ‘Wamberg’ parliamentary committee, to oversee the conduct of cross-border 
counter-terrorism cooperation so that systemic malpractice or opportunities for greater 
transparency can be routinely identified. Detectives evidently need to know that the 
EU serves their needs and interests rather than the other way around. 
 
Europol’s liaison function 
 
Like their Interpol counterparts, Europol’s liaison officers are considered to be 
fundamental components of the Europol project since they have the capacity to 
become highly influential experts on international criminality, which not only helps to 
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give direction to the organisation but can shape and influence the nature of 
participation of their domestic police forces.
1097
 Den Boer remarks that the fact that 
European liaison officers must work together on a daily basis and tend to use a 
common language, namely English, means that some major obstacles to cooperation 
are overcome, particularly language, knowledge and access in the first instance.
1098
 
Moreover, the simple participation of practitioners and government officials in 
working groups and policy-making forums has the potential to build a significant 
degree of trust between police forces.
1099
 Loader conveys that ELOs serve to create an 





Nadelmann’s research indicates that liaison officers share a common bond or 
camaraderie by virtue of both their physical proximity as well as the fact that they are 
no longer considered to be ‘normal’ police officers vested with standard police 
powers but ‘knowledge brokers’ who are highly dependent upon the cooperation and 
integrity of one another and the support and trust of their domestic police forces.
1101
 
Anderson remarks that liaison officers effectively represent an international 
professional community of expert transnational intelligence officers who can develop 
overviews and stimulate cross-border police operations like no other brand of police 
officer.
1102
 The close working relationships between liaison officers means that ELOs 
can effectively reassure their domestic police teams that their foreign counterparts can 
be trusted.
1103
 Gerspacher and Lemieux posit that liaison officers can essentially serve 
as ‘entrepreneurs’, not only supplying Europol with information but stimulating the 




Europol has also long been interested in establishing international liaison networks 
with police forces outside of the EU in order to enhance the international dimension 
of EU-based investigations.
1105
 A distinctive international dimension was added to 
Europol’s liaison network in more recent years.1106 Liaison bureaus from more than 
17 non-EU countries, including Eastern European and North American countries have 
been added to Europol’s liaison department. In the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks, an agreement between the US and Europol facilitated the secondment of US 
liaison officers to Europol, the stationing of a Europol representative in Washington 
and the participation of US representatives in EU policing working groups.
1107
 The 
United States liaison bureau within Europol contains representatives from the FBI, 
DEA and Homeland Security.
1108
 The USA bureau originally had limited access to the 
EIS due in part to the lack of a national data-protection supervisory authority in the 
                                                 
1097
 Lemieux (n85) 6, 7 
1098
 Den Boer (n999) 57 
1099
 Anderson (n1008) 44 – 46  
1100 Ian Loader, ‘Policing, securitization and democratization in Europe’ in Tim Newburn and Richard 
Sparks (eds), Criminal Justice and Political Cultures: National and International Dimensions of Crime 
Control (Willan 2004) 56, 57 
1101
 Nadelmann (n241) 190 
1102
 Anderson (n240) 13 
1103
 Rijken (n116) 229 
1104
 Gerspacher and Lemieux (n868) 72 - 76 
1105
 Anderson (n1008) 39 
1106
 Fijnaut (n886) 260 
1107
 Occhipinti (n781) 174 
1108




 However, this was overcome in 2002 following a number of data protection 
guarantees by the US.
1110
 Similarly, Europol and Interpol have both exchanged 





The addition of an international liaison dimension is important for the simple fact that 
the new intelligence created within Europol’s analysis department and the activities of 
the liaison department and crime centres may have possible connections with criminal 
or counter-terrorist investigations outside of the EU area and vice versa. Moreover, 
the USA’s policy of aggressively stationing senior officials with expertise in drug 
trafficking, human trafficking and counter-terrorism in embassies across the world has 
helped it to develop an extensive repository of criminal intelligence and foreign police 
contacts which could be of great value to Europol participants.
1112
 Denmark, for its 
part, has been staunchly advocating the sharing of liaison officers stationed by the EU 
Member States outside of the EU area. Upon Denmark’s initiative, the EU introduced 
a Joint Action in 1996 and a subsequent Decision in 2003 calling for Member States 




In practice, the English police forces maintain a sizeable liaison bureau at Europol 
consisting of detectives seconded from the London Metropolitan Police, various other 
territorial police forces, the National Crime Agency and the UK Border Authority 
amongst others. Denmark decided in 2010 to recall its police attaches stationed in 
Danish embassies within the EU and transferred or centralised their functions within 
the Danish liaison bureau at Europol.
1114
 Interpol had previously proposed the posting 
of all bilateral liaison officers in Europe to its European Liaison Bureau within its 
own headquarters prior to the establishment of Europol but Denmark was one of the 
first countries to bring the idea to fruition, albeit opting for Europol instead of 
Interpol.
1115
 Denmark’s enthusiasm for the Europol project is particularly well 
reflected in the fact that its National Police Commissioner served as Deputy Director 
of Europol between 2003 and 2006, shortly before his appointment as National Police 
Commissioner. Bresler remarks that the secondment of senior officers to management 
positions within transnational or international policing constructs was traditionally 
considered to be a backward career step but that no longer appears to be the case.
1116
 
Kleiven reports that the idea of centralising all EU-based liaison officers within 





Ireland, on the other hand, has generally seconded only two senior detectives to its 
liaison bureau at Europol, normally two counter-terrorism officers together with a 
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customs official. A team of two police officers ensures continuity if one of the officers 
retires or transfers to another post. Ireland’s liaison bureau is located alongside the the 
UK bureau by virtue of the fact that Europol’s Management Board tries to co-locate 
the liaison bureaus of neighbouring countries in order to engender day-to-day contact 
and collaboration. Several technologically-advanced purpose-built conference rooms 
are also maintained at Europol headquarters to enable Europol Liaison Officers or 
visiting detectives to plan and coordinate arrests, property searches, surveillance 
operations or controlled deliveries in real-time across multiple jurisdictions.  
 
Ireland’s comparable lack of engagement with Europol’s liaison function appears to 
have its roots in a long-standing degree of caution around the deployment of Irish 
police officers to foreign jurisdictions. A Garda Síochána Act introduced in 1989, 
long before the Europol project was established, explicitly provided that Garda 
officers could only be seconded abroad, with police powers, as part of a UN peace-
keeping or observer mission. More importantly, it explicitly provided that seconded 
officers must remain under the direction and control of the Commissioner.
1118
 Irish 
police attaches stationed abroad were exempt from these provisions as Irish embassies 
abroad are considered to be Irish jurisdictional territories.
1119
 Even Ireland’s liaison 
officers at Interpol and the EDU were considered to be exempt as the officers were 
seconded on an advisory basis, without police functions, and remained under the 
direction and control of the Commissioner.
1120
 Ireland was clearly cautious about the 
governance and control of Irish police officers operating beyond the domestic 
jurisdiction so much so that a number of Irish police officers were forced to resign 
their membership of the force and subsequently reapply if they wished to represent 
Ireland on the investigative taskforce of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
1121
 ELOs are non-operational so the use of coercive 
police powers was not an issue but they needed to retain the status of police officers in 
order to maintain their access to the national police computers as well as the ability to 
divulge information as part of a Europol-centred operation.  
 
The Irish Europol Act 1997 thus amended the Garda Siochana Act 1989 to expressly 
enable the Irish police Commissioner to second officers abroad to function as police 
officers as part of the Europol project.
1122
 The relevant provisions in the Garda 
Siochana Act 1989 were subsequently repealed and replaced by the Garda Siochana 
Act 2005, which appear to be modelled by and large on comparable English 
legislative arrangements.
1123
 The current provisions effectively split the force’s 
secondment possibilities into two fields: police participation in peacekeeping and 
international policing. The first section provides for police participation in voluntary 
peacekeeping missions outside of the State in order to carry out duties of a police 
character with the UN or any other international organisation.
1124
 The second section 
enables the Commissioner to assign eligible members of the Garda Síochána for 
service outside of the State to carry out liaison duties with Europol or any other 
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foreign law enforcement agency or international organisation subject to the agreement 
of the Minister for Justice.
1125
 The Act provides that the Minister may also authorise 
the secondment of customs officers to Europol. 
 
In terms of its ‘added value’, the detective bureaus within the three jurisdictions are 
frequently involved in property searches and surveillance operations coordinated 
through Europol. The Europol liaison bureaus regularly engage in collaboration, 
particularly in the context of controlled deliveries of drug consignments across their 
domestic police areas. Ireland has reportedly undertaken its biggest drug 
interceptions, counterfeiting and cybercrime investigations through Europol.
1126
 
However the significance of the Europol liaison department clearly pales in 
comparison to the volume of cooperation carried out across more informal 
mechanisms for direct liaison between police forces within Europe.
1127
 The London 
Metropolitan Police has long stationed detectives to major cities such as Paris, 
Hamburg, Rotterdam and Antwerp to develop relationships with foreign detective 
bureaus and, in particular, to keep tabs on prominent criminals and suspected 
terrorists dating as far back as the 1880s.
1128
 At present, English police forces have 
liaison officers stationed across the EU, Eastern Europe, the Americas, Asia and 
further afield.
1129
 They maintain a particular focus on high-profile transit countries for 
drugs in Europe, such as Spain and the Netherlands, as well as producer-countries in 




Similarly, Ireland has stationed liaison officers in embassies in The Hague, Paris and 
Madrid since the 1990s. The officer originally posted in The Hague was responsible 
for direct police liaison with the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium while the liaison 
officer in Madrid was responsible for developing links with police forces in Spain, 
Portugal and Morocco.
1131
 A significant volume of direct cooperation between Irish 
police officers and their UK counterparts reportedly occurs via an Irish liaison officer 
stationed in the Irish embassy in London and a UK liaison officer stationed in Dublin. 
Ireland’s embassy-based police attaches are managed and coordinated by a distinct 





Nadelmann’s research indicates that there has been an explosion of bilateral liaison 
officers from Western European countries stationed throughout Europe and across the 
globe since the 1970 and ‘80s. He convincingly argues that the widespread use of 
embassy-based bilateral liaison officers is directly attributable to the pioneering 
approach of the US which has aggressively stationed its organised crime and drug 
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detectives throughout Europe, Asia and South America since the 1960s in order to 
promote the merits and possibilities of structured and systemic cross-border police 
cooperation.
1133
 US law enforcement agencies had long stationed liaison officers in 
major European cities, dating back to the 1860s, to combat the illicit flow of jewellery 
and diamonds into the US and to build cases against the Italian-American mafia.
1134
 
However the US significantly increased its liaison presence in the 1970s in order to 
tackle the increasing flow of hard drugs across the US border as part of its new ‘war 
on drugs’ campaign.1135 Anderson observes that although America claimed 
extraterritorial jurisdiction for drug crimes affecting the US, it was of no legal or 
practical significance without the cooperation of the police forces, courts and 




Nadelmann reports that the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) stationed some 228 
liaison officers in 43 foreign locations in 1976 increasing to some 300 agents across 
70 different foreign locations by the 1990s.
1137
 Similarly, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) also developed its international profile from the 1970s, 
increasingly stationing legal attaches, known as Legats, in US foreign embassies for 
the purpose of developing working relationships, gathering intelligence and 
stimulating cooperation primarily in the area of counter-terrorism.
1138
 At present, it is 
not unusual for American embassies to contain liaison officers from the DEA, FBI, 
Homeland Security, Justice Department, Customs, US Marshalls, Secret Service, and 
revenue service.
1139
 Nadelmann observes that most European governments expect US 
liaison officers to secure the permission of the national police headquarters or national 
criminal intelligence service as a professional courtesy before dealing with local 
police units on a case-by-case basis but that in practice liaison officers often ignore 
protocol and contact detectives and prosecutors directly as needs arise.
1140
 He remarks 
that liaison officers typically forge relationships with local detectives not via the local 





Detectives in Europe were reportedly only too keen to develop working relationships 
with the DEA in order to take advantage of the liaison officers’ access to the US 
intelligence databases as well as the connected network of DEA liaison officers all 
around the world.
1142
 Nadelmann reports that European detectives conducting 
investigations into drug networks linked to South America, Asia or Africa would 
reportedly contact the DEA to see if its databases or liaison officers in the region held 
any relevant intelligence before, or even instead of, contacting the relevant foreign 
police force through Interpol.
1143
 Nadelmann describes liaison officers as ‘fixers’ and 
facilitators who are expected to be able to make direct and immediate contact with 
relevant local detectives upon receiving a request for information or assistance from 
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their domestic police units.
1144
 Bowling and Sheptycki refer to liaison officers as 
international or ‘global police’ officers, even though their work on secondment is 
almost entirely intelligence or knowledge based.
1145
 They describe the bilateral liaison 





Occhipinti’s noted in 2010 that many countries, particularly the US, continue to prefer 
the direct and simple nature of bilateral cooperation rather than the more formal 
bureaucratic approaches of Europol and Interpol.
1147
 This means that the bilateral 
routes and networks are as important as the formal international institutions, if not 
more so. Guille’s comparative study of numerous EU countries indicates that the 
mechanisms of informal bilateral cooperation are not only preferred by practitioners 
but that they appear to work far more effectively than the emerging formal constructs 
of international police and judicial cooperation.
1148
 Following the September 11 
attacks, for instance, both the New York Police Department (NYPD) and the London 
Metropolitan Police reportedly increased the number of liaison officers they have 
stationed around the world.
1149
 Nadelmann suggests that the bilateral liaison construct 





Furthermore, there are an array of bilateral and multilateral liaison officers who are 
not based within embassies but regularly travel to meet with their foreign counterparts 
to discuss border criminality and develop joint strategies as part of a structured forum. 
The territorial police force in Kent, England, for example, has a long-standing 
relationship with police forces from France, Belgium and the Netherlands.
1151
 Due to 
the prevalence of the maritime smuggling of stolen vehicles, art work, antiques, drugs, 
weapons and illegal immigrants across the Strait of Dover throughout the 20
th
 
Century, detectives from the Kent Police and French Police de L’Air et des Frontiers 
(PAF) in Calais, France met regularly from 1968 onwards to coordinate operations. 
The regular joint intelligence forum of senior detectives is known as the Cross 
Channel Intelligence Conference (CCIC).
1152
 Detective branches from Dutch and 
Belgian police forces, particularly those from shipping ports such as Rotterdam, also 
regularly attend the meetings.
1153
 Johnson reported in 2002 that CCIC working groups 
meetings consisted of members of the Dutch national police, the Belgian federal 
police, the Rotterdam Police, and the UK NCS and NCIS as well as representative 
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As part of the CCIC initiative, the Kent Police established its own European Liaison 
Unit (ELU) to deal with enquiries concerning investigations of a cross-channel 
nature.
1155
 Members of the liaison unit were usually fluent French speakers or could 
avail of an intensive language training programme.
1156
 An innovative ‘Police Speak’ 
project was even developed by the participants to encourage officers to remove 
ambiguous words from voice and written communications.
1157
 The English word 
‘attend’, for example, was to be avoided, as it could be confused with the French word 
‘attendre’ which means ‘to wait’.1158 Direct cooperation through the CCIC was 
reportedly quite successful leading to the coordination of numerous surveillance 




Sheptycki’s seminal research indicates that much of the CCIC’s work is small-scale in 
nature, usually involving the investigation of forged documents, counterfeit materials 
and vehicle thefts.
1160
 He reported that after the discovery of a number of bodies in an 
airtight container in Dover in 2000, within 24 hours numerous intelligence meetings 
had been held between the Kent Constabulary, the Dutch national police and various 
prosecutors.
1161
 The subsequent investigation involved the secondment of officers and 
the exchange of letters of request pertaining to mobile phone data, CCTV footage, 
documents seized during property searches in both countries, forensic evidence of 
shoeprints, cigarette butts and grocery receipts from purchases, eventually leading to a 
number of convictions in both the Netherlands and the UK.
1162
 Guille reports that 
English police forces frequently use the Kent liaison bureau to contact counterparts in 





To a similar extent, Danish police forces participate in the Nordic Police and Customs 
Cooperation Group (Politi-og Toldsamarbejde I Norden) (PTN), which was 
established in 1984.
1164
 Initially the PTN involved regular scheduled meetings of the 
major drug investigation police units in the Nordic countries, known as the ‘E6 
meetings’, but its remit quickly expanded to cover other areas of organised crime.1165 
One of the major initiatives of the Group was to coordinate and share all of their 
liaison officers stationed in embassies abroad. The foreign liaison officers, known as 
‘Nordic’ liaison officers are expected to represent the interests of any of the Nordic 
States if requested.
1166
 There are approximately 33 Nordic liaison police officers 
stationed in 17 countries throughout the world, 9 of which are Danish police 
officers.
1167
 The Group also participates in a Task Force on Organised Crime in the 
Baltic Sea Region which was established by the foreign ministers of the Nordic States 
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as well as those of Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia in 1996 in order to 
facilitate greater police and judicial cooperation. The Nordic countries, in particular, 
are attractive markets for synthetic drugs and counterfeit goods trafficked from the 
Eastern Baltic region due to the high prices that they can achieve in Scandinavia.
1168
 
The Baltic Sea Taskforce reportedly contributed to the establishment of a Nordic 
Baltic Police Academy in 1997 to enhance the capacity of the Baltic States’ police 




Various other regions in Europe also have similar arrangements in place, not least the 
Benelux States. A much lauded example is a working group established by municipal 
police chiefs from the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany within the Aachen border 
region or ‘Euro-region’ in 1969.1170 Known as NeBeDeAg-Pol (the Netherlands, 
Belgian, Deutsch, Aachen Police Venture), the working group of police chiefs 
established direct telex and radio connections between police stations, held regular 
intelligence meetings, appointed liaison officers for particular crime types, published 
local procedures for arranging hot pursuit and surveillance and even ran language 
courses for police officers.
1171
 Spapens indicates that the Dutch-Belgian-German 
border region is inflicted with marauding criminal gangs known for specialising in 




In more recent years, the Belgian, Dutch and German police forces established a joint 
Police Information and Communication Centre (EPICC) within the Euro-region 
pursuant to the Benelux Convention on Police Cooperation and the Treaty of 
Enschede.
1173
 The latter Treaty of Enschede was formed in particular to allow for 
German police officers to cross into the Netherlands without authorisation in the event 
of a major disaster within the border area in order to assist with crowd control, traffic 
management and search and rescue.
1174
 It also encouraged Dutch courts to handle 
requests for mutual police assistance and evidence exchanges from German police 
within the border region in a similar fashion to requests received from the other 
Benelux States.
1175
 Staffed with liaison officers and intelligence analysts, the EPICC 
serves to rapidly process requests for assistance and facilitates structured intelligence 
sharing on forms of criminality affecting the border area.
1176
 Since 2005, Benelux, 
German and French police forces in the Aachen border region have also been 
participating in joint motorway patrols, known as Joint Hit Teams (JHT) on the roads 
exiting the Netherlands in order to catch ‘drug tourists’ trying to smuggle drugs into 
the surrounding countries.
1177
 A network of prosecutors from the respective countries 
was also established to stimulate further collaboration, known as the Bureau Euro-
region Samenwerking (BES).
1178
 Fijnaut and Spapens note that there have been talks 
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Joint police stations have also become increasingly popular throughout continental 
Europe. A Belgian police force operates a joint police station with a neighbouring 
German police force in the border area of Eupen and with French police in the border 
area of Courtrai.
1180
 Similarly, France and Germany established a Police and Customs 
Cooperation Centre (PCCC) at Kehl on foot of the Mondorf Agreement 1997.
1181
 
Staffed with some 65 officers, the Kehl station carries out a mainly administrative 
function, enabling each of the seconded officers to access their own domestic 
databases of police records, stolen items, counterfeit documents, fingerprints and 
DNA samples so that information can be exchanged rapidly.
1182
 Felsen reports that the 
Franco-German Saarbrucken agreement had previously led to the development of 
compatible radio networks and multi-lingual joint border control stations at Kehl, 




Although the detective bureaus at the Irish land border do not participate in a 
permanent formal cross-border policing taskforce along the lines of the Kent CCIC or 
the Euro-region EPICC, they have formed case-specific taskforces which meet on a 
weekly or monthly basis until the relevant case is resolved.
1184 
On a more regular 
basis, detectives often travel across the border to hold informal meetings on a case by 
case basis.
1185 
Due to the fact that terrorist bombings, shootings, bank robberies, 
currency counterfeiting, fuel smuggling, car thefts, gun-running, drug trafficking and 
human trafficking are frequently perpetrated by criminals and criminal groups 
residing in one jurisdiction but operating in the other, it is not unheard of for 
detectives from the serious crime and counter-terrorism bureaus to cross the border 
several times a month to discuss cases.
1186 
One RUC border superintendent was 
known to travel south of the border up to 10 times a month in the early 1980s, visiting 
stations all across the border to generate cooperation, before he was murdered by the 
IRA during one such border crossing.
1187
 Throughout the 1970s and ‘80s it was not 
unheard of for detectives to keep suspects that were wanted by the neighbouring 
police force under surveillance until they crossed the border at which point the 




Detectives from the Irish Police and the PSNI continue to depend heavily on informal 
bilateral relationships and ad hoc meetings to share intelligence and coordinate cross-
border investigations.
1189
 The absence of a legal framework along the lines of the 
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Schengen Convention means that unless detectives go through the highly impractical 
and bureaucratic process of submitting and securing a letter of request for the 
purposes of a short meeting, they must ordinarily cross the border as a civilian without 
any police powers or immunities.
1190
 The procedure is not unusual since numerous 
police officers travel across Europe in a similar civilian capacity, without any official 
status or letter of request, in order to discuss cases with foreign police officers and 
magistrates before instigating formal cross-border police cooperation. However it is 
slightly more peculiar in the sense that it has long been popular on continental Europe 
for border areas to have networks and legal frameworks in place to stimulate and 
facilitate structured cooperation within the border zone. There are effectively no broad 
mechanisms designed to oversee the regular but haphazard conduct of cross-border 
policing at the Irish land border. 
 
The disparate forms of cross-border police liaison throughout Europe ultimately show 
that the Europol liaison bureau is little other than a bit-part player. The Europol 
liaison bureau appears to be one of a number of multi-lateral liaison constructs and, 
more particularly, relatively marginal to the needs of the police forces within the 
English Channel, Benelux, Nordic and Baltic regions. Anderson conveys that the 
academic practice of conceptualising cross-border policing through the lens of a 
centralised-state model versus a purely decentralised-state model tends to erroneously 
and illogically place informal or direct embassy-based bilateral liaison in competition 
with formal or institutional Europol-based liaison.
1191
 He conveys that, to the 
contrary, bilateral and international forms of liaison should not be perceived to be in 
conflict but complementary to one another.
1192
 Bilateral cooperation through 
embassy-based police officers or through simple border meetings facilitates direct and 
flexible communication and information exchange whereas international institutional 
structures such as Europol can play a crucial intelligence analysis and coordinating 
role.
1193





A major concern from an accountability and transparency perspective is that the EU 
has not taken substantive steps to enhance the transparency or quality of the informal 
structures and processes in place at the land borders throughout Europe. The EU has 
promoted the virtues of its Europol construct while effectively leaving a significant 
volume of cross-border police cooperation to be conducted in relative ‘low visibility’. 
The EU should clearly conduct a major ‘rethink’ of its approach to information 
sharing within the EU so that a vast expanse of police liaison is not being neglected in 
favour of promoting the virtues of a single intelligence agency in The Hague. Europol 
clearly has an important role to play but so too do a number of bilateral networks and 
mechanisms throughout Europe. It is remarkable that the EU has not done more to 
enhance the transparency and accountability of such constructs that are at once so 
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Mutual police assistance & joint investigation teams 
 
The EU’s novel framework for Joint Investigation Teams (JIT) has gained remarkably 
little traction within the Member States. In total, only 40 EU JITs were established 
between 2004 and 2009 across the entire 27 Member States.
1195
 A considerable 
number of the JITs were established bilaterally between France and Spain as part of 
their investigations into ETA.
1196
 More particularly, Block observes that almost all of 
the JITs were bilateral collaborations between no more than 2 countries, raising 
questions about the capacity of the JIT framework to facilitate ground-breaking multi-





Block indicates that the general avoidance of the JIT instrument is due largely to the 
fact that the JIT provisions were belatedly included in the Mutual Assistance 
Convention 2000 without any significant feasibility studies being conducted.
1198
 He 
suggests that very little effort was made to accommodate the conventional legal rules 
and values of the constituent police forces across the EU area.
1199
 Instead, the 
initiative was included largely upon the recommendation of the German government 
and modelled by and large on the German JITs used across the separate Lander.
1200
 
Since the JIT framework did not fit the working practices of various Member States, 





The UK’s experience in particular has been indicative of the unappealing aspects of 
the JIT construct. One of the UK’s first engagements with the new EU measure was 
the establishment of a JIT between the now defunct National Crime Squad (NCS) and 
the Dutch police force.
1202
 The NCS, which has since been replaced by the National 
Crime Agency (NCA), was in the course of investigating a drug-trafficking network 
and had identified a number of persons in the Netherlands intimately connected to the 
case. The prosecution of the London-based members of the network did not depend 
upon the assistance of the Dutch Police.
1203
 However following a number of failed 
attempts by various EU Presidencies to establish a successful JIT, the Netherlands and 
the UK Governments were actively encouraging their respective police forces to 




The NCS duly made contact with the relevant Dutch police force, discussed the merits 
of a JIT and subsequently submitted a formal letter of request to establish a JIT so that 
officers from the NCS could participate in a communication interception operation by 
the local Dutch Police.
1205
 As per the JIT Framework Decision, following the 
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acceptance of the letter of request the participants had to negotiate a JIT Agreement 
which was to include details on the composition of the team, time limits, locations, 
foreign participants, their entitlements and ownership of information amongst other 
issues. However during the negotiation of the Agreement, the NCS learned that its 
seconded detectives could be required to fully disclose their knowledge of the main 
English investigation at a subsequent Dutch criminal trial.
1206
 As standard, a judge in 
the UK can permit the non-disclosure of police information in the interests of 
safeguarding an ongoing covert surveillance operation under the principle of public 
interest immunity (PII) but the legal protocol in the Netherlands was less clear cut. 
There was immediate concern that the possibility of having to disclose operational 




The English participants subsequently decided to second officers to the Netherlands 
who had limited knowledge of the ongoing drugs case in the UK. The seconded 
officers were briefed only on non-sensitive issues.
1208
 Any sensitive information was 
classified and sent through Europol so that the sources of information could be 
protected by virtue of the diplomatic immunity of Europol’s own staff.1209 In 
hindsight, it would have been far more straightforward if the English detectives had 
instead sent a simple letter of request to the Dutch police to carry out a 
communication interception on its behalf. The seconded officers had no knowledge of 
the case and were therefore unable to exchange working intelligence.
1210
 Their 
presence in the Netherlands was effectively a token gesture in order to meet the 
requirements of a JIT. 
 
Fijnaut’s research indicates that the JIT construct is largely impractical for police 
cooperation within the Benelux States for the simple fact that the Benelux police 
forces have long avoided using formal written letters of request where possible.
1211
 
Fijnaut observes that since the Benelux Treaty 1962 encouraged prosecutors and 
courts to exchange letters of request directly, prosecutors have become accustomed to 
making oral requests instead of using formal letters.
1212
 Prosecutors have long treated 
requests from other areas of Benelux by analogy, as if such requests had come from 
the local police force or prosecution service. Moreover, secondments are typically 
facilitated by way of ‘travel orders’ which enable police officers to enter the 
neighbouring jurisdiction under the command of the local police force and enjoy the 
same legal privileges and liabilities as officers from that State.
1213
 Den Boer notes that 
the Benelux system works relatively harmoniously because Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg have been harmonising or ‘tuning’ their basic criminal laws, 
investigative procedures and professional practice for the purposes of cross-border 
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The same is largely true of the Nordic States which introduced a Nordic Police 
Cooperation Agreement 1972 and a Nordic Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement 
1974. The two agreements essentially established enhanced variations of the CoE 
Mutual Assistance Convention 1959, along the same lines of the Benelux Treaty 
1962.
1215
 Although the 1972 Agreement was revised in 2002 with new guidance on 
EU Joint Investigation Teams, Danish police prosecutors generally use the traditional 
processes to secure foreign warrants through simple oral applications meaning that the 
JIT framework loses much of its appeal.
1216
 Like the Benelux States, the EU JIT 
construct only becomes relevant in practice when the Nordic countries engage in 
cooperation with a police force outside of Scandinavia.  
 
Denmark has participated in 9 JITs between 2002 and 2012, almost all of which 
involved the German police force responsible for the region or Land of Schleswig-
Holstein which straddles the land border with Denmark. Danish detectives attached to 
the Danish police district of South Jutland frequently travel across the border to 
Schleswig-Holstein to assist the local police during surveillance operations.
1217
 JITs 
are considered to be particularly useful due to the simple fact that Schleswig-Holstein 
was historically a contested area, changing hands between Denmark and Germany on 
a number of occasions dating back to the Middle Ages, while remaining home to 





By and large, instead of utilising the EU JIT framework a number of Member States 
appear to have reformulated some of its key concepts through alternative 
measures.
1219
 Spapens indicates that some investigators from the Benelux States have 
creatively generated an overarching letter of request, renewable every month, which 
enables investigative actions to be carried out without the need for multiple letters of 
request and, most importantly, without actually committing resources towards 
establishing a joint case file, a joint command or the secondment of officers.
1220
 
Similarly, Ireland moved in 2008 to develop its own bespoke legal framework for 
specific forms of joint investigation. The Irish Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) 
Act 2008 enables the Irish police force to choose between establishing a JIT or more 
simply to invite foreign officers to Ireland to participate in operations, particularly 
controlled deliveries, whilst affording them the full immunities and liabilities outlined 
in the JIT Act. The 2008 Act explicitly provides that the novel secondment provisions 
outlined in the EU JIT Framework Decision, which provide for police powers, 
immunities and liabilities, shall be applied to officers who are seconded outside of the 
JIT framework.
1221
 Ireland effectively copied the successful formula used in the JIT 
Framework Decision and applied it to a separate bespoke mode of cooperation. 
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To a similar extent, the UK’s Police Reform Act 2002 somewhat presciently 
described an ‘international joint investigation team’ as any team or taskforce 
established pursuant not only to the EU Mutual Assistance Convention but to any 
other EU instrument, the Schengen Convention, the Council of Europe Convention on 
Mutual Assistance or any international agreement to which the UK was party.
1222
 The 
UK’s broader conceptualisation reflected the fact that the CoE Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters 1959, the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance and 
Cooperation between Customs Authorities 1997, known as the Naples II Convention, 
and the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2000, had all 
established vague legal bases for joint investigation teams, and most importantly, had 
all preceded the EU JIT initiative.
1223
 It effectively ensured that the concept of a ‘joint 
investigation team’ was not monopolised by the EU JIT construct. Remarkably, the 
EU Commission requested the Government to legislate specifically for the EU JIT 
with greater legal clarity but its overtures were refused by the Home Secretary who 
issued a more informal and flexible Circular to clarify the manner in which the EU 




Ireland, for its part, has completely eschewed the EU JIT instrument in practice. 
Detectives from the Garda Siochana and the PSNI continue to exchange traditional 
letters of request when undertaking ‘parallel’ investigations, without the establishment 
of a joint command and the formal secondment of officers. Parallel investigations 
have reportedly led to numerous drug seizures, counterfeit currency seizures, weapon 
finds and arrests in recent years.
1225
 The British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly 
reported in 2009 that even though no EU JITs have been established in Ireland, 
cooperation at the border was ‘excellent’, based on the informal home-grown 
communication channels and working relationships built up between the police 
stations and detective departments on both sides of the border.
1226 
Ireland typically 
adopts the same ethos in respect of cross-border police investigations with other 
jurisdictions, opting for parallel investigations over and above formal joint 
investigations. The Irish Police frequently undertakes property searches, 
communication interceptions and surveillance operations on foot of information and 




The main problem with parallel investigations, from a transparency and accountability 
perspective, is that the absence of an overarching taskforce which works to establish 
and maintain joint intelligence files and joint plans means that police officers might 
naively or negligently omit to share crucial intelligence and information.
1228
 As Walsh 
points out a parallel investigation could fail where a single JIT could have 
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 Moreover, it raises the issue of responsibility. In the absence of a joint 
command, both police forces might naively assume that the other is putting 
considerable resources into the investigation and prosecution of specific individuals. 
Critically, there were significant criticisms over the parallel investigations pursued by 
the Irish and Northern Irish police forces into the terrorist bombing of Omagh in 1998 
which was designed to derail the Good Friday Peace Agreement 1998.
1230
 Critics 
claimed that intelligence sharing both before and after the attack was sporadic and 
haphazard exposing the disjointed nature of police cooperation at the border.
1231
 The 
Patten Commission stated that the Belgian response to the aftermath of the Heysel 
stadium disaster in 1985 exemplified a much more appropriate style of joint 
investigation since it involved the immediate secondment of officers and the 
establishment of a defacto joint command.
1232
 Mulcahy reports that interviews with 
Northern Ireland police officers in the 1990s suggested that the Garda Siochana’s 
contribution to Northern Irish criminal cases was considerably ‘small’ in reality.1233 
 
One of the Patten Commission’s terms of reference was to make recommendations to 
enhance police cooperation across the Irish border.
1234
 Its final report was 
unsurprisingly critical.
 
The Commission categorically found that the respective police 
forces and governments were not doing enough to exploit the scope for structured 
cooperation in comparison with other European police forces.
1235
 It recommended the 
immediate establishment of a joint database concerning cross-border criminality, the 
interoperability of relevant IT and communication systems, the posting of liaison 
officers from each service to the neighbouring forces, the development of a joint 
disaster plan and the introduction of joint training regimes.
1236
 Many of its 
recommendations mirrored the work programme outlined in the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement 1985 which had called for the development of work programmes to 
facilitate the exchange of information; joint threat assessments; coordinated 
operations and the secondment of liaison officers amongst other initiatives.
1237
 
Regrettably, although both governments established working groups to consider the 
Patten recommendations, the only recommendations that were subsequently 
developed through to fruition was the development of a joint disaster plan in 2002 and 
a cooperative training framework in 2003.
1238
 However, both initiatives were 
considerably lacking in substance. The joint disaster plan was developed following a 
one-day exercise while the training regime set out in the Garda Siochana Act 2003 
resulted in only one long-term officer secondment by the end of 2010. 
 
It is submitted that the establishment of a permanent taskforce between the Irish and 
Northern Irish Police forces along the lines of the Anglo-French CCIC, the Benelux 
EPICC or the Benelux-German NeBeDeAgPol, would greatly enhance the 
transparency and accountability of the detectives responsible for investigating and 
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prosecuting cross-border crime in Ireland. Such a taskforce should compile joint 
intelligence dossiers, develop threat assessments, draw up coordinated strategies, 
monitor the establishment of joint investigations and, most importantly, publish 
periodic reports on its successes and challenges. Where the police chiefs could 
previously point to the lack of legislation to underpin such a construct, the EU JIT 
provisions and the secondment provisions within the Garda Siochana Act 2005 and 
the Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008 can all be used to underpin the 
effective establishment of such a taskforce.  
 
Although the JIT framework is unattractive to police forces in the Nordic and Benelux 
regions because they enjoy more fluid forms of cooperation, it appears to be 
particularly suitable in the Irish context. As Walsh conveys, JITs could be used to 
facilitate a modicum of formal cooperation, transparency and accountability where 
none exists.
1239
 At the very least, the establishment of a JIT at the Irish land border 
would give the appearance that something was being done and enable members of the 
public to scrutinise the performance of their police forces to a minimal extent.
1240
 The 
fact that Europol analysts were seconded to Ireland to assist with the forensic analysis 
of an illicit counterfeit currency production laboratory in 2010 and again in 2012 to 
assist with the collation of intelligence as part of a ‘parallel’ Garda and PSNI 
investigation into cross-border prostitution and human trafficking suggests that the 
respective detective bureaus and police chiefs recognise the benefits of joint 
intelligence collation.
1241
 A more formal, permanent construct could greatly enhance 
transparency and accountability on a day-to-day basis. 
 
The EU JIT construct evidently ranks amongst the most unfavourable forms of joint 
investigation available to the Member States’ police forces. Den Boer remarks that the 
JIT instrument is symbolic of the growing sentiment amongst practitioners that the 
EU’s measures are overly bureaucratic and, in many cases, barely workable.1242 Any 
potential future moves by the EU to force cooperation through the use of JITs would 
be unwise considering the fact that many police forces can deal with an array of cases 
using much simpler, more responsive and faster channels of communication. For the 
EU to prescribe mandatory cooperation through JITs would presumably encourage 
police officers to pay lip serve to the construct, while continuing to engage in cross-
border cooperation through more creative casual and informal means.  
 
One of the most pressing concerns from an accountability and transparency 
perspective is that the EU appears to be promoting a largely unwanted marquee 
construct while leaving a vast field of investigative cooperation largely unregulated, 
disjointed and opaque. The EU’s prioritisation of the JIT instrument seems 
remarkably misplaced considering the vast practices and processes of cross-border 
police cooperation that it is leaving marginalised and untended. It appears that the EU 
measure was designed to enhance the ‘image’ of the EU’s security measures over and 
above the needs of the Member State police forces since the measure tried to 
monopolize the concept of ‘joint investigation teams’ without actually affecting the 
conduct of all other forms of joint investigation teams, whether loosely structured 
parallel investigations or formal networks such as the CCIC. It is submitted that the 
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EU should be focusing not on introducing grandiose, exhibitionistic measures such as 
the EU JIT but should be focusing more particularly on enhancing the transparency, 
accountability and, by extension, the effectiveness of the broader field of investigative 
cooperation. It should arguably be focusing on encouraging the development of 
regional networks across Europe and, most importantly, require such taskforces to 
regularly publish details about their successes as well as their challenges. Such 
openness and transparency would undoubtedly help to foster greater feelings of 
security and safety amongst the public and would enable the legislature to take clear 




Although the Europol and JIT constructs represent the EU’s marquee initiatives in the 
area of cross-border policing both measures affect only a relatively small volume of 
police cooperation. Europol does not systematically receive the volume of intelligence 
that it was designed to process and the Member States’ detective departments, 
particularly the counter terrorism bureaus, continue to share vast quantities of 
information and intelligence bilaterally. JITs, on the other hand, are a relatively 
marginal form of investigative cooperation. Although the previous chapter outlined 
that the EU measures appeared at face value to be regulating the different forms of 
police cooperation within Europe they are considerably marginal in reality.  
 
Of particular concern is the fact that the EU’s cross-border policing strategy revolves 
around the two marquee constructs without much concern for the tangential forms of 
informal and home-grown police cooperation. In other words, the EU appears to have 
hedged its bets with the Europol and JIT initiatives despite the evidence suggesting 
that, although they are useful in various respects, they do not meet some of the basic 
needs of police officers and are habitually being avoided. Although the EU 
institutions are tasked to enhance police cooperation within the EU area it is 
remarkable that they seem to be avoiding responsibility for the quality of other forms 
of police cooperation. The EU seems to be interested only in promoting those 
frameworks that attach the ‘EU label’ which suggests that it values political ‘image’ 
over police conduct and accountability in practice. 
 
It is submitted that the EU needs to rethink its approach to cross-border policing and 
embrace the ethos of the Member States’ approaches to criminal procedure. In line 
with the spirit of PACE, RIPA and Public Order Acts, the EU should seek to 
accommodate and, most importantly, regulate all of the different procedural courses 
of action that a police officer can choose in the context of cross-border policing. The 
UK Acts and the similar Danish AJA serve to accommodate police discretion or 
choice while engendering a high standard of conduct which, in turn, greatly facilitates 
accountability. To realise a similar ethos at the transnational or supranational level, 
the EU must extend its gaze far beyond the Europol and JIT constructs to focus on 
enhancing the standards of other forms of investigative police cooperation, not least 
the temporary and permanent regional taskforces established bilaterally between the 
Member States’ police forces. It could clearly do so through codes of ethics, 
procedural codes and mechanisms of oversight and inquiry. 
 
It appears that the EU institutions cannot claim to have ‘established’ cross-border 
police cooperation in line with Article 87 of the Lisbon Treaty for they have left the 
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vast field of cross-border police cooperation largely untended. Moreover, the narrow 
measures that the EU has introduced have not been widely co-opted by the Member 
States’ police forces in practice. The EU has only established measures with a limited 
scope and marginal impact. The next chapter will proceed to examine the extent to 
which the EU regime holds police officers and relevant policy officials accountable 
for the conduct of cross-border police cooperation in Europe, whether within the 







Ch. 5 Complaint and inquiry as EU law and policy 
 
This chapter will address whether and to what extent the EU has developed 
mechanisms that require police officers, policy makers and the institutions to which 
they belong to explain, justify and answer for their conduct through disciplinary, legal 
and democratic means. As the thesis has already outlined, the enhancement of police 
accountability is not one of the five primary cross-border policing objectives outlined 
in the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty appears to prioritise the operational 
objectives of enhancing information collation, the development of common 
investigative techniques, the development of operational measures, the empowerment 
of Europol and the coordination of police training over and above the accountability 
of the police officers engaging in cross-border police cooperation. To echo Herbert 
Packer’s famous model, the EU treaties appear to prioritise the ‘ends’ or objectives of 
crime control over and above the ‘means’ of due process.1243 
 
Cursory research undertaken by Den Boer in 2002 and 2010 indicates that the EU has 
not absorbed the mechanisms or ethos of legal accountability and democratic 
accountability in line with conventional values.
1244
 Harfield reached a similar tentative 
conclusion in a journal article on transnational investigations in Europe in 2011.
1245
 
Their arguments centred around the fact that the EU Member States have 
marginalised the role of the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament in 
cross-border policing matters. Such observations are not difficult to make considering 
the fact that neither the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) nor the 
European Parliament were afforded substantive roles in cross-border matters in the 
original Maastricht Treaty or in the subsequent Europol Convention introduced 
pursuant to it. The reasons for their omission will be analysed in the sections on legal 
and democratic accountability. 
 
The chapter will proceed to draw direct correlations between the conventional legal 
and constitutional values of the Member States and the nature of the maturing EU 
project. Most importantly, it will critically evaluate the ability of the extant signalling 
mechanisms to deliver police accountability in light of the EU ‘codes’ in place and the 
prevailing degree of police ‘co-option’ on the ground in the Member States. The 
chapter will address whether and to what extent the general norms of democratic 
scrutiny and legal and administrative accountability apply effectively to EU cross-
border cooperation and, more particularly, whether and to what extent cross-border 
cooperation is being conducted under the close executive control of police chiefs, 
ministers and civil servants to the exclusion of public input. To facilitate comparisons 
with the chapter on complaint and inquiry at the national level the same analytical 




The analysis of the mechanisms of disciplinary accountability at the national level 
indicated that police management, particularly sergeants and inspectors, are crucial 
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for determining whether and to what extent police officers adhere to high moral, 
ethical and legal standards of conduct. By consistently disciplining officers for 
malpractice or by habitually covering up for persistent malpractice, police 
management effectively establishes a ‘sense of permission’ or ‘perception of reality 
and purpose’ of what is acceptable conduct. Police managers essentially play a large 
part in shaping the types of choices made by police officers. Foucault’s observation 
that how a person conducts himself or ‘behaves’ is determined to a significant extent 
by the manner in which the person is conducted or ‘directed and regulated’ by 




Moreover, the thesis showed that the modern codes of procedure coupled with the 
relatively recent evolution of civilian complaints bodies replete with investigative 
powers have served to narrow the discretionary field. The same ethos should arguably 
hold true for cross-border police cooperation. Surely the establishment of an external 
agency for the purposes of supervision and review is crucial to ensure that police 
officers and managers conduct themselves according to prescriptive standards instead 
of eschewing them in favour of more secretive approaches which engender loyalty 
and job security over and above honesty and accountability. To a similar extent, 
surely a normative code of ethics and programmatic procedural codes are required to 
set standards of conduct against which police actions or inactions can be measured.  
 
Remarkably, the EU has made no attempt of note to ensure that cross-border policing 
is being carried out according to such standards. Europol’s Management Board is 
largely responsible for setting Europol’s administrative priorities and ensuring that the 
agency’s Director subsequently achieves them. However there are no mechanisms of 
sanction or reprimand to ensure that Member State police forces submit fulsome 
intelligence to Europol rather than vague intelligence files which can amount to little 
more than a few pages. With respect to the Schengen and JIT constructs, police 
officers temporarily visiting another Member State, whether engaged in a hot pursuit 
pursuant to the Schengen Convention or as part of a Joint Investigation Team, are 
simply to be treated as police officers of that State with respect to any offences 
committed by them. Instances of misconduct such as discourtesy and disobeying 
instructions are to be dealt with primarily by the errant police officer’s domestic 
police force.
1247
 It is expected that any forms of misconduct will be reported in the 
post-operation report and exchanged between commanders so that disciplinary action 





Although Europol publishes an annual report and the officers involved in Schengen 
pursuits and JITs are required to submit a post-operation report, a major problem from 
an accountability perspective is that no notable internal or external mechanisms of 
supervision and review exist to convincingly ensure that substandard, unethical or 
unlawful practice is brought to light. As outlined in the chapter on complaint and 
inquiry within the Member States, the weight of evidence indicates that police 
managers and their subordinates have a tendency to eschew legal and procedural 
probity in the interests of self-preservation and noble-cause corruption in the absence 
of systematic supervision and control. To all intents and purposes, police officers can 
                                                 
1246
 See Foucault (n284) xix to xxiv, 193 
1247




systematically flout the rules and principles of the Europol and JIT constructs with a 
considerable degree of impunity.  
 
It is submitted that the EU needs to do much more to hold police forces to account for 
the quality of their cooperation. More particularly, the EU needs to extend its gaze 
beyond the Europol, Schengen and JIT measures to ensure that police officers are 
systematically conducting themselves ethically, lawfully and transparently when 
engaging in more informal forms of bilateral and regional cooperation. The EU does 
not need to go to the extent of imposing financial sanctions but the mere application 
of a code of ethics, the introduction of a duty to publish reports or the establishment of 
an agency for procedural oversight would greatly enhance the transparency and 
accountability of cross-border policing. The new Standing Committee on Internal 
Security (CoSI), for example, is not concerned with the general procedural oversight 
of police officers on the ground but with ensuring that the EU agencies such as 
Europol, Eurojust and Frontex are meeting their objectives and are cooperating with 
one another in line with the relevant treaties and legal frameworks. 
 
Remarkably the EU has not sought to enhance the transparency or accountability of 
cross-border police cooperation in the EU by introducing any of the suggested 
measures. Instead it has introduced its marquee Europol and JIT constructs which it 
continues to promote instead of addressing the much wider expanse of investigative 
cooperation. It seems incredible that the Council of Europe introduced a Code of 
Police Ethics in 2001 enumerating some 65 principles ranging from human rights to 
public consultation, civilian oversight and parliamentary accountability but that the 
EU, which is the institution tasked with enhancing cross-border policing and has the 
legal authority to make such a code legally binding, has avoided taking such 
measures. It is submitted that the EU approach to cross-border policing needs a major 
rethink in order to engender transparency and accountability across the popular forms 
of police cooperation which have remarkably lacked such attentiveness thus far. 
Before moving to examine the issues of legal and democratic accountability, the thesis 
will further argue that the EU could potentially take some novel steps in the 
concomitant areas of police training and the coordination of national investigative 
agencies in order to engender higher standards of officer conduct and by extension 
greater transparency and accountability. 
 
National coordination of police cooperation 
 
It is submitted that one way that the EU could enhance the transparency and 
accountability of cross-border policing is to require the national agencies that are 
responsible for cross-border policing to adhere to clear reporting requirements. The 
chapter will show that such an endeavour should not be considerably difficult since 
remarkably similar national structures have evolved in England, Ireland and Denmark 
which direct and control cross-border policing activities across the respective 
jurisdictions. The respective national agencies have evolved in two areas, namely 
serious and organised crime and counter-terrorism. The national functions in the area 
of serious and organised crime are carried out by the National Crime Agency (NCA) 
in England, the National Bureau of Criminal Investigation (NBCI) in Ireland and the 
NEC Serious Crime Squad in Denmark. In the area of counter-terrorism, the national 
function is the responsibility of the London Metropolitan Police Counter-Terrorism 
Command (SO15) in England, the Special Detective Unit (SDU) in Ireland and the 
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PET in Denmark. Although the agencies have undergone various reconstructions in 
recent years, each agency has a rich history and has enjoyed a relatively stable 
function over time.  
 
In general, a degree of national coordination and priority setting is considered to be 
crucial to counteract drug trafficking, human trafficking and terrorism since without 
them it can become unclear which detective bureau is responsible for taking the lead 
in investigating the major criminals and criminal networks that span multiple local 
police areas.
1249
 Moreover, detectives are reportedly far more disposed to 
investigating straight-forward cases that can bring a greater chance of success and 
plaudits rather than exerting considerable time and effort on resource intensive and 
challenging investigations. Furthermore, due to the relatively small chances of success 
in proportion to the financial resources and manpower needed to undertake a major 
investigation, police chiefs tend to be reluctant to allocate a tranche of the fixed police 
budget to a major investigation without being presented with convincing evidence or 
assurances that a conviction is likely. Ayling et al point out that detective bureaus are 
generally expected to present a financial ‘business case’ which outlines their plans for 
the case, with a particular emphasis on the expected financial costs involved.
1250
 
National oversight is also considered to be crucial for ensuring that ‘rivalries’ between 
detective bureaus do not cause information or cooperation to be withheld by 
detectives out of some misplaced sense of loyalty to their own colleagues and police 
chief.
1251 
Benyon et al note that rivalries are a long-standing feature of decentralised 
police forces, pointing to historic rivalries between the territorial police forces in 
England, the Police Judiciaire, PAF and Gendarmerie in France and the regional 




The national agencies not only help to clarify responsibilities but they also serve to 
collate intelligence in the various crime areas.
1253
 The National Intelligence Model 
(NIM) developed by English police forces, for example, requires police officers to 
designate whether case uploads to the national police computer are specific to the 
local area (level 1), whether they are of a regional nature (level 2) or whether they 
have national or cross-border dimensions (level 3).
1254
 Tasking and Coordination 
Groups (TCG) within each police force are typically required to develop crime 
analyses, threat assessments, targets, priorities and strategies across each of the three 
levels.
1255
 The respective national agencies focus particularly on collating level 2 and 
level 3 type intelligence in liaison with the TCGs in order to develop national 
overviews, threat assessments, strategies and develop ‘new intelligence’ by 




Although the concept of ‘intelligence-led’ policing is not new since detective bureaus 
have long relied on paper-based databases to identify linkages between cases and have 
long used crime occurrences to identify crime hotspots, the rapid evolution of new 
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computer technologies since the 1970s has enabled huge volumes of information to be 
stored, shared, accessed and searched to an unprecedented extent.
1257
 Bayley notes 
that the IT revolution not only assisted the agencies carrying out national functions 
but the evolutionary changes also naturally demanded the establishment of more 
‘centralised’ databases maintained by central intelligence analysis units and agencies 
so that such benefits could be exploited.
1258
 The London Metropolitan Police, for 
example, established a National Drugs Intelligence and Immigration Unit in the 1970s 
for the purposes of collating easily accessible case files to combat the growing flow of 
new hard drugs such as heroin into the UK.
1259
 Other major ‘national’ databases 
established within Scotland Yard included a National Office for the Suppression of 
Counterfeit Currency, a National Football Intelligence Unit (NFIU) to counteract 
football hooliganism, a Public Sector Corruption Index, a Paedophile Index and a 
National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU) amongst others. Sheptycki remarks that 
there was an almost simultaneous centralisation of intelligence processes and agencies 
in the spirt of ‘intelligence-led policing’ throughout Europe in the 1980s and ‘90s.1260 
Similarly, Den Boer comments that the new computer and information technologies 
had a major ‘centralising’ effect on police forces.1261  
 
In practice, in the area of serious and organised crime, the UK’s National Crime 
Agency (NCA) is responsible for coordinating ‘regional’ and ‘national’ investigations 
into organised crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, weapon trafficking, 
cybercrime and economic crime across the dozens of police divisions or Basic 
Command Units throughout England. Although the Agency was established in 2013, 
its basic functions were carried out by various agencies dating back to the 1960s. Its 
predecessors included the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in the 2000s, the 
National Crime Squad (NCS) and the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) 
in the 1990s, the Regional Crime Squads (RCS) in the 1970’s and ‘80s and the ‘flying 
squads’ of the London Metropolitan Police dating back to the 1830s.1262 In the latter 
respect, the central detective units within the capital cities of London, Dublin and 
Copenhagen all carried out an organic and highly pragmatic ‘national’ detective 




 The large volume of crime occurrences that 
they encountered coupled with a higher critical mass of police officers engendered 
vast repositories of criminal intelligence and highly-skilled detectives unknown 
elsewhere in the respective jurisdictions.
1264 
Expert detectives that were most 
amenable to travelling throughout the country to assist and bolster the investigative 





Each new ‘national’ agency established in England throughout the 20th Century 
effectively replaced, subsumed or amalgamated its predecessors. Most importantly, 
each construct was responsible, at the time, for effectively the same function. They 
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were each responsible for the collation of the intelligence files and criminal databases 
maintained by the local detective bureaus to ensure that police officers could access a 
single ‘master’ database and, most importantly that such intelligence work was used 
to coordinate investigations into high profile criminal networks.
1266 Each ‘national’ 
version in England, bar the numerous RCS initiatives, also housed the Interpol NCB, 




Until the establishment of the NCA in 2013, none of its predecessors had enjoyed any 
powers of direction and control over the disparate detective bureaus throughout 
England. The NCS, NCIS and RCS were largely administrative agencies designed to 
support the needs of the territorial police forces. They were expected to encourage 
detective bureaus to engage in cooperation based on a convincing intelligence file 
collated at the national level with the sweetener of a ring-fenced police budget 
provided by Parliament.
1268
 The nine original Regional Crime Squads (RCS) 
established in 1964 were essentially ad hoc bureaus of detectives who were seconded 
from the four to five police forces within a particular region in order to coordinate 
their investigations into the major organised crime networks active in the area.
1269
 
They were supervised by a management team which contained the participant chief 





The NCS, on the other hand, effectively amalgamated the remaining Regional Crime 
Squads into a national agency in 1997 but without the benefit of any authoritative 
powers to force cooperation to occur between the police territories.
1271
 The 
complementary NCIS, which was first established within Scotland Yard in 1991, was 
designed to focus predominantly on the collation and dissemination of level 2 and 
level 3 intelligence data.
1272 
Hebenton and Thomas indicate that the decision to 
establish the NCIS was undoubtedly inspired in part by the emerging calls at the 
European level for the establishment of national departments to engage with the 
proposed Europol project.
1273
 Scotland Yard already contained a number of 
functioning intelligence bureaus, not least the National Drugs Intelligence Unit 
(NDIU), so the NCIS was somewhat of a convenient label under which they could all 
be grouped together and eventually hived off into a more easily identifiable 
independent entity. Den Boer points out that each of the ‘national’ bureaus had long 
been geared predominantly towards national not international needs so even though 
the NCIS served to hive them off into a separate national entity by 1997 there was 
nothing to suggest that the primary domestic focus of the constituent units would 
change.
1274
 Levi suggests that the establishment of the NCIS and the NCS also had 
political importance for they gave the impression that something was being done 
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about organised crime at the national level and, most importantly, assumed a degree 




Most importantly, some unique powers were developed for SOCA in 2005. SOCA, 
which amalgamated the NCS and NCIS, was similarly bereft of any powers of 
direction and control but it could controversially bestow full police powers duties, 
privileges and immunities onto civilian investigators or experts employed by the 
Agency on a case by case basis.
1276 
The initiative was designed not to usurp the 
statutory powers and responsibilities of police officers but largely to enable civilian 
investigators with acute knowledge of a particular case, criminal or technical expertise 
to lawfully participate in operations under the guidance and instruction of detectives 
from a territorial police force.
1277
 Nevertheless, SOCA was abolished in 2013 for the 
primary reason that its investigations were was taking too long to complete, four years 
on average, as well as the fact that the value of criminal assets seized by the Agency 
within its first five years paled in comparison to the money invested in it.
1278
 In other 
words, SOCA was expected to do what the territorial police forces could not and often 
would not do and the Agency was supposed to do it quickly.  
 
The NCA, which has since subsumed SOCA, not only retained the novel features of 
its predecessor but the Director of the new agency was bestowed with the power to 
issue operational directions to any territorial police chief in England concerning the 
investigation of serious and organised crime.
1279
 The NCA Director General is also 
appointed by and can be dismissed by the Home Secretary who is also responsible for 
issuing strategic directions to the Agency.
1280
 This relatively undemocratic feature is 
far removed from the governance and oversight of the previous NCS and NCIS which 
were accountable to bespoke National Service Authorities which contained 
representatives from the territorial police forces.
1281 
The authority of the NCA is now 
comparable in many ways to the Irish Police force’s National Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation (NBCI), effectively moving the English policing model closer to the 
Irish model of a unitary, centralised police force. Nevertheless, as Ayling et al note, 
like many other police systems throughout Europe, the English system cannot be 
described as decentralised or centralised since the local system is designed to be 
highly decentralised, falling under local political influence and control, whereas the 
national agencies such as the NCA are considerably centralised, remote from intimate 
communal concerns.
1282
 A degree of nationalisation or centralisation is ultimately 
important for inter-force or inter-divisional cooperation whereas a complementary 




From an international perspective, the recent decision to bestow the NCA with powers 
of direction and control is not highly unusual since it brings the UK closer into line 
with Ireland but the Government must be careful not to continue down the Irish route 
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of eschewing local democratic accountability in favour of a highly centralised, remote 
police force. More particularly, the decision to bestow the NCA with executive 
powers of direction and control does not appear to be directly attributable to any 
particular EU initiative but rather appears to be the consequence of a litany of failed 
experimental ‘national’ constructs designed to engender police cooperation dating 
back to the 1970s. 
 
Denmark, for its part, maintains a similar national criminal investigation department 
known as the Nationalt Efterforsknings-Stottecentre (NEC) within the National Police 
Commissioner’s headquarters (Rigspolitiet).1284 The Serious Crime Squad within the 
NEC is responsible for encouraging the different police forces to cooperate in relevant 
cases of serious crime, to develop national overviews of serious crime occurrences 
and to respond to requests for investigative assistance from the police districts. Much 
like the UK’s NCIS, the NEC was effectively rebranded in 1997 in response to 
European calls to establish easily identifiable points of contact for the purposes of 
cross-border policing. The national agency was formerly known as the 
‘Kriminalpolitiet’ between 1938 and 1997.1285  
 
To a similar extent, the Irish Police transformed its long-standing Central Detective 
Unit (CDU) into the National Bureau of Criminal Investigation (NBCI) in 1997.
1286
 In 
essence, England, Denmark and Ireland all re-branded their national ‘ordinary crime’ 
detective bureaus in 1997. The UK formally established the NCS and NCIS, Denmark 
established the NEC and Ireland instituted the NCBI. They apparently did so in 
response to the EU’s Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime 1997 which called 
upon every EU police system to designate a ‘national’ point of contact for serious and 
organised crime enquiries.
1287
 Hebenton and Thomas state that the establishment of 
the units represented a marked centralisation of national policing system as a by-
product or ‘recoil effect’ of more enhanced cross-border police cooperation within the 
EU.
1288
 However the more in-depth analysis would indicate that the ‘national’ 
functions were carried out by other departments long before the 1990s. The effect of 
the EU initiative was merely to encourage police forces to either re-brand the relevant 
detective departments by attaching the word ‘national’ as a prefix to their existing title 
or by hiving off the departments’ functions into a separate national agency. 
 
With respect to counter-terrorism, the London Metropolitan Police has retained its 
national role for coordinating counter-terrorism investigations and the provision of 
counter-terrorism police training, a role it has carried out since the 1880s.
1289
 Known 
presently as the Counter Terrorism Command (SO15), it maintains a central 
intelligence database, coordinates and trains counter-terrorism officers stationed 
throughout the country and spear-heads the personal protection of both domestic and 
visiting dignitaries throughout the English mainland.
 1290
 Like its Irish counterparts, its 
officers do not have any coercive police powers that differ substantively from 
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‘ordinary crime’ detectives or rank-and-file constables.1291 It has unrivalled expertise 
in forms of terrorism and espionage aimed against the government and key 
institutions in London and maintains close links with the military intelligence security 
services (MI5, MI6 and GCHQ) which work to uncover and respond to terrorist 
networks and espionage emanating from abroad.
1292
 Following the rise of drug-related 
organised crime in the 1980s and the fact that much of the drug supply emanates from 
developing or failed States abroad, many of which are considered to be hotbeds of 
terrorism, the UK’s military security services have developed increasingly close links 
with the organised crime detective bureaus, particularly within Scotland Yard.
1293
 
Provision has been made in the Crime and Control Act 2013 to eventually transfer the 
LMP’s national Counter-Terrorism Command to the NCA upon the direction of the 
Home Secretary. 
 
To a similar extent, Ireland’s Special Branch or Special Detective Unit (SDU) has 
been a feature of the national police force since the force was first established in the 
1920s.
1294
 Like their English counterparts, the detectives’ unique status is denoted not 
by unique police powers but primarily by their expertise, skillset and focus.
1295
 The 
Irish Special Branch also cooperates particularly closely with the ‘ordinary crime’ 
NBCI due to the acute existence of an overlapping relationship between organised 
crime and terrorism in Ireland.
1296
 Bank robberies, fuel smuggling, counterfeit 
currency production, extortion, punishment beatings and shootings are frequently the 
responsibility of subversive organisations in order to fund and further their broader 
political aims. Anderson et al note that an intimate link between terrorist organisations 
and organised crime is a pervasive feature common to countries inflicted with home-
grown terrorist groups, not least Ireland and Spain.
1297
 Moreover, the national police 
detective bureaus are increasing forging relationships with their respective military 
intelligence services to combat the foreign sources of organised crime and 
terrorism.
1298
 The Irish and Danish special branches maintain close links with their 
national military intelligence agencies, the Irish Defence Force’s Directorate of 
Intelligence (G2) and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) respectively.  
 
Denmark’s centralised counter-terrorism agency, on the other hand, which is 
responsible for coordinating and training counter-terrorism officers within each police 
district, is the PET (Politiets Efterretnings Tjeneste) which dates back to 1951.
1299
 It is 
presently housed within the Rigspolitiet alongside the NEC. Unlike their English and 
Irish counterparts, Danish PET officers are denoted not only by their skillset in 
methods of surveillance, concealment, communication interceptions, hostage retrieval, 
explosives and VIP protection but they also enjoy some unique police powers.
1300
 
PET officers can, for instance, go to the extent of disrupting or disconnecting 
telecommunications without a warrant in order to foil the completion of a potentially 
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 They may also participate to a significant extent in criminality when 
operating as an undercover agent, subject to an extensive suite of regulations and 
guidelines.
1302
 Nevertheless, Walker remarks that such unique counter-terrorism 
powers are rarely called upon and are largely peripheral to the investigation of 
terrorism since it is the quality of information and intelligence garnered ‘locally’ from 
witnesses and informants and the basic police powers of search, seizure, surveillance 
and interception that typically play the most crucial part in investigating and 
preventing a terrorist attack.
1303
 It is the low-level intelligence that is habitually 
recorded by police patrolmen about the activities and utterances of recidivist criminals 
and their associates that is often crucial to intelligence-led policing.  
 
Denmark’s PET is directed and controlled by a Director General who, unusually, does 
not report to the National Police Commissioner but is appointed by and can be 
dismissed by the Minister for Justice.
1304
 The distinction serves to split the regulatory 
function between the National Police Commissioner in matters of ‘ordinary’ or 
‘general’ crime and the PET Director General in matters of ‘high’ or ‘specific’ crimes 
of relevance to national security to ensure that there is no confusion.
1305
 Although all 
Danish police officers are subject to regulations issued by the National Police 
Commissioner, the PET Director General may issue regulations pertaining strictly to 
PET officers concerning their exceptional statutory powers which are not shared by 
rank and file police officers.
1306
 The PET receives its own budget, publishes its own 
annual report and maintains an extensive website which contains information and 




More recently, a number of multi-disciplinary taskforces have been established in 
Denmark to enhance cooperation between the NEC and the PET. Taskforce East, for 
example, contains a number of detectives seconded from the NEC, PET and district 
police forces. It reportedly contributed to the conviction of over 250 low ranking 
organised crime gang members in 2011 and the arrest of a number of arms-traffickers 
in 2012.
1308
 Moreover, the detective units in the respective jurisdictions, both ordinary 
and special, have increasingly been able to call upon highly specialised tactical units 
which are maintained and trained by force headquarters on a permanent basis to carry 
out highly technical surveillance operations and dangerous operations such as 
barricade entry and hostage rescue. Denmark maintains a Police Action Force 
(Politiets Aktionsstyrke) which serves both ordinary and special crime detectives. 
Similar units are maintained by the Irish Police such as the Emergency Response Unit 
(ERU) and the National Surveillance Unit. The London Metropolitan Police has a 
Specialist Crime and Operations Unit (SCO19) amongst others. 
 
It is submitted that the EU could enhance the transparency and accountability of 
cross-border policing within Europe by simply focusing on enhancing the 
‘organisational responsibility’ of these particular national agencies. Each jurisdiction 
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appears, rather simply, to have one national agency for organised crime and one for 
counter-terrorism matters. The police officers assigned to the two agencies will often 
be the officers participating in EU JITs, engaging in secondments abroad, responding 
to requests from Europol analysts and preparing the case files for upload to Europol. 
Most importantly, it is these national agencies that invariably monitor and inform the 
police divisions and districts. Moreover, they are centrally involved in establishing 
and maintaining the informal channels and bilateral mechanisms for cross-border 
police cooperation that are important and largely inevitable to ensure rapid, 
appropriate and responsive police cooperation.  
 
Since the national agencies are responsible for coordinating investigations at the 
national level, they should have a clear view of the full extent of formal and informal 
police cooperation being carried out within the State. Moreover, police forces are 
increasingly amalgamating decentralised police forces to make the ‘national’ 
coordination function even simpler.
1309
 The amalgamations of police forces in 
England prior to 1974 and in Denmark in 2007 were designed in part to enhance the 
critical mass of rural police forces and, most importantly, to abolish force boundaries 





By virtue of enhancing the transparency and accountability of the national 
organisations the EU could, in effect, indirectly enhance the transparency and 
accountability of a large swathe of cross-border police cooperation within the Member 
States. Instead, the previous chapter conveyed that the national agencies appear to be 
withholding intelligence from Europol and avoiding JITs in practice while the EU 
continues to do little other than consider ways of forcing police forces to utilise its 
unattractive marquee initiatives. As already mentioned, practical steps that the EU 
could take to enhance the transparency and accountability of the national agencies 
include the possible introduction of a legally binding code of ethics, the development 
of a duty to publish reports and the establishment of external agencies of review in 
order to ensure that police officers are adhering to an appropriate standard of conduct 
while engaging in cross-border policing. Such steps would not need to encroach upon 
the tenets of national security or the pre-eminence of domestic law and order. As 
Patten outlines, the democratic ideal is that everything should ultimately be made 
available for public scrutiny unless it is specifically in the public’s best interest for the 




Collaborative Police Training 
 
One of the EU’s early objectives, outlined in the Paris Declaration 1989, the 
Maastricht Treaty 1992 and the Lisbon Treaty 2009, was the enhancement of 
collaborative police training. The thesis did not address the training dimension in the 
previous chapter on ‘codes’ for the simple fact that the EU’s training initiatives do not 
require the establishment of operational procedural codes. The training initiatives 
serve primarily to facilitate the sharing of knowledge about procedural best practices, 
processes, techniques, technologies and forensics across jurisdictions.
1312
 As Bayley 
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convincingly argues, training is not central to accountability or sufficient to bring 
about reform since knowledge or skills will be lost if not immediately applied and 
maintained through constant supervision and discipline.
1313
 The existence of a clear 
legal basis or code together with the existence of signalling mechanisms of complaint 
and inquiry are clearly the primary prerequisites for effective police accountability.
1314
 
However the EU’s training initiatives will be discussed briefly since they can 
potentially draw police officers’ attention to the need for greater procedural and 
disciplinary supervision and any emerging methods of best practice. More broadly, it 
has long been appreciated that collaborative training can breed familiarity and trust 





The EU’s earliest effort to promote joint training was the Oisin Programme 
established by Joint Action in 1996.
1316
 Programme Oisin consisted largely of an ad 
hoc funding body endowed with a budget of €8 million to be awarded on a 
competitive basis to joint police training and research projects across the EU.
1317 
Police forces were encouraged to apply to the Oisin Committee, which consisted of 
one representative from each member state and a chair from the EU Commission, for 
up to 70 percent of the costs of a collaborative project.
1318
 Although the programme 
was renewed up until 2002, participation in the programme was reportedly poor due 
in part to the onerous application process and the fact that 30 percent of project costs 
had to be sourced from existing police budgets.
1319
 Specialist versions of the Oisin 
programme were also introduced, most notably Project Falcone which provided 
training and research funding for projects that focused specifically on organised 
crime.
1320
 Collaborative training programmes were also established for prosecutors 
and border guards such as Project Stop (human trafficking), Odysseus (immigration 
and asylum), Hippocrates (prevention of crime), and Grotius (mutual legal assistance). 
 
The desire for a formal structured regime for joint training was outlined at the 
Tampere summit of the EU Heads of State and Government in 1999.
1321
 The JHA 
Council subsequently introduced a Council Decision in 2000 establishing a European 
Police College (Cepol). On foot of the Council Decision, the heads of all of the EU 
national police colleges were required to meet on an annual basis as the governing 
board of the new College.
1322
 They were obliged to discuss training priorities and 
strategies and adopt a coordinated annual training programme of courses which were 
open to foreign officers across the national police colleges.
1323
 In other words, the 
College originally functioned largely as a directory of courses in the Member States. 
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The Cepol Governing Board could also use its budget to award grants to applicant 
police forces to carry out courses in a similar fashion to the Oisin Programme.
1324
 The 
first Cepol Decision was replaced by another Council Decision in 2005 mainly to 
switch its funding structure from direct inter-governmental contributions to the EU 
budget.
1325
 The Governing Board originally met at the Danish national police college 
in Copenhagen before relocating permanently to the English national police training 
college at Bramshill, which had previously housed the Oisin Committee. 
 
Cepol continues to maintain a directory of national police courses which are open to 
foreign police forces and provides funding for courses on a competitive basis. Courses 
have included, amongst others, modules on new EU measures such as JITs or cutting 
edge investigative or forensic techniques developed by police forces and laboratories 
within the Member States. New modus operandi identified in the areas of terrorism, 
drug transportation and cybercrime often provide the subject matter for new Cepol 
courses. Lemieux notes that courses on intelligence analysis and intelligence-led 
policing, risk management and financial forensics have become increasingly popular 
in recent years.
1326
 An online electronic database known as the European Police 
Learning Network (EPLN) was also developed so that police forces can share 
technical information, lecture slides, research reports and other educational materials. 
Notices about new courses are typically disseminated by the national Cepol 
representatives who are normally stationed within the national police academies.  
 
The UK, Ireland and Denmark have all participated in and managed both Oisin and 
Cepol-funded courses. In recent years, the Police Training College at Bramshill has 
offered bespoke courses for detectives covering new modus operandi such as the use 
of the haulage industry by organised crime networks. The Danish Police College has 
run courses on child pornography and Europol amongst others. Although Ireland has 
never participated in a JIT, it ironically held a seminar on Joint Investigation Teams 
(JIT) at the Irish Police College as one of the flagship events of Ireland’s presidency 
of the EU in 2004.
1327
 It has also run courses on counter-terrorism, human trafficking, 
asset seizures, cybercrime, policing airports and controlled deliveries amongst 
others.
1328 
A two-year part-time Masters course in Forensic Computing and 
Cybercrime Investigation open to applicants from any EU police forces was 
introduced in the mid-2000s by University College Dublin (UCD) in collaboration 
with the Garda Bureau of Fraud Investigation (GBFI) and Cepol.
1329
 In its first year it 





However, much like the EU’s Europol and JIT constructs a wealth of bilateral training 
relationships co-exist alongside Cepol. Various police training colleges in Germany, 
Austria, Bramshill in England and the FBI/ DEA Academies in Quantico, Virginia 
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have long had an international profile.
1331 
Police chiefs and senior police officers were 
traditionally highly amenable to sending their specialist police officers abroad for a 
few weeks of specialist training, particularly to ‘centres of excellence’ for counter-
terrorism, surveillance, special weapons and forensic techniques and regularly invited 
foreign trainers from highly-regarded schools to their police academies to give 
seminars.
1332
 Travelling abroad for management and leadership courses was also 
popular amongst police officers aiming for promotion to higher positions. The 
training relationships were ultimately highly pragmatic, organic and practitioner-led.  
 
It is widely appreciated that the long-standing training practices originally contributed 
to the spread of the use of French-style undercover agent provocateurs; the American-
style development of car radio dispatchers and even the use of identifiable blue 
uniforms for police forces around the world.
1333
 More particularly, Interpol also 
provides a major training service for police forces throughout Africa, Asia and South 
America using both lecture-based and distance-learning online modules.
1334
 Much like 
Cepol, many of the training programmes promoted through Interpol are funded and 
provided by participant police forces, particularly the US DEA and FBI and the 




Irish police officers periodically attend training programmes and fellowships at the 
FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia and at John Jay College in New York.
1336
 
Moreover, MOUs signed between the Irish police and police forces in Hungary and 
Russia in the early 2000s provide for the temporary secondment of trainers and the 
exchange of training and technical manuals in areas of bomb disposal and the seizure 
of criminal assets amongst other areas.
1337 
Northern Irish police officers also received 
part of their pre-deployment training to a UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo at the 
Garda College in Templemore in 1999.
1338
 Garda and PSNI officers occasionally 
travel across the Irish land border to provide short seminars and attend conferences 
which do not attract Cepol funding.
1339
 Provisions in the Garda Siochana Act 2005 
enable the Garda Commissioner and PSNI Chief Constable to arrange for the long-
term training secondment of police officers between the two forces largely for the 
purposes of knowledge transfer and the development of working relationships.
1340 
Seconded officers who opt for a long-term secondment can use the legal framework to 
inherit all powers, duties and liabilities of the foreign rank in order to participate as a 
full member of the managerial department for a prolonged period of time. Seconded 
officers fall under the direction and control of the host police chief and lose their 
status as a police officer in their original jurisdiction. Although the framework 
provides that secondments can last for a period of up to three years, it was envisaged 
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that most secondments would typically last no more than 12 months in practice.
1341
 
The provisions originally stemmed from the repealed Garda Síochána (Police 
Cooperation) Act 2003 which was introduced following the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
2002 to enhance cooperation in light of the Northern Ireland peace process. 
 
Cepol is ultimately little more than one institution for funding and disseminating 
information about police training courses amongst many. Nevertheless, it is submitted 
that instead of encouraging police officers to participate in courses in a piecemeal, 
haphazard and independent manner, the EU could do more to enhance transparency 
and accountability in cross-border policing by requiring Cepol to prioritise training 
courses that focus on key issues of disciplinary accountability such as human rights 
protections and the roles and responsibilities of police supervisors.
1342
 As it stands, the 
procedures and networks of cross-border policing, whether operational or 
administrative, are generally only given superficial treatment in the basic entry-level 
police training curriculums within the Member States.  
 
In terms of basic academy instruction until 2013 each of the territorial police forces in 
England were responsible for the delivery of their own curriculums according to a set 
of national occupational standards set by the Home Office.
1343
 The police forces 
typically minimised classroom instruction in favour of on-the-job training and 
learning.
1344
 Mawby and Wright note that most of the Home Office training standards 
pertained to vague benchmarks such as problem solving and teamwork which required 
a simple mark out of ten on the basis of on-the-job performance.
1345
 Moreover, 
England’s new College of Police, which was established in 2013 as a non-
departmental government body responsible for introducing national police training 
programmes, does not appear to have taken any significant steps to address the stark 
absence of police training in cross-border matters. The police colleges in Ireland and 
Denmark both deliver courses on criminal law, evidence, court procedure, military 
drill, forensics, treatment of inmates and police organisational structures and 
procedures to new members but the courses are almost entirely confined to national 
policing structures, processes and issues. 
 
The EU should arguably be doing more to encourage the incorporation of cross-
border policing subjects into national police curriculums in order to improve 
understanding about cross-border policing and, most importantly, to ensure that the 
strengths and weaknesses of cross-border policing and the EU project are regularly 
debated and appreciated within classrooms and police academies. Although codes of 
procedure and signalling mechanisms of complaint and inquiry are the central 
ingredients of police accountability, police training should at least serve to bring 
standards of conduct and procedural best practice to the attention of police officers 
and their supervisors so that they may be able to form an authoritative ‘perception of 
reality’ or ‘sense of permission’ about what is appropriate, ethical and responsible 
conduct and what is not. 
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Although the mechanisms of ‘legal accountability’ are the most stable of the three 
dimensions of complaint and inquiry on the national level, the Member States 
remarkably avoided establishing any relatively comprehensive mechanisms of legal 
accountability on the EU level until the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty 2009. This 
chapter will show that although the mechanisms of legal accountability have only a 
limited capacity to hold officers to account in the context of cross-border policing, 
there are some crucial steps that the EU could take to enhance police accountability in 
the judicial sphere. 
 
Ironically, a fundamental element of the Member States’ approaches to the Europol, 
Schengen and Mutual Assistance instruments was the pragmatic decision to delegate 
the issue of legal accountability to the domestic structures and processes where 
possible. Each Europol participant was held to be legally responsible for the quality of 
information provided and the conduct of their liaison officers. Police officers engaged 
in hot pursuit under the Schengen Convention or on secondment on foot of the Mutual 
Assistance Convention were to simply enjoy the legal standing of a domestic officer 
of the host State. Critically, a fundamental and unique feature of the policing 
frameworks was that if a successful civil prosecution was brought for harm caused by 
a visiting police officer, the host State would not have to bear the cost of the financial 
remedy but it would be the responsibility of the police officer’s own police force to 
cover any expenses. The movement of police officers across borders was almost 
exclusively a matter for the domestic legal systems. The practical system left little 
room for the development of novel judicial mechanisms for police accountability.  
 
Similarly on the supranational level, instead of subjecting the Europol organisation 
and its staff to the legal differences of numerous legal systems and to protect the 
integrity of the Europol Information System, the Member States opted to exempt 
Europol and its staff from the legal nuances by affording them immunity. Europol 
officials can only be subject to the rule of law in a similar fashion to civilians if their 
immunity is waived by the Europol Director on a case by case basis.
1346
 Only the Data 
Protection Officer or the JSB can essentially adjudicate on malpractice and must 
subsequently bring its recommendations to the attention of the Europol Management 
Board.  
 
The Court of Justice (CJEU) for its part was initially afforded a marginal role in 
matters of EU cross-border policing. The Court’s jurisdiction will be greatly enhanced 
pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty once the various instruments are switched to regulations 
but its involvement was relatively limited under the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
Treaties. Pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty, the Member States could decide whether 
and to what extent the CJEU would be afforded a power of interpretation or 
adjudication under a policing Convention and, more unusually, whether such powers 
would apply to all participants or whether Member States would each have to 
individually opt-in to the CJEU’s jurisdiction.1347  
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With respect to Europol, the Member States ultimately decided to limit the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU to the extent that it could only interpret obligations arising 
under the Europol Convention in the area of data protection upon the application of an 
appropriate national court. The Member States were required to opt-in to the CJEU 
provisions which the UK chose not to do.
1348
 The government reportedly feared that 
the CJEU, if empowered to determine breaches of obligations and management 
disputes under the Europol Convention, would encroach upon the largely unfettered 
ability of its national counter-terrorism agencies to store and share personal data.
1349
 
Once the Amsterdam Treaty largely replaced the Convention instrument with 
Decisions and Framework Decisions, the CJEU was thereafter afforded the 





The residual effect was that the CJEU had some powers of interpretation and 
adjudication under some conventions and instruments but not others and over some 
Member States but not others. The contested nature of the CJEU’s role conveyed a 
significant degree of discord and distrust towards the European Court and contributed 
to a tense, complex and disjointed juridical landscape. Walker observes that the 
CJEU’s juridical framework had developed to meet the needs of market regulation, 
concerning public and private economic actors, not the complex problems of internal 
security so the concerns of the Member States were somewhat understandable.
1351
 
Nevertheless, he remarked that the uneven role of the CJEU clearly weakened the EU 
ideals of solidarity and equality under the rule of law causing a major imbalance 
between political supranationalism and juridical supranationalism in the area of cross-
border police cooperation in comparison to other policy areas, which generated a 




The CJEU now enjoys a similar power of interpretation across the Europol, JIT and 
mutual assistance instruments due largely to the introduction of new Decisions and 
Framework Decisions pursuant to the Amsterdam Treaty. The switch to regulations 
pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty should reaffirm its role. However, the transformation 
has had a negligible effect on the issue of police accountability since the Court is 
concerned primarily with the issue of whether the measures are given their proper 
effect in principle. In other words, the Court is concerned with evaluating whether the 
appropriate structures and processes have been established pursuant to the relevant 
instruments over and above the precise nature of a police officer’s engagement with a 
measure. Most importantly, the Court is not obliged to determine whether and to what 
extent a measure enhances transparency and police accountability since such 
attributes are not formal, identifiable treaty objectives. For instance, a not-for-profit 
interest group known as Advocaten vor de Wereld challenged the legality of the 
Amsterdam Treaty provision to introduce Framework Decisions and Decisions in 
place of Conventions partially on the basis that the initiative would side-line the role 
of national parliaments which they argued are crucial for democratic 
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 However, the Court ruled that even though national parliaments 
would no longer be involved in the adoption process, the new instruments had treaty-
status and were of comparable legal stature to Conventions thereby making the switch 
legal.
1354
 Similarly, although Framework Decisions were used aggressively to 
establish onerous obligations in the absence of substantive democratic oversight, the 
CJEU ruled in the landmark Pupino case in 2004 that implementing legislation was to 
be in close conformity with framework decisions in order to give them the closest 
useful effect possible and enable consistent interpretation, rather than affording 




It is submitted that in order for the CJEU to be able to adjudicate on the quality of an 
EU policing instrument in terms of transparency and accountability then such 
attributes must be given either treaty-status or routinely announced at the outset of 
each relevant statutory instrument. The thesis has conveyed that the precise nature of 
police accountability can be appreciated using the three limbs of codes, co-option and 
complaint. If the concept of police accountability is afforded treaty status, the Court 
could potentially determine whether the EU’s procedural statutes are legally precise, 
procedurally clear and human-rights compliant in line with the rule of law (codes), 
whether new provisions are necessary and proportionate to the needs of public 
policing (co-option), and whether the relevant structures and processes contain 






The thesis previously outlined that mechanisms of democratic accountability are 
crucial for facilitating the airing of complaints, concerns, questions and simple 
misunderstandings by members of the public about the propriety of police actions or 
omissions. It showed that mechanisms of local democratic accountability facilitate 
civilian guidance of local police policy whereas the national mechanisms of 
democratic accountability facilitate public input into and scrutiny of national laws, 
regulations, codes and policies governing the structures, powers and procedures of the 
police. The thesis demonstrated that the mechanisms that the national legislature have 
in place to ‘signal’ when and to what extent new or amended laws, structures and 
processes are required are particularly crucial. The chapter will proceed to examine 
whether and to what extent the EU institutions have incorporated and accommodated 
these tenets of police accountability in principle and in practice. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty appears at face value to reflect the key principles of democratic 
accountability. In particular, new measures can only be introduced across the five 
primary policy objectives through a process of ‘co-decision’ between the Council of 
Justice Ministers, known as the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA Council) and 
the directly elected European Parliament. The policy process requires the European 
Council of Heads of State and Government to define the general political directions 
and priorities by consensus and the Council of Justice Ministers together with the 
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To respect the tenet of national sovereignty in matters of domestic law and order, any 
new measures that concern the movement of police officers across borders, referred to 
as ‘operational cooperation’, requires unanimity within the JHA Council, a process 
officially known as the ‘special legislative procedure’.1358 Operational cooperation 
includes issues of hot pursuit, investigative secondments and joint investigation teams 
amongst others. On the other hand, matters of information exchange and minimum 
rules concerning substantive investigative techniques are subject to Qualified Majority 
Voting (QVM), known as the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, since they do not 
involve the entry of foreign police officers into foreign jurisdictions.
1359
 However the 
thesis has already outlined that the establishment of minimum rules pertaining to the 
EIO and the application of the principle of mutual recognition has the potential to 
erode basic judicial and constitutional standards, particularly in common law 
jurisdictions, so the application of QVM to such matters is considerably premature.
1360
 
The Treaty does however permit Member States to apply an ‘emergency brake’ to 
stop the adoption process if such measures threaten to affect fundamental aspects of 
their criminal justice systems.
1361
 The same ‘brake’ can be applied to measures which 
are designed to introduce new ‘euro-crime’ definitions and sanctions.1362 The Treaty 
holds that QVM should be used as the default legislative process unless the Treaty 
explicitly specifies otherwise, largely because the attainment of unanimity within a 
28-seat Council can be an onerous challenge. 
 
The co-decision role afforded to the European Parliament is a brand new feature of 
the legislative process introduced pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty. The JHA Council 
was previously only required to keep the EU Parliament regularly informed of the 
initiatives being pursued.
1363
 The process of ‘co-decision’ was a longstanding tradition 
of the EU’s primary policy area known as the ‘economic community’ but it was not 
extended to the new policy competency of cross-border policing in 1993 due to the 
prevailing political perception that policing matters should remain the preserve of the 
national parliaments and their representative Ministers of Justice.
1364
 As Anderson 
conveys, it was widely appreciated that the nature and form of the domestic criminal 
justice system was tied to the raison d’état of State and Government and that any 
ceding of power away from central government could serve to erode or undermine its 
legitimacy.
1365
 The founding Maastricht Treaty clearly outlined that the only 
institutions with the power to introduce new EU cross-border policing legislation were 
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the national parliaments themselves through the traditional process of ratifying 




The EU’s ‘three pillar’ structure was designed to reflect the fact that the EU 
institutions could supra-nationally introduce legislation with respect to economic 
matters but only the national parliaments could approve new legislative frameworks in 
the areas of cross-border policing and foreign policy.
1367
 The EU Parliament was 
however bestowed with some influential oversight roles through specific measures. 
The Europol Decision 2008, for instance, empowered various EU parliamentary 
committees such as the Committee for Civil Liberties (LIBE) to call upon the 
President of the JHA Council, the Chairperson of the Europol Management Board or 
even the Europol Director to appear before it to discuss matters relating to Europol, 
taking into account Europol’s obligations of confidentiality. Furthermore, the 
Decision transferred Europol’s budget, which had previously consisted of direct 
contributions from the Member States, to the EU institutions in order to bestow the 
EU Parliament with the power of co-decision strictly in respect of Europol’s budget.  
 
To facilitate ‘shared’ control over the EU’s ‘internal security’ agencies, such as 
Europol, Eurojust, Frontex and Sitcen, a new committee was established pursuant to 
the Lisbon Treaty which contains representatives from the JHA Council, the EU 
Parliament and the EU Commission. The Standing Committee on Internal Security 
(CoSI) is required to focus specifically on facilitating, promoting and coordinating 
cooperation between the relevant EU organisations and agencies.
1368
 CoSI is required 
to approve the annual plans of the respective organisations and to develop strategic 
action plans to identify ways in which cooperation across the EU agencies and 
Member States can be improved. All of the EU organisations and agencies in the 
fields of cross-border police and judicial cooperation, including Europol, are required 
to regularly report to the new oversight committee.
1369
 An annual meeting is held 
between CoSI and the heads of all of the major EU agencies so that opportunities and 
obstacles can be identified.
1370
 Most importantly, CoSI is required to keep the EU 
parliament and the national parliaments of the Member States informed of its 
proceedings and reports. It has published thematic reports on organised crime, 





The inclusion of representatives from the EU Commission on the Standing Committee 
is important for a number of reasons. The EU Commission was empowered to suggest 
new policy initiatives and proposals in the area of cross-border policing on its own 
initiative pursuant to the Amsterdam Treaty. It was afforded this role in part to bring 
greater structure and order to the JHA Council’s drafting processes as well as ensuring 
that the Member States were giving the EU measures their proper effect. It was widely 
acknowledged that the rotation of chairpersons within the JHA Council working 
groups every six months in line with the EU Presidency meant that a considerable 
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number of initiatives were only being partially dealt with before the policy agenda 
was changed to suit the new presiding Member State.
1372
 Since the late 1990s, the 
Commission has maintained a ‘scoreboard’ to keep track of the objectives, actions 
needed, timetables for adoption and the state of play of all initiatives agreed upon.
1373
 
The scoreboard is typically shaped into a programme of action published by the 
Council every five years. Most importantly, it is the EU Commission that generally 
encourages senior police practitioners and prosecutors from the Member States to 
attend expert working groups to consider new policy initiatives.
1374
 Working groups 
are typically established as policy issues arise and disbanded once they are addressed. 
More long-term working groups have included the Police Cooperation Working 
Group, the Counter Terrorism Working Party, the Multidisciplinary Group on 
Organised Crime and the Cross-Border Surveillance Working Group.
1375
 Officers who 
attend such working groups are typically coordinated, briefed and de-briefed by a 
policy unit attached to their respective liaison bureaus. 
 
Although the introduction of CoSI has undoubtedly enhanced the transparency and 
accountability of the EU’s agencies, the thesis has already outlined that a similar ethos 
should be applied to the broader forms of informal and bilateral police cooperation. 
CoSI has been designed to ask the pertinent questions, namely what is being done, by 
whom, how well and whether there is room for improvement, but it is unfortunate that 
its gaze is largely confined to the EU’s marquee structures and processes. A 
complementary or reformed oversight body is clearly needed if the EU is to attempt to 
hold the national criminal intelligence agencies, the counter-terrorism branches and 
the various regional liaison networks to some degree of accountability. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty also outlines a role for national parliaments although the degree of 
their participation is much reduced from the original ethos outlined in the Maastricht 
Treaty. National Parliaments must be kept directly informed about the content and 
status of draft legislative acts by the institutions of the Union.
1376
 National parliaments 
can submit reasoned opinions on EU policies to influence considerations and can even 
employ a card-based system to signal their concern over proposed initiatives. 
Moreover, national parliamentary committees are also entitled to participate in any 
evaluation mechanisms established to inquire into the implementation of the Union 
policies.
1377
 More specifically, they are to be involved in the political monitoring of 
Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities.1378 
 
The EU regime for democratic accountability appears to chime with the relevant 
structures within the Member States. The Council of Justice Ministers can only 
introduce measures in full cooperation with the European Parliament which enjoys the 
power of co-decision. Not only are the Justice Ministers obliged to appear before the 
European Parliament to convince it of the merits of proposed initiatives but the 
Parliament’s Committees can also call Ministers and the heads of Europol and 
Eurojust amongst other agencies to appear before them to outline the nature of their 
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activities and their budgetary needs. CoSI appears to serve as an inspectorate along 
the lines of the UK’s HMIC albeit focused predominantly on the extant EU agencies. 
The involvement of the national parliaments, together with their respective select 
committees, bring a more ‘local’ dimension since they should serve to ensure that 
measures meet the needs of the domestic police forces and, at the very least, ensure 
that the measures do not detract from the ability of the domestic police forces to 
deliver effective local policing functions.  
 
However, in the spirit of conventional approaches to transparency and accountability, 
the EU Parliament should ideally establish a bespoke select committee for matters of 
cross-border policing which allows public access to its meetings where possible.
1379
 
Neyroud and Vassilas convey that the establishment of a bespoke committee is 
considered crucial for the simple fact that, like their national counterparts, European 
parliamentarians are elected by and large on the basis of local issues so parliamentary 
debates rarely address peculiar and marginal issues such as cross-border policing.
1380
 
A dedicated parliamentary committee, much like the ones which can be found within 
the Member States, is clearly needed so that its members are compelled to routinely 
investigative and appraise the conduct of the JHA Council and its measures for cross-
border policing in the public interest. 
 
A tainted project 
 
Although the EU regime appears at face value to have enhanced its democratic 
qualities, it is submitted that the modern regime hides a deeply fractured relationship 
between the Member States and the EU institutions which continues to affect the 
form, nature and co-option of the EU measures. The problems revolve by and large 
around the Amsterdam Treaty 1997. The Amsterdam Treaty controversially provided 
that the JHA Council could begin to independently introduce new legally-binding 
procedural frameworks, to be known as Decisions and Framework Decisions, instead 
of having to formulate new frameworks using the traditional Convention instrument 
which required the approval of each national parliament.
1381
 The Council could use 
the ‘Decision’ instrument to introduce new legal obligations for the Member States as 
long as such obligations did not require the approximation of the laws and regulations 
within the Member States.
1382
 The new Framework Decision instrument, on the other 
hand, could be used by the Council to introduce legally binding minimum rules which 
required the approximation of laws and regulations within the Member States.
1383
  
Although the Treaty provided that Framework Decisions did not have ‘direct effect’, 
the CJEU subsequently found in the landmark case of Pupino that implementing 
legislation was to be in close conformity with framework decisions in order to give 
them the closest ‘useful effect’ possible to enable consistent interpretation.1384  
 
The Member States bestowed the Council with independent legislative responsibility 
in matters of cross-border policing primarily out of fear that the impending accession 
                                                 
1379
 See Peers (n1372) 118 - 120 
1380
 Neyroud and Vassilas (n822) 80 - 82  
1381
 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union [1997] art 34 & art 35 (ex art 






 ibid art 35 ex K.7; Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino (2005) Case C-105/03 ECR 
 191 
of ten new Member States to the European Union would render unworkable the 
traditional process of moving Conventions through each and every national 
parliament.
1385 
The previous cohort of Member State legislatures had taken more than 
three years to ratify the Europol Convention using the Maastricht-era provisions and a 
further two years on average to ratify each subsequent protocol to the Convention.
1386
 
It was expected that the expansion of the Union to 25 Member States would render the 
traditional legislative process even slower and more pedantic.
1387
 It was envisaged 
that the replacement of Conventions with Decisions and Framework Decisions would 
enable the JHA Council to enhance and amend the existing structures, processes and 
objectives of cross-border policing with significant flexibility and speed in response to 
changing circumstances and emerging political priorities. Den Boer indicates that the 
Member States considered the idea so appealing that the proposal to replace the 
Convention instrument with Decisions and Framework Decisions, thereby side-lining 
the traditional role of national parliaments, was ‘hardly discussed’.1388 
 
Framework Decisions and Decisions clearly prioritised political expediency over and 
above democratic and judicial controls.
1389
 Practitioners and legislators that were 
familiar with the processes of drafting and ratifying international conventions, 
whether within the CoE, the UN or the Schengen network, conveyed that a period of 
negotiation spanning multiple years was normal and, most importantly, necessary in 
order to substantively formulate a single instrument which could overcome significant 
political and legal differences between jurisdictions while still respecting key 
constitutional, legal and administrative values and practices.
1390
 Various academics 
suggested that a better way to reduce the negotiation period was to substitute civil 
servants with police practitioners and prosecutors within the legislative working 
groups so that political, procedural, legal and human-rights issues could be ironed out 
at the outset.
1391
 Peers suggests that the slow lethargic approaches of the national 
parliaments could have been remedied with a more straight-forward Treaty provision 





Not only were the Amsterdam measures contrary to constitutional tradition but the 
Member States clearly failed to foresee the remarkable unity and zeal with which the 
Justice Ministers would approach their new position. On foot of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the JHA Council rapidly introduced a haphazard collection of measures that 
were unprecedented in scope and effect.
1393
 Walker notes that the policy area of 
‘Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) became the busiest policy area of the EU 
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Most controversially, the JHA Council proceeded to use their new independent 
legislative powers to force through measures which national parliaments were 
previously reluctant to realise. For example, although the Council had previously used 
Joint Actions to encourage the harmonisation of a number of criminal laws but 
without convincing the national parliaments to do so en masse, the Council proceeded 
to introduce a raft of new Framework Decisions which required the Member States to 
enact common criminal offence definitions and sanctions in areas of terrorism, drug 
trafficking, participation in organised crime, human trafficking, illegal immigration, 
corruption in the private sector, euro counterfeiting, racism and child pornography 
amongst others.
1395
 Klip remarks that the forceful nature of the Framework Decisions 
finally gave formal credence to the idea of ‘euro-crimes’.1396 Peers stated that the new 
measures effectively established a body of ‘EU criminal law’, whereas he refers to 
constructs such as Europol and JITs as elements of ‘EU criminal procedure’.1397 
 
Furthermore, the Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams 2002 and the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) 2002, which were 
introduced in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States, 
were both introduced in spite of the fact that national parliaments were in the process 
of ongoing deliberations and had previously rejected proposed Conventions in the 
latter area.
1398
 Murphy points out that the most ironic feature was that the instruments 
were not introduced by the EU because of a high degree of trust between the Member 
State parliaments, police forces and judiciaries but more particularly because of a 
distinct lack of trust and agreement between them.
1399
 The common measures were 
introduced almost entirely in the interest of political expediency and the façade of 
unity and productivity but with a convenient lack of concern for the robustness and 
fairness of the constituent structures, processes and standards.
1400
  The application of 
mutual recognition in the context of an EAW or a JIT, for example, effectively meant 
that a court must accept the standards of a foreign criminal justice system as the 
equivalent of its own, thereby potentially reducing minimal standards to those of a 
weaker criminal justice system. In many respects, the JHA Council used the 
Amsterdam-era measures to force through measures which served to trample upon the 
very values and procedures which national parliaments would normally have served to 
safeguard.  
 
Van der Aa and Ouwerkerk’s research indicates that the Council’s policy technocrats 
not only introduced measures such as the EEW and the European Protection Order 
(EPO) which were far removed from practitioner needs but even the European 
                                                 
1395
 Framework Decision on combating  terrorism 2002/475/JHA; Framework Decision on Human 
Trafficking 2002/ 629/JHA; Framework Decision on corruption in the private sector 2003/568/JHA; 
Framework Decision on the counterfeiting of the Euro 2000/383/JHA; Framework Decision on child 
pornography 2004/68/JHA; Framework Decision on the penalties for unauthorised entry 
2002/946/JHA; Framework Decision on combatting racism and xenophobia 2002/629/JHA;  
Framework Decision on Drug Trafficking 2004/757/JHA; Framework Decision on fight against 
organised crime 2008/84l/JHA amongst others 
1396
 Andre Klip, European Criminal Law (2nd ed, Intersentia 2012) 212 - 220 
1397
 Peers (n1372) 1 - 5 
1398
 Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States 2002/584/JHA  (2002) OJ L 190; See EU Conventions on Extradition 1995 and 1996 
1399 Cian Murphy ‘The European Evidence Warrant: mutual recognition and mutual (dis)trust’ in 
Christina Eckes and Theodore Konstadinides (eds), Crime within the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (Cambridge University Press 2011) 247, 248 
1400
 Peers (n1372) 906 - 941 
 193 
Commission considered the measures to be redundant in practice.
1401
 Similarly, 
Stefanou and Xanthaki have since warned that the proposal to establish a European 
Criminal Records System (ECRIS) in the interest of rapid access might not be 
worthwhile in light of the fact that the system would require major transformations in 
the format, storage and translation of criminal records and raise key issues of data 
protection.
1402
 They suggest that the increasingly accessible letter of request procedure 
is a viable alternative and more attuned to the sensitive nature of criminal records.
1403
 
It is fundamentally clear that a number of the key measures introduced and proposals 
pursued by the JHA Council in the decade between the Amsterdam and Lisbon 
Treaties were poorly conceived and, most importantly, driven not by practitioner 
needs or the interests of accountability.
1404
 Den Boer indicates that the self-serving 
interests of the JHA Council, reflected in their ill-suited measures, appears to have 
rendered police forces and practitioners increasingly wary of the ability of the EU 




The fact that the national parliaments did not sense danger prior to approving the 
Amsterdam Treaty was presumably coloured by the fact that the Justice Ministers had 
previously proven themselves to be relatively unproductive during their experiment 
with the informal ‘Trevi’ network between 1977 and 1993.1406 The Trevi Group was 
established in 1977 as a forum for the EC Justice Ministers to discuss common 
legislative strategies following the refusal of Interpol in 1975 to open its channels to 
help combat the rise of Palestinian-based terrorism in the 1970s.
1407
 The name ‘Trevi’ 
was derived from the Trevi fountain in Rome close to where the EC ministers held 
their first meeting.
1408
 The forum subsequently met during each bi-annual EU summit 
of Heads of State and Government. Meetings were chaired by the Member State 
holding the EC presidency at the time. A steering committee known as the ‘Trevi 
troika’ acted as the forums secretariat and contained representatives drawn from the 
previous, sitting and future EC Presidencies.
1409
 Seven non-EC states including 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, the USA, Canada and Morocco were also 




The Trevi Group ultimately established four working groups to enhance various 
aspects of cross-border police cooperation, none of which were hugely successful.
1411
 
Trevi Working Group One, the raison d’etre of the Trevi project, was tasked to 
establish a robust communications system between the participant counter-terrorism 
branches and to collate and analyse intelligence on the prominent terrorist networks 
throughout Europe.
1412
 Each participant counter-terrorism bureau was expected to 
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designate a senior officer at the national level as an International Liaison Officers 
(ILO). The ILO was to serve as a point of contact and to establish a secure and rapid 
telecommunication system to enable the rapid exchange of sensitive information. 
However the working group was dominated by civil servants from the respective 
Ministries of Justice at the expense of police practitioners who reportedly rendered the 
network overly bureaucratic and disorganised.
1413
 It was reportedly because of 
widespread disaffection with the Trevi Working Group that the counter-terrorism 
bureaus of England, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany moved to 
establish the PWGOT following the assassination of the British Ambassador to The 
Hague in 1979. The entirely separate PWGOT had its own rapid communication 
system to rival that of Trevi’s but, most importantly, it was the PWGOT system that 




The Trevi ministers appeared to learn from the experience of Working Group One and 
began to focus their energies not on matters of operational cooperation but on research 
and technical enhancement.
1415
 Trevi Working Group Two was set up to develop 
policies on new police equipment, technologies, language training, forensic sciences, 
procedural training and other technical matters which could enhance police 
cooperation.
1416
 It reportedly participated in the establishment of contact points and 
temporary secondments between European police forces to assist with identifying 
football hooligans during major European tournaments.
1417
 Working Group Three was 
created in 1985 to develop policies that could help police forces to address the most 
serious drug-trafficking and organised crime networks in Europe. The group 
reportedly developed research notes on the harmonisation of criminal law and 
procedures, the development of new training programmes, the introduction of new 
techniques for confiscating criminal assets and the widespread exchange of police 
liaison officers with expertise in drug-trafficking. Trevi Working Group Four, 
established in 1985 and known as ‘Trevi 1992’, was tasked to conduct research into 
the possible policing measures needed to compensate for the possible removal of 
internal border controls throughout the EC area. It was within Trevi 1992 that the 
substance of the Paris Declaration 1989 and the Programme of Action 1990 were 
negotiated.
1418
 Other contemporaneous working groups established by the Trevi 
ministers included the Ad Hoc Working Group on International Organised Crime 
(AHWGIOC) which compiled reports on the structure, nature, threat and obstacles to 




The Trevi Group essentially worked better as a research forum than as a network for 
operational cooperation but, as Benyon et al remark, Trevi ultimately tried to do too 
much too quickly and failed to do anything well.
1420
 It was presumably in this light 
that the Maastricht Treaty designated the JHA Council as the primary research and 
policy drafting entity and the national legislatures as the primary adjudicators for any 
and all proposals, particularly those concerning operational matters. Loader and 
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Walker outline that the vague and lofty nature of the Maastricht Treaty was favoured 
by the national parliaments at the outset for the very reason that they had agreed to 
very little substantively and would not be forced to partake in any formal measures 




It is clear that the subsequent self-exclusion of the national and European parliaments 
from the legislative process pursuant to the Amsterdam Treaty was a breath-taking 
oversight. Walker points out that the move was contrary to national constitutional 
standards and represented a major democratic deficit which constitutional 
democracies would never have allowed within their own national systems.
1422
 
Essentially the idea of ‘government’ within the context of EU ‘inter-
governmentalism’ was drastically transformed from encompassing the participation of 
majority parliamentary assemblies to the simple agreement of self-interested and 
partisan government ministers and their technocratic representatives. It enabled 
policing measures to be introduced ‘above’ national parliaments, which drew the EU 
project much closer to the qualities of supranationalism than inter-governmentalism 
and thus further away from its original design.  
 
Moreover, the Member States appeared to fundamentally underappreciate the fact that 
the Justice Ministers had long exemplified a clear tendency to eschew parliamentary 
oversight and consultation in their previous guise as the Trevi Group.
1423
 Although the 
Trevi Group had the intentional appearance of being EC-compatible, the Group was 
not a formal EC institution and its members actively used this key feature to avoid 
reporting to the European Parliament.
1424
 Critically, the Ministers frequently used the 
rationale of national security to declare that they could not discuss any matters 
covered during the Trevi meetings either with the EU Parliament or with their own 
national parliaments as they pertained largely to ongoing counter-terrorism operations 
and investigations.
1425 
The avoidance of transparency and accountability meant that 
the Trevi Group was widely considered to be highly secretive and opaque by 
design.
1426
 Anderson et al observed in 1995 that the transfer of the Trevi Group into 
the fold of the EU project had the potential to make the deliberations of the Justice 
Ministers more transparent and render them more accountable for their actions but it 




Pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty, consultation between the JHA Council and the EU 
Parliament amounted to little more than the forwarding of action plans and a 6-month 
report with every rotation of the EU Council Presidency.
1428
 Peers remarks that the 
publication of documents by the JHA Council was ‘wholly inadequate’ since they 
tended to retain documents requested on the basis of ‘public security’.1429 He implies 
that, although the EU Commission helped to enhance the transparency of the policy 
process by establishing practitioner-dominated working groups and by publishing 
policy scoreboards and green papers for public consultation, the actual effect that the 
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Commission had on policy outcomes was minimal.
1430
 The reports and policy 
initiatives drawn up by the Commission’s working parties all have to be submitted to 
the Council’s Permanent Representative Committee (COREPER) of seconded 
ministerial officials who ultimately conduct the formal negotiations on behalf of their 
governments before any draft measures are finally submitted to the JHA Council for 
consideration and approval.
1431
 In the Amsterdam era, the absence of parliamentary 
co-decision at either the national or the EU level meant that there was almost nothing 
to stop the JHA Council and its ministerial representatives from side-lining the 
Commission’s recommendations and pursuing its own ends of crime control over and 
above citizens’ rights and freedoms.1432 Anderson et al suggest that the cavalier 
attitude of the JHA Council was coloured in part by the pressure incumbent upon the 
Council to produce definitive and authoritative solutions to address an open-ended 





Moreover, the JHA Council had displayed remarkable rashness in numerous ways 
between 1993 and 1997 which should have been identified and remedied prior to the 
Amsterdam Treaty instead of being exacerbated by it. The pilot European Drugs Unit 
(EDU) which was established by the JHA Council as a precursor to Europol clearly 
exemplifies the Ministers’ propensity for prioritising political appearance over and 
above practitioner needs. Firstly, the Ministers established the pilot project once the 
Maastricht Treaty had been adopted, instead of establishing it prior to the Treaty in 
order to identify statutory challenges in a similar fashion to Trevi Working Group 
One. Secondly, they did not fully appreciate the fundamental importance of data 




The Joint Action which established the EDU in 1995 required the participant police 
forces to designate a National Drugs Intelligence Unit (NDIU) within their 
organisational structures which was expected to send information to the EDU 
database and respond to requests from the EDU management team.
1435
 Several of the 
Member States did not have official national drug squads at the time so 
representatives were often sent from the police forces responsible for policing the 
respective capital cities.
1436
 Much like the subsequent Europol project, each NDIU 
was required to second a small number of high ranking policing and customs officials 
as liaison officers to the EDU headquarters. They were expected to share information 
and coordinate investigations under the oversight and management of the EDU 





However it became readily apparent that the participant police forces were not 
prepared to routinely send criminal intelligence to the EDU without robust data 
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safeguards to protect the secrecy and integrity of their files.
1438
 Due to the prevailing 
data protection and security concerns, the EDU was prohibited from storing any 
information sent to it until such concerns could be alleviated.
1439
 The Unit’s early 
efforts at coordinating national investigations and producing threat assessments were 
therefore based largely around the information exchanged bilaterally through the 
liaison officers, highlighting the potential effectiveness of transnational liaison but 
effectively undermining the raison d’etre of the Europol project, namely its common 
information system.
1440
 Moreover, the JHA Council also controversially introduced 
additional Joint Actions to increase the mandate of the EDU to include not only 
serious drug crime but offences of human trafficking, vehicle trafficking and the 
smuggling of nuclear materials even before an IT database could be established for 
drug crime alone.
1441
 The moves indicated that the JHA Council was determined to 
realise a particular illusory vision of the European project without fully appreciating 
the needs and capabilities of the practitioners involved.  
 
It is eminently obvious that the Justice Ministers and their representatives have a 
propensity for valuing the appearance of political productivity over and above 
substance, which is clearly not in line with the ethos of constitutional democracy. 
Zedner observes that such characteristics should not be considered unusual since it is 
the job of policy officials posted to the vague ‘security’ policy area to continuously 
and exponentially stimulate insecurities, amplify the nature and awareness of threats 
and continuously devise new security measures in order ensure continued demand for 
their services.
1442
 Arguing along similar lines, Walker observes that technocrats 
seconded to the EU policy forums have a vested interest in the maintenance and 
continuous expansion of European policy in the policing field whether or not it is 
necessary or even desirable for the simple reason that their job depends upon it.
1443
 
Similarly, Loader argues that without appropriate signalling or communicative 
mechanisms, government officials and technocrats will tend to resort to ‘instrumental 
reasoning’ which involves employing strategic persuasion and a rhetorical ‘security’ 
discourse to try to make policy subjects act in an artificially specific way in order to 
bring about the official’s desired end or state of affairs.1444  
 
It is submitted that the ministerial tendency to eschew democratic accountability in 
the interest of self-preservation is not too dissimilar to the belated realisation in the 
early 2000s that police managers are unlikely to deal effectively with civilian 
complaints about officer misconduct in the absence of hierarchical oversight or 
external review mechanisms. Like the national parliaments which are incrementally 
enhancing the capacity of their independent civilian complaints bodies, the national 
parliaments and the EU Parliament clearly need to develop similar mechanisms of 
oversight to hold policy officials to account on the EU level. In other words, 
mechanisms of complaint and inquiry are clearly needed to hold police officers and 
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policy makers to account for the quality of their conduct on both the domestic and 
transnational levels. 
 
The Member States have since recognised the remarkable absence of appropriate 
safeguards in the Amsterdam Treaty. Following the Laeken summit of heads of State 
and Government in 2001, the Member States decided to replace Framework Decision 
and Decision instruments with ones which facilitated systematic policy inputs from 
national parliaments and the co-decision of the EU Parliament.
1445
 The failed 
European Constitution in 2002 provided for the replacement of the measures with 
more democratic Directives and Regulations but it was never enacted following 
rejections by referendum in the Netherlands and France.
1446
 The provisions were 
subsequently incorporated almost verbatim into the extant Lisbon Treaty. Loader and 
Walker argue that the EU Parliament, because it is not state-centric, should ultimately 
help to generate common ‘cosmopolitan’ preferences across States particularly with 
regard to defending and promoting human rights and civil liberties and keep the 
tendency of executive government to introduce emotionally-charged partisan 
legislation and abusive practices in check.
1447
 Fletcher suggests that introduction of 
co-decision appears to have served its function as it has led to a far more considered, 






On the basis of national experience and the chequered history of the EU project, it is 
submitted that the EU must do much more than simply instituting a regime of ‘co-
decision’. It is widely appreciated that national and supranational parliaments are far 
from impartial decision makers. Reiner remarks that elected bodies are by their very 
nature highly political and partisan, often representing the interests of their political 
party or class over and above the interests of ‘foreigners’.1449 Similarly, Loader and 
Walker eloquently convey that fleeting political fears, particularly those concerning 
national security and terrorism, have a tendency to turn legislators into ‘poor 
democrats’, driving them to introduce radical and poorly considered legislative 
measures which temporarily address public outrage but undermine the very liberty 
and security that legislatures are constituted to protect.
1450
 The ‘crime anxiety’ around 
the impending accession of ten new members was clearly enough for the Member 
States to approve the radical transformation of the EU cross-border policing project 
pursuant to the Amsterdam Treaty.
1451
 Loader and Sparks suggest that the changing 
dynamics of post-modernity and the place of crime in popular culture and media will 





The EU Parliament cannot simply depend upon civilians and complainants to bring 
issues to the attention of individual members. Numerous academics have pointed out 
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that the development of a technocratic security agenda, removed from popular 
sentiment and insulated from democratic scrutiny, coupled with the development of 
weak national and supranational mechanisms of accountability was caused by a 
distinct lack of public interest in EU affairs in the first instance.
1453
 Anderson et al 
outline that because political interests are generally confined largely to local and 
national issues, civilians and local politicians are not overly concerned with the 
direction of the EU project and, by extension, its mechanisms for policy-making and 
accountability.
1454
 Loader observes that the general public is not overly concerned 
with matters of cross-border policing because much cross-border police cooperation 
concerns information and evidence that is exchanged in private areas of police 
stations and international organisations such as Europol which have almost no public 
visibility.
1455
 Loader and Walker surmise that there is no symbolic sense of common 
identity, community, solidarity, mutual trust and peoplehood at the EU level to inspire 




In line with the previous section on ‘legal accountability’ it is submitted that the idea 
of ‘police accountability’ should be given treaty-status so that cross-border policing 
measures are not negatively constructed around some abstract rhetorical threats to 
safety but, more particularly, around the need for transparency, accountability and 
human rights.
1457
 Mechanisms for complaint and inquiry need to be established within 
and between the EU Parliament and national parliaments to ensure that the EU 
legislators are not promoting impractical measures for political benefit or leaving vast 
areas of cross-border policing untended out of simple inertia. As Beetham and Lord 
observe, police professionals and political technocrats cannot claim a privileged 
knowledge of what is good for society, only parliaments with appropriate 
communicative mechanisms and democratic inputs can make such a claim.
1458
 Loader 
conveys that policing measures, whether local or transnational, must ultimately be 
based on ‘communicative action’ which uses public discourse and concerns as the 




Effective national and supranational parliamentary committees and inspectorates must 
be realised. They must be tasked with focusing on whether and to what extent EU 
measures are providing appropriate added value. Like the select committees on the 
ground in the Member States, such constructs must be equipped with sufficient 
resources and powers of inquiry to conduct such analyses. National parliaments, in 
particular, have the primary capacity and responsibility to establish signalling and 
communicative mechanisms of complaint and inquiry, particularly with respect to the 
Minister for Justice. To the same extent that a police sergeant creates a ‘sense of 
permission’ for his subordinates, it is the national parliament and executive 
government that guide the activities of their representative Minister for Justice by 
instituting or failing to institute mechanisms of oversight and procedural guidance. 
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Although the Lisbon Treaty has re-instituted some democratic policy processes and 
effectively enhanced the EU’s cross-border policing competency and capacity, it is 
submitted that the JHA Council’s radical affront to democratic governance between 
the Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties raises numerous issues which have not yet been 
comprehensively addressed. Despite the Member States’ relatively cautious approach 
to the Maastricht Treaty, the Amsterdam Treaty effectively established a radical 
‘supranational’ regime overnight which was without precedent and, most importantly, 
produced an ever increasing number of measures that were largely undemocratic, 
unworkable and unattractive to police officers on the ground. Beetham and Lord 
suggest that the enactment of the Amsterdam Treaty ultimately undermined the EU’s 
claims to ‘legitimacy’.1460 They argue that legitimacy is based upon three vital 
components. Firstly, political authority must be acquired and established according to 
legal rules. Secondly, those rules must be justifiable according to socially accepted 
beliefs about the rightful constitutional source of authority and the proper ends of 
government. Thirdly, the position of authority must be confirmed through affirmation 
or recognition by other legitimate authorities, not least the judiciary and possibly other 
nation-states.
1461
 The EU project appeared to have fallen foul of the second limb of 
legitimacy in particular by allowing the JHA Council to eschew basic constitutional 




In terms of engendering a spirit of trust and cooperation between the Member States’ 
police forces and the EU policy makers, although the Amsterdam Treaty professed to 
respect the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States and to ensure 
that decisions were taken ‘as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the 
citizen’, the JHA Council proceeded to do precisely the opposite.1463 As a result, the 
policy intentions of the EU policy-makers continue to be viewed with suspicion and a 
significant degree of Euro-scepticism even in the post-Lisbon era.
1464
 More 
particularly, the extant suite of EU cross-border policing measures, which were not 
created under the modern Lisbon architecture but largely under the undemocratic 
Amsterdam policy framework, are characterised by a distinct lack of ‘added value’ 
over and above alternative informal measures. In this light, the degree of ‘real 
achievement’ on the EU level remains in serious doubt.1465 The national and 
supranational parliaments need to establish and maintain robust mechanisms for 
complaint and inquiry as a matter of urgency in order to engender transparency and 
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The thesis initially set out to critically analyse how and to what extent national legal 
and administrative norms on police accountability and transparency are informing the 
concept, design and operation of EU cross-border policing instruments. It was readily 
apparent that the new terrain of increasing interaction between national and 
supranational legal systems within the European Union presented new challenges for 
conventional approaches to police accountability and transparency. The EU Member 
States are responsible for policing within their respective jurisdictions and the EU 
institutions are increasingly responsible for enhancing the conduct of police 
cooperation between the Member States. Within the transnational realm of cross-
border policing, the EU had the potential and capacity to instigate a novel brand of 
police accountability from the top-down from the outset. Alternatively the EU 
institutions might have chosen to extend the conventional approaches to police 
accountability to the realm of cross-border policing. Either way, it was assumed that 
the emergence of an EU competency in matters of cross-border police cooperation 
implied that the EU Member States had reached a common understanding about the 
nature and form of cross-border policing and police accountability more generally. 
The relentless development of Union-wide procedural instruments and frameworks 
for police cooperation suggested that a paradigm shift had occurred towards more 
enlightened, cosmopolitan thinking about issues of sovereignty, police authority and 
police accountability. 
 
However no major academic studies had previously been carried out to determine the 
precise effect of the emerging EU regime, partly because the EU competency is 
relatively new, complex and continuously evolving. More particularly, the concept of 
police accountability appeared to be poorly conceived since there were no readily 
identifiable or widely embraced typologies of police accountability. As a result, the 
development of an effective framework through which the national and supranational 
policing systems could be analysed and evaluated from a transparency and 
accountability perspective was required. The theoretical typology, which draws from 
a range of academic and technocratic observations, contains three key dimensions, 
namely codes, co-option and complaint. The thesis argued first and foremost that the 
importance of procedural ‘codes’ was not adequately reflected in traditional 
conceptualisations of police accountability. The relatively recent development of 
highly programmatic and formulaic statutory codes of procedure between the 1980s 
and 2000s has become so central to the ‘rule of law’ that it is not only discernible 
across jurisdictions but now forms an integral part of modern ECtHR jurisprudence. 
Most importantly, the thesis conveys that it is largely within this area that the EU 
regime can be considered to be marginally pro-active. The EU has developed a 
number of initiatives that are formulaic and programmatic, particularly the Europol, 
Schengen and JIT initiatives. Like the national codes of procedure, the EU measures 
are highly detailed and formulaic in order to engender greater procedural clarity and 
legal precision. 
 
However the most important aspect of the three-pronged typology of police 
accountability is that policy makers and academics should not focus their interest on 
one dimension of police accountability without concern for the other two. Although 
the EU has introduced measures across almost all of the normative types of police 
cooperation, the chapter on ‘co-option of EU law and policy’ shows that the marquee 
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EU measures only capture a small volume of cross-border police cooperation. The EU 
‘codes’ have actually left a vast expanse of cross-border policing untended. Moreover, 
the EU’s marquee measures are largely being eschewed in practice because of a 
trenchant lack of communicative action and practitioner consultation.  
 
Most importantly, the chapter on ‘complaint and inquiry as EU law and policy’ 
outlines that the EU did not introduce its procedural codes out of some enlightened 
desire for greater transparency and accountability. The measures were largely the 
product of national parliamentary involvement in the negotiation and ratification of 
rudimentary EU measures which were designed to address the political imperative of 
the illusory ‘security deficit’. National parliaments that had become accustomed to 
developing legally precise and procedurally clear policing statutes on the domestic 
level were naturally going to act consistently when considering policing statutes in the 
more obscure realm of cross-border policing. However, the EU measures 
subsequently became less attuned to national values and approaches to police 
accountability once national parliaments were side-lined from the policy process on 
foot of the Amsterdam Treaty 1997. In various cases, the measures introduced post-
Amsterdam have served to erode the democratic quality of police accountability on 
the EU level as well as lowering judicial standards and practitioner trust on the 
national level. More particularly, the EU measures have not afforded significant 
treatment to the issues of disciplinary accountability and managerial oversight which 
shape the conduct of formal and informal cross-border policing in Europe.  
 
Using the typology to both elucidate problems and suggest methods of internalisation, 
the thesis argued that the EU should follow the lead of the Member States by seeking 
to regulate all possible forms of cross-border police cooperation through more 
expansive procedural ‘codes’ while still facilitating police discretion and ‘co-option’ 
in a similar fashion to the national codes of procedure. Furthermore, it argued that it is 
not sufficient for the EU to simply introduce a policy of ‘co-decision’ to remedy its 
democratic deficits but that it must oversee the establishment and enhancement of 
parliamentary committees, inspectorates and other oversight bodies in line with 
modern approaches within the Member States. Public pressure and a litany of police 
scandals led to the development of independent investigative police complaints 
agencies and inspectorates within the Member States in order to address systematic 
managerial deficiencies within police forces only as recently as the 2000s. The EU 
has made no clear attempt to rectify similar deficiencies which evidently pervade the 
realm of cross-border policing. 
 
The conduct of informal cross-border police cooperation and the operation of the 
EU’s policing working groups are clearly replete with managerial deficiencies that 
need to be routinely addressed in line with conventional constitutional, legal and 
administrative values. Moreover, robust oversight bodies are particularly important 
due to a palpable absence of public interest in the EU cross-border policing project 
coupled with the propensity of ministerial officials to prioritise their public image and 
job security over and above the needs of practitioners on the ground in the Member 
States. The concept of ‘police accountability’ should arguably be incorporated as an 
EU policy objective so that the EU institutions are routinely obliged to consider the 
adequacy of the EU’s procedural codes and the relevant signalling mechanisms of 
complaint and inquiry. The thesis shows that such an endeavour is more than possible 
through the application of a relatively straightforward heuristic typology. 
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The typology of codes, co-option and complaint appears to dispel ambiguity or a lack 
of understanding around police accountability which might afflict legislators, policy 
makers, practitioners and academics. By considering the elements of codes and co-
option as discernible issues, the thesis clearly separated out two major sources of the 
trenchant ambiguity around the traditional dimensions of disciplinary, legal and 
democratic accountability. Instead of considering the constituent issues across the 
three dimensions, the thesis positioned the mechanisms of complaint and inquiry as 
specific forums through which the quality of the codes and the extent of co-option 
could be evaluated for specific purposes. 
 
The comparative approach enabled the study to identify legal and procedural 
anomalies and challenges at both the national and supranational level since the 
traditional elements of police accountability were originally formulated within the 
confines of national legal, political, historical and cultural constraints, reflecting the 
national orientation of policing. The use of a consistent typology to conduct the 
comparative and critical analyses served to elucidate international best practices that 
could and should be adopted by both national and supranational legislators. The 
development and application of the typology indicates that the Member States are 
pursuing a broadly uniform approach to police accountability at the national level but 
that the national governments are slow to acknowledge and rectify sub-standard 
mechanisms. Most importantly, the traditional conceptualisations of police 
accountability were clearly far too narrow, focusing predominantly on mechanisms of 
complaint and inquiry instead of considering the nature of procedural standards and 
processes that shape the delivery of police accountability in practice. National 
legislators could clearly benefit from proactively employing the heuristic typology of 
codes, co-option and complaint to identify weaknesses in the architecture of police 
accountability both within and between States. 
 
In the interest of developing an unabridged theory of police accountability the thesis 
implicitly adopted Foucault’s position that it should not matter greatly which level of 
government drafts and introduces policies, laws and common principles as long as 
they contribute to the constituent populations’ pursuit of peace, safety, wealth and 
fulfilment.
1466 
The attachment of human communities to prevailing ideas of 
‘sovereignty’ have routinely been dispelled as populations shifted their attachment 
from religious pastoral care in the time of classical antiquity to the sovereignty of 
walled city-states, to nation-states and increasingly towards the transnational system 
of States.
1467 
The EU project shows that States are attempting to co-exist with each 
other according to a balanced plurality and common principles without one State 
dominating another, which clearly requires a more dynamic understanding of 
sovereignty.  
 
States remain responsible for domestic law and order and the transnational EU system 
of States has become increasingly responsible for the distinct realm of cross-border 
policing. However the EU institutions have become considerably remote and clearly 
need to foster better communicative linkages with national parliaments and 
practitioners to ensure that EU measures are co-opted in practice. It is submitted that 
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the EU effectively needs to internalise the constitutional, legal and administrative 
values of the Member States so that its measures are in turn internalised by the 
Member States’ police forces. It is submitted that legislators should not be overly 
concerned about ‘sovereignty’ but on reconciling approaches to police accountability 
so that policing both within and between States is transparent and accountable. The 
focus should be on the quality of the police codes, the nature of co-option and the 
mechanisms for complaint and inquiry on the ground rather than the specific site or 
sites of the relevant legislature. Police accountability, because it demands disciplinary 
accountability, legal accountability and democratic accountability, should serve to 
ensure that the conduct of policing does not become authoritarian or oppressive within 
States at the behest of either national or international interests. Adherence to a 
comprehensive framework of police accountability can effectively guarantee that 
policing remains disciplined, community-orientated and, by extension, democratic and 
legitimate, whether such policing activities are conducted at the behest of local 
civilians or foreign police forces.  
 
The thesis represents a valuable addition to modern epistemology because it seeks to 
capture the range of factors, phenomena and distinctive characteristics of the scientific 
object of police accountability. It not only identifies a common ethos of police 
accountability through a comparative analysis of various jurisdictions but considers 
the role of the emerging EU project in the design and delivery of police 
accountability. The thesis showed that the EU ultimately needs to conduct a major 
rethink of its approach to cross-border police cooperation in order to bring it into line 
with conventional legal and administrative approaches to police accountability.  
 
As part of the reconciliation, the Member States and the broader EU institutions 
should devise new processes which identify best practice across the Member States, 
develop mechanisms to hold the national criminal intelligence agencies to account for 
their conduct both nationally and across borders, engender more ethical management 
styles and establish robust signalling mechanisms for complaint and inquiry which 
signal problems as they arise, whether they concern local, national or cross-border 
police practice. It is submitted that legislators must consider the issue of police 
accountability in a transnational light since the carrying out of comparative analyses 
can identify crucial weaknesses and indicate effective remedies. 
 
The thesis represents the first major attempt to conceptualise the modern condition of 
police accountability within Europe. It develops a typology through which to view the 
quality of police accountability within, between and above the Member States. More 
particularly, it outlines in relatively precise terms the nature of the reforms that should 
be undertaken within England, Ireland and Denmark and within the supranational EU 
project to enhance the relevant structures and processes for police accountability. 
Bayley remarked in 1996 that there continues to be a longstanding search for a 
comprehensive theory of the institutional development of policing so that the quality 
of the public policing system can be evaluated, reforms implemented and, most 
importantly, that a more knowledgeable and critical audience is not continually asking 
the police to change in impractical ways.
1468
 Manning pointed out in 2010 that the 
absence of a theory of policing means that efforts of reform will continually be 
contorted and distorted by self-serving governments, politicians and influential 
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 This thesis marks a significant step towards the development of such a 
theory by reconciling the full range of factors that make up the subject of police 
accountability as a national and supranational construct. 
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